Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for freee API integration
Nothing to run from here
Iris is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
96/100
tool-list score
6
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
On-chain investigations: wallet analysis and fund tracing on Solana, EVM chains, Bitcoin and Tron.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http 0xvector0-iris-mcp https://iriscan.app/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# analyze_address, trace_transfer, find_token_insiders and 3 more
Iris costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
0XAll 1 server
0xVector01 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http 0xvector0-iris-mcp https://iriscan.app/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take Authorization header (Optional. 'Bearer iris_live_...', an Iris API key from Account > API on iriscan.app (10 free calls a day, paid plans above that). Without it, paid tools are paid per call in USDC with x402.) if you want to set it.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
6 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Analyze a wallet with Iris: on Solana (also a token mint or a program), Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Robinhood Chain, BNB Chain, Bitcoin, Tron, dYdX or Noble. The chain is read from the address (0x is Ethereum unless chain says another EVM chain). Costs 1 credit (2 when depth is over 1000), or without an API key $0.05 ($0.10 deep) paid per call with x402; refunded (never settled) if it fails. A token
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | The address: Solana or Tron base58, 0x (EVM), Bitcoin (bc1, 1 or 3), dydx1 or noble1. On Solana also a token mint or a program. |
| chain | string | no | The chain, when the address's form doesn't say it: an EVM chain for a 0x address (ethereum by default). Read from the address otherwise. |
| depth | integer | no | How many of the most recent transactions to read. Over 1000 is a deep analysis (2 credits, or $0.10 with x402). Smaller is faster: 200 is often enough for a first look. |
Follow one transfer through the mixer (Privacy Cash, Cloak, Umbra, encrypt.trade, MagicBlock Private Payments, ShadowWire...), exchange, or instant-swap service (SideShift, ChangeNOW, FixedFloat, SimpleSwap, StealthEX, Changelly...) on its other side, by timing and amount: for a deposit, the withdrawals that match it after; for a withdrawal, the deposits that match it before. Gives the likely wall
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | string | no | The transfer's chain, when the wallet's address doesn't say it: an EVM chain for a 0x wallet (ethereum by default). |
| counterparty | string | no | Optional: the exchange, swap service or mixer wallet (or pool contract) on the other side, when the transaction moved money with several. Iris picks the one it knows otherwise. |
| direction | string | no | Optional, with counterparty: out when the wallet paid it (a deposit), in when it paid the wallet (a withdrawal). |
| signature | string | yes | The transaction: a Solana signature (base58), an EVM or Tron transaction hash, or a Bitcoin txid. |
| wallet | string | yes | The wallet whose deposit or withdrawal is traced (not the exchange or the mixer). |
Find the wallets a token's creator is linked to by money (a Solana token, or a Robinhood Chain or BNB Chain one with chain): wallets it funded, wallets that paid it, wallets with the same funder, among the token's earliest buyers, the wallets handed tokens at launch and its largest holders. Says how much of the supply they bought and hold, with the transactions that link them, and why none were fo
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | string | no | robinhood for a Robinhood Chain token (Pons launches), bsc for a BNB Chain one (Flap and four.meme launches). |
| limit | integer | no | How many candidate wallets to check (early buyers and top holders). Fewer is faster. |
| mint | string | yes | The token's address: a Solana mint (base58), or a 0x token with chain. |
Whether a Solana wallet launched or traded memecoins with a launch kit, Proxima (proxima.tools) or BlockX, with the evidence. Proxima: its 5% sell fees (a separate bare transfer after each sell, built with it), its 5% cut of pump.fun creator-fee claims, its receipt round trips (895,880 lamports out, 890,880 back). BlockX: its fee inside each trade (0.4% to 0.8%), its nonce relay funding, cash-outs
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| mint | string | no | Optional: narrow the report to this token (base58 mint). |
| wallet | string | yes | The Solana wallet (a dev or trader), or a token's mint to scan its creator (base58). |
Every counterparty of an address that analyze_address analyzed in the last hour on this account (without an API key: for the x402 payer whose receipt is given): wallets it sent to or received from and the venues it swapped on, with labels, the native coin (SOL, ETH, BTC, TRX...) and stablecoins moved each way, the number of transactions, and the date and signature of its first and last transfer (f
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | The address analyze_address analyzed. |
| chain | string | no | Optional: the chain it was analyzed on, for a 0x address analyzed on several EVM chains. The latest analysis otherwise. |
| filter | string | no | flagged: threats, sanctioned and mixer counterparties, and look-alike (address poisoning) ones; for a token, its creator, bundlers and insiders. exchange or mixer: only those. |
| limit | integer | no | How many to list, largest by value first. |
| receipt | string | no | Only without an API key: the receipt analyze_address gave when it was paid with x402. |
The account's plan and what is left: analyses, traces and pack credits, when the allowance renews, and what each tool costs. Without an API key: what each tool costs per call with x402. Free.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Iris or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 96 / 100
Release 0.2.0 · scanned 30 Oct 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score96
Findings0 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digestb7c8debf2d30c11728abe7feea36ce14d423a23ea1084d1ea7adab86a908753f
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| analyze_address | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| trace_transfer | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| find_token_insiders | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| scan_launch_tool | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_connections | no tags | |
| get_credits | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestb7c8debf2d30c117
Scanned2026-10-30
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.2.0.
0.2.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Iris can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.