Validate Formhaus form definitions and simulate multi-step paths against the real engine.
Nothing to run from here
1ly is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
99/100
trust score
12
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
445
downloads in 30d
What it does
MCP server for 1ly.store - Discover and pay for APIs with AI agents
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user 1ly-mcp '--' npx -y @1ly/mcp-server
1ly costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
1LAll 1 server
@1ly1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts 1ly as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user 1ly-mcp '--' npx -y @1ly/mcp-serverReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take ONELY_WALLET_SOLANA_KEY (Path to Solana keypair JSON file (e.g. /home/user/.1ly/wallets/solana.json) or inline JSON byte array. Required for paid API calls and token tools (launch, trad), ONELY_WALLET_EVM_KEY (Path to EVM private key file or 0x-prefixed hex string. Required for payments on Base network.), ONELY_API_KEY (1ly.store seller API key. Auto-saved locally after running the 1ly_create_store tool — you do not need to set this manually. Required for seller tools: manage l), ONELY_WALLET_PROVIDER (Wallet provider to use. 'raw' (default) uses local key files via ONELY_WALLET_SOLANA_KEY or ONELY_WALLET_EVM_KEY. 'coinbase' uses Coinbase Agentic Wallet (Base), ONELY_NETWORK (Preferred blockchain network for payments. 'solana' (default) or 'base'. Determines which wallet is used when an API supports both networks.), ONELY_SOLANA_RPC_URL (Solana RPC endpoint URL. Defaults to https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com. Use a private RPC (e.g. Helius, Quicknode) for better reliability and rate limits.), ONELY_BUDGET_PER_CALL (Maximum USD amount allowed per single paid API call. Defaults to 1.00. The server will refuse any call priced above this limit.), ONELY_BUDGET_DAILY (Maximum total USD spending per calendar day (UTC). Defaults to 50.00. Resets at UTC midnight. The server will refuse calls that would exceed this limit.), ONELY_BUDGET_STATE_FILE (Path to the local JSON file used to track daily spending. Defaults to ~/.1ly-mcp-budget.json. Created automatically with owner-only permissions (0600).), ONELY_SOLANA_DRY_RUN (Set to '1' to simulate Solana transactions without broadcasting to the blockchain. Returns a fake signature. Use for testing only — no real payments will be mad), ONELY_API_BASE (Override the 1ly.store API base URL. Defaults to https://1ly.store. Only http://localhost:PORT is accepted as an alternative (for local development). Do not cha) if you want to set them.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
This listing has not published its tool surface here yet, so what a client will ask you to approve is whatever the manifest declares at install time.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
No tool surface on file
This listing has not published its tool list here yet. Nothing is shown here rather than another listing’s tools, which is what this page used to do.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install 1ly or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 99 / 100
Release 0.1.7 · scanned 14 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score99
Findings0 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest74939078c6941f42ae650fe24e6b049dc2fd1d1c2ac318556b7df9c94852cc74
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 99
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfacenot available
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| No per-tool rows for this release — see the note below. | ||
No tool surface was enumerated, so there is nothing to attribute a capability to.
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest74939078c6941f42
Scanned2026-10-14
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.1.7. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.1.7
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish 1ly can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.