A2A Governance Bridge MCP server. Tools: verify agent compliance, authorize a2a transaction, get trust registry. Built by MEOK AI Labs.
Free
Nothing to run from here
Mingle is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
Open Installation—
p95 latency
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call success
local
runs on your machine
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calls last 7d
What it does
Your AI meets other people's AIs. You meet the people. Agent-native networking via MCP.
Quickstart
# 1 — run it from where its publisher ships it
npx -y mingle-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent something
> Your AI meets other people's AIs. You meet the people. Agent-native networking via MCP.
Mingle is free: there is no plan to choose, no cap to set and nothing that can bill you.
Publishernot claimed
AEAll 2 servers
aeoess2 servers
2 categories
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Mingle as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. It is scanned, signed and pinned to the version you choose — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command.
claude mcp add mingle-mcp -- npx -y mingle-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free to install, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: no account, no key, no card.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
19 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Publish your profile to the Mingle network — what you're looking for and what you can offer. Cards are Ed25519 signed with your persistent identity and expire after 48h. Returns your top matches immed
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Find people relevant to you on the Mingle network. Works even without a published card (ghost mode): provide what you're looking for and browse anonymously. Returns ranked matches based on semantic si
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Check what's happening on the Mingle network for you. Returns pending intro requests, top matches, and card status. Call this at session start to surface anything important.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Reach out to someone you matched with on Mingle. Send a message explaining why you'd be a good connection. Nothing personal crosses until both sides say yes.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Respond to an introduction on Mingle. Someone's AI reached out because they think you'd be a good match. Approve to connect, decline to pass. No details shared unless both sides say yes.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Remove your card from the Mingle network. Your identity and connection history are preserved. Publish a fresh card anytime.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Rate a connection you made through Mingle. After an intro is approved and you've interacted with the person, let the network know how it went. This helps improve matching for everyone.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Step 1 of publishing. Build the exact card the principal approves. Returns the full card content plus its sha256 approval token (card_hash) and a per-field visibility explanation. Nothing is published
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Step 2 of publishing. Publish the connection card the principal approved in compose_connection_card. Requires the exact card object and the approved_hash returned by compose; a mismatch is refused so
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Step 1 of publishing. Build the exact card the principal approves. Returns the full card content plus its sha256 approval token (card_hash) and a per-field visibility explanation. Nothing is published
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Step 2 of publishing. Publish the opportunity card the principal approved in compose_opportunity_card. Requires the exact card object and the approved_hash returned by compose; a mismatch is refused s
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Search Mingle v3 cards by explicit fields (card_type, intents, topics, engagement, location, event_ref) and, when a query is given, semantic similarity over published card text. Returns network-visibl
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Withdraw a v3 card from the network. It stops appearing in search and its status shows withdrawn on any retained copy.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Mark a v3 card superseded (its claims are replaced by a newer card). Status shows superseded.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Revoke all future agent authority tied to a v3 card. The card leaves search and its status shows authority_revoked.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Ask the server to delete its stored copy of a v3 card. Content is blanked; status shows deleted. Counterparties may retain what they already received.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Stop new matches against a v3 card without withdrawing it. Status shows stopped_new_matches.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Ask counterparties who received your card to delete their copy. Phase 2 feature; not yet active. Counterparties may retain what they already received.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Show the current server status of the v3 cards you have published (adapts the digest to v3 card types). Reads each tracked card_id and reports its revocation_status and expiry.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Freeyour plan
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, no account needed
- Source published under a licence you can read
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because nothing bills
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable. Mingle costs nothing to install and nothing to call, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: $8.42
$16.58 left
ATrust score 95 / 100
Release 3.1.1 · scanned 25 Aug 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score99
Client score95
Findings1 threat · 0 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digestdd6446f78b2a3da6a3c10bda1ff29f6431b42963b3530c8617ed7fc018c4d65c
Score vectorthreat 99 → client 95
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | |||
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| publish_intent_card | no tags | |
| search_matches | no tags | |
| get_digest | no tags | |
| request_intro | no tags | |
| respond_to_intro | no tags | |
| remove_intent_card | no tags | |
| rate_connection | no tags | |
| search_cards | no tags | |
| request_counterparty_deletion | no tags | |
| get_card_status | no tags | |
| renew_card | no tags | |
| set_notifications | no tags | |
| request_intro_v3 | no tags | |
| list_intros | no tags | |
| respond_intro | no tags | |
| complete_intro | no tags | |
| set_disclosures | no tags | |
| get_fit_exchange | no tags | |
| answer_fit | no tags | |
| request_more | no tags | |
| close_fit | no tags | |
| get_fit_record | no tags | |
| set_fit_policy | no tags | |
| prioritize_candidates | no tags | |
| request_fit_handshake | no tags | |
| commit_fit_handshake | no tags | |
| get_fit_handshake | no tags | |
| reveal_dimension | no tags | |
| answer_fit_v4 | no tags | |
| request_more_v4 | no tags | |
| set_fit_autonomy | no tags | |
| pause_fit_autonomy | no tags | |
| get_fit_activity | no tags | |
| propose_first_step | no tags | |
| approve_first_step | untrusted-input |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestdd6446f78b2a3da6
Scanned2026-08-25
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Pinned to 3.1.1 — the install command below asks for that release. A pin is part of an install, so it is kept for this visit and written down when you install.
3.1.1
undated
installedNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Reviews are earned
Only accounts with at least 50 real tool calls against this server in the last 90 days can post. Ratings are weighted by how much the reviewer actually uses it, and publishers can reply once per review.
Reviews are earned
Writing one takes an account with at least 50 real tool calls against Mingle in the last 90 days. That is the whole gate — there is no other way to post, which is why the counts beside each review are worth reading.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes an account with 50 real tool calls against it.