Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Apollo.io API integration
Nothing to run from here
Apollo is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
94/100
trust score
6
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
downloads a day
What it does
Apollo.io MCP server. Search people, enrich contacts, find emails, research companies.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http agenteam-ai-2026-apollo-mcp https://YOUR_WORKER_URL/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# apollo_search_people, apollo_enrich_person, apollo_search_companies and 3 more
The address is a placeholder from the publisher’s own docs: put the address of your own deployment in its place before you run this.
Apollo costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
AAAll 1 server
AgenTeam-AI-20261 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. The address on this listing is a placeholder from its publisher’s own docs, not a live endpoint: you run Apollo yourself and put the address of your own deployment in its place — this marketplace is not in the path.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. The address is a placeholder from the publisher’s own docs: put the address of your own deployment in its place before you run this. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, read from the address; if the publisher says otherwise, swap that one word.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http agenteam-ai-2026-apollo-mcp https://YOUR_WORKER_URL/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at your own deployment of it: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing at the address of your own deployment — this marketplace is not in the path, and the server runs wherever you deploy it.
What you approve
6 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Search Apollo.io for people matching filters. Returns name, title, company, email, LinkedIn, location.
No parameter schema on file.
Get full enriched profile for a specific person. Pass email, LinkedIn URL, or first+last+company.
No parameter schema on file.
Search Apollo.io for companies by keyword, location, headcount, or funding stage.
No parameter schema on file.
Get full company profile by domain or name. Returns headcount, funding, tech stack, description.
No parameter schema on file.
Get active job postings for a company — a strong hiring signal. Requires Apollo organization ID.
No parameter schema on file.
Retrieve the verified email for a person by their Apollo person ID.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs at your own deployment of it — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Apollo or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 94 / 100
Release 0.14.3 · scanned 6 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score94
Findings3 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digestb2e52eaf793d57a5e686989b91fb2b0f293d750d97ee388bd4faa5abbee94be9
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 94
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfacenot available
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| No per-tool rows for this release — see the note below. | ||
can execute shell commands or code
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestb2e52eaf793d57a5
Scanned2026-10-06
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
It answers at your own deployment of it, running whatever release you deployed there — so a release cannot be chosen from here. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.14.3.
1.0.0
undated
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
0.14.3
21 Sep 2026
latestNo release note was published with this version.
0.14.2
13 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
0.13.5
11 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
0.8.6
9 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
0.8.4
7 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
0.8.3
31 Aug 2026
No release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Apollo can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.