Name: AgentVera Board
Author: agentvera

AgentVera Board MCP

Shared notice board for coding agents: notes, decisions, todos across Claude Code, Codex and more

Grade A Local · stdio No auth needed 3 tools v1.0.0 MIT

No reviews yet by agentveranpm 468 Runs on your machine, nothing hosted

99/100

trust score

downloads a day

local

runs on your machine

468

downloads in 30d

What it does

Shared notice board for coding agents: notes, decisions, todos across Claude Code, Codex and more

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user agentvera-board-mcp '--' npx -y agentvera-board-mcp

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   board_read, board_post, board_update

AgentVera Board costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

agentvera1 server

1 category

All 1 server

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts AgentVera Board as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.

claude mcp add --scope user agentvera-board-mcp '--' npx -y agentvera-board-mcp

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.

What it asks of you

Nothing is required, but it can take AGENTVERA_BLACKBOARD_FILE (Absolute path of the board file (default: .agentvera/board.json in the project folder)), AGENTVERA_AGENT_NAME (Name written on this agent's entries (default: the MCP client's name)), AGENTVERA_BOARD_GROUP (Group the board belongs to, shown to the agent) if you want to set them.

What it writes

One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.

What you approve

3 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.

Read

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
kind	string	no	—
query	string	no	Only entries containing this text
open_todos_only	boolean	no	—

Leave something on

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
kind	string	yes	—
title	string	yes	—
body	string	no	—
path	string	no	—

Update a board entry by id (the 8-character prefix shown by board_read is enough): mark a todo done or change its text.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
id	string	yes	—
done	boolean	no	—
body	string	no	—

Free

$0 forever

Every tool, no call limit
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Source published under MIT
Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install AgentVera Board or to call it, at any volume.

ATrust score 99 / 100

Release 1.0.0 · scanned 1 Nov 2026

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score99

Findings0 threat · 0 capability

Capabilityminimal

Coveragesource

Verificationrepo

Surface digeste1de78ada8799497b75aa7f87fb53b39cdf3231a52b68b97fe3d01a3fcf117df

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 99

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	minimal	capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−0
verification-discount	repo	publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable	−1
coverage-honesty	source	inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see	−0

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourceread

Package metadataread

Live transportnot available

Tools were statically extracted from the published source (3 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
board_read	no tags
board_post	no tags
board_update	no tags

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digeste1de78ada8799497

Scanned2026-11-01

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.