Alpaca Trading API integration for Model Context Protocol (MCP)
Nothing to run from here
Alertio is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
96/100
tool-list score
7
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Real-time DeFi risk data: health factors, liquidations, stablecoin pegs, utilization. No API key.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http alertio-mcp https://www.alertio.io/api/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# scan_wallet, scan_solana_wallet, scan_ton_wallet and 4 more
Alertio costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
ALAll 1 server
alertio1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http alertio-mcp https://www.alertio.io/api/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
7 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Scans an EVM wallet address across all supported lending protocols and returns every active borrowing position with health factors and liquidation risk. Covers Aave V3 (7 chains: Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Polygon, Optimism, Avalanche, Scroll), Aave V4 (Ethereum Core/Prime/Plus), Spark (Ethereum), Morpho (Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum), Euler (Ethereum, Monad), and Moonwell (Base, Optimism). Health fact
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| wallet | string | yes | EVM wallet address — must start with 0x and be exactly 42 characters, e.g. 0xabc…1234 |
Scans a Solana wallet address for Kamino lending positions and returns active borrowing positions with health factors and liquidation risk. Health factor < 1.0 means the position is liquidatable. Use this when asked: "Check Kamino health for this Solana wallet", "Is this Solana address at risk of liquidation?", "What is this wallet borrowing on Solana?"
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| wallet | string | yes | Solana wallet address in base58 format — 32 to 44 characters using base58 alphabet (no 0, O, I, or l), e.g. 7xKX…AbCD |
Scans a TON wallet address on the EVAA lending protocol and returns the active borrowing position with health factor and liquidation risk. Health factor < 1.0 means the position is liquidatable. Use this when asked: "What is the EVAA health factor for this TON wallet?", "Is this TON address at risk on EVAA?", "Check lending risk for EQ…"
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| wallet | string | yes | TON wallet address in friendly format — must start with EQ or UQ and be exactly 48 characters, e.g. EQD…wxYZ |
Simulates the impact of a collateral price drop on all active EVM lending positions for a wallet (Aave V3/V4, Spark, Morpho, Euler, Moonwell). Formula: newHF = currentHF × (1 − drop%). Shows per-position health factor changes and flags which positions would move to AT RISK, DANGER, or LIQUIDATED. Use this when asked: "What happens to this wallet if ETH drops 30%?", "Would this wallet survive a 40%
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| wallet | string | yes | EVM wallet address — must start with 0x and be exactly 42 characters, e.g. 0xabc…1234 |
| collateral_drop_pct | number | yes | Percentage drop in collateral value to simulate, e.g. 30 for a 30% price crash. Range: 1–80. |
Calculates a lending health factor from position inputs, with no wallet or on-chain lookup required. Give it collateral (one or more assets, each with its own liquidation threshold) and the debt, and it returns the health factor, the blended threshold, the collateral drop that would trigger liquidation, and the collateral value at which liquidation begins. Optionally simulates a collateral price d
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| collateral | array | yes | Collateral legs. Pass one entry per supplied asset; each keeps its own liquidation threshold and the blended figure is derived. |
| debt_usd | number | yes | Total borrowed value in USD. Zero means no debt, so no liquidation risk. |
| collateral_drop_pct | number | no | Optional: simulate the collateral falling by this percentage, e.g. 30 for a 30% crash. |
| debt_change_pct | number | no | Optional: simulate the borrowed asset's price moving by this percentage. Positive grows the debt and pushes HF down (borrowing a volatile asset); 0 or omitted is stablecoin debt. |
Returns real-time USD peg data for the top stablecoins (USDT, USDC, DAI, FRAX, crvUSD, USDS, GHO, and more) sourced from DeFiLlama. Shows current price, deviation from $1.00, and market cap. Flags any coin deviating more than 0.5% as a depeg signal. Use this when asked: "Is USDC currently depegged?", "Which stablecoins are showing depeg signals right now?", "What is DAI trading at?", "Are any stab
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| symbol | string | no | Optional: filter to a single stablecoin by symbol, e.g. "USDC", "DAI", "USDT". Case-insensitive. Omit to get all top stablecoins. |
Returns Aave V3 lending market utilization rates, supply APY, and borrow APY across 7 chains (Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, Polygon, Optimism, Avalanche, Scroll). High utilization above the optimal rate causes borrow APY to spike sharply. Also shows if a market is frozen or paused. Use this when asked: "What is the USDC utilization on Aave Ethereum?", "Is there room to borrow WETH on Base?", "Which Aa
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| asset | string | no | Optional: filter by asset symbol, e.g. "USDC" or "WETH". Case-insensitive. Omit for all assets across all chains. |
| chain | string | no | Optional: filter by chain name. Omit for all 7 chains. |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Alertio or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 96 / 100
Release 1.2.0 · scanned 21 Oct 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score96
Findings0 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digest93050263bddcef1fc3a15561dc508b35f89ffb77592a731e5ab952e8856eeeb8
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| scan_wallet | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| scan_solana_wallet | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| scan_ton_wallet | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| simulate_liquidation | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| calculate_health_factor | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_stablecoin_pegs | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_market_utilization | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest93050263bddcef1f
Scanned2026-10-21
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.2.0.
1.2.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Alertio can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.