Name: Yo
Author: alfongj-com

Yo MCP

Let agents send content-free push notifications to a paired phone via MCP.

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP API key 5 tools v1.0.1 MIT

No reviews yet by alfongj-comGitHub The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

93/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Let agents send content-free push notifications to a paired phone via MCP.

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http yo-mcp https://getyo.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${YO_API_KEY}'

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   register_agent, check_registration, cancel_registration and 2 more

It needs YO_API_KEY: this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.

Yo costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

alfongj-com2 servers

2 categories

All 2 servers

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads YO_API_KEY from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx YO_API_KEY … and open a new terminal (Windows).

claude mcp add --scope user --transport http yo-mcp https://getyo.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${YO_API_KEY}'

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.

What it asks of you

Nothing is required, but it can take Authorization header if you want to set it.

What it writes

One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.

What you approve

5 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

Register this agent with Yo (unauthenticated). Returns a pairing URL and code to show the user, who approves the connection in the Yo app. Then poll check_registration to obtain the API key.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
proposed_name	string	yes	Proposed display name for the agent (e.g. "banana", "devin-home-repo")
description	string	no	Short description of what this agent does
platform	string	no	Agent platform (e.g. "cursor", "devin", "claude-code")

Check the status of a pairing code from register_agent. On the first poll after the user approves, the response includes the api_key exactly once — store it immediately in your secret mechanism — plus paired_with, the account the agent is now connected to, which you MUST show the user.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
pairing_code	string	yes	The pairing code returned by register_agent
claim_token	string	no	The claim_token returned by register_agent; required to receive the api_key

Abort a pairing you started with register_agent. Works while pending and after approval: an already-approved connection is revoked (the API key stops working) so a pairing approved by the wrong account can be undone. Available until the pairing expires, and for 15 minutes after you pick up the API key; later than that, use revoke_self. Then call register_agent again.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
pairing_code	string	yes	The pairing code returned by register_agent
claim_token	string	yes	The claim_token returned by register_agent (authorizes the cancellation)

Permanently revoke THIS agent using its API key as the Bearer token. Use when you discover (at any time) that paired_with is not your owner’s account and cancel_registration no longer works. The key stops working immediately; call register_agent to start over.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
confirm	boolean	yes	Must be true — revocation is immediate and irreversible

Send a Yo push notification to your owner. Recommended: include a short subject explaining what the notification is about, and a context_url when there is a useful link to open. The subject appears on the lock screen and in the app; avoid secrets. Requires an agent API key as the Bearer token.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
subject	string	no	Recommended: a short, specific subject explaining why you are notifying the user (1–120 characters, counted as Unicode code points), e.g. "PR ready for review". Plain text, one line; avoid secrets bec
context_url	string	no	Optional https or app deep-link URL opened when the user taps the notification

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Yo or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100

Release 1.0.1 · scanned 23 Oct 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score93

Findings0 threat · 0 capability

Capabilitymoderate

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digestb3031eefc4cf83b8d4acf4752e4ed3431539d4945401c6ca8fa47a3a64efbcef

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	moderate	capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−3
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
register_agent	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false
check_registration	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false
cancel_registration	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false
revoke_self	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false
yo	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digestb3031eefc4cf83b8

Scanned2026-10-23

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.