Name: CuffTracker
Author: AndrewVG23

CuffTracker MCP

Chicago and Milwaukee crime data: query incidents, stats, and map-linked MCP UI resources.

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP API key 3 tools v1.0.1

No reviews yet by AndrewVG23 The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

96/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Chicago and Milwaukee crime data: query incidents, stats, and map-linked MCP UI resources.

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http cufftracker-mcp https://www.cufftracker.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   get_city_crimes, get_crime_stats, search_crimes

It needs AUTHORIZATION (Bearer token when CUFFTRACKER_MCP_API_KEY is set on the server): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.

CuffTracker costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

AndrewVG235 servers

2 categories

All 5 servers

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads AUTHORIZATION (Bearer token when CUFFTRACKER_MCP_API_KEY is set on the server) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx AUTHORIZATION … and open a new terminal (Windows).

claude mcp add --scope user --transport http cufftracker-mcp https://www.cufftracker.com/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.

What it asks of you

Nothing is required, but it can take Authorization header (Bearer token when CUFFTRACKER_MCP_API_KEY is set on the server.) if you want to set it.

What it writes

One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.

What you approve

3 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

Query crime incidents for Chicago or Milwaukee. Filter by crime type, location description, date range, and text. Returns a page of incidents with coordinates. Chicago's portal withholds about the last seven days. Milwaukee comes from the city WIBR file.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
city	string	no	City to query.
end_date	string	no	End date in YYYY-MM-DD format.
limit	integer	no	Max records to return (1-500).
location_descriptions	array	no	Filter by location descriptions (e.g., ['STREET', 'RESIDENCE']). Omit for all.
offset	integer	no	Records to skip for pagination.
primary_types	array	no	Filter by crime types (e.g., ['THEFT', 'BATTERY', 'NARCOTICS']). Omit for all types.
search_text	string	no	Text search across primary_type and description fields.
start_date	string	no	Start date in YYYY-MM-DD format.

Get aggregate crime statistics. Returns top crime types, total records, date range, top locations, and counts by city.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
city	string	no	City to get stats for. Use 'all' for cross-city comparison.
top_n	integer	no	Number of top items to return.

Full-text search across crime descriptions and types. Returns matching records with full details.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
city	string	no	City to search. Use 'all' for both.
limit	integer	no	Max results (1-200).
query	string	yes	Search text (e.g., 'armed robbery', 'domestic battery').

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install CuffTracker or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 96 / 100

Release 1.0.1 · scanned 28 Oct 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score96

Findings0 threat · 0 capability

Capabilityminimal

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digest218a7d106aaba9d1e2c669a3d7febf7899e1bb255aa0e769ceb79d4dab41eef3

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	minimal	capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−0
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
get_city_crimes	no tags
get_crime_stats	no tags
search_crimes	no tags

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digest218a7d106aaba9d1

Scanned2026-10-28

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.