Local MCP capabilities provider for Expo
Nothing to run from here
GxP Gateway Audit (mcp-glp-audit-proxy) is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
trust score
9
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
259
downloads in 30d
What it does
GxP Gateway Audit (mcp-glp-audit-proxy) audits MCP and HTTP(S) traffic across six flows (mcp2mcp, mcp2api, api2mcp, api2api, mcp2llm, api2llm). Every call goes to an append-only SHA-256 hash-chained JSONL log. 0.4.0 adds an HTTPS listener (TLS 1.3, mTLS/bearer), configurable body_mode (hash_only/redacted/full), a fail-closed chain that stops on tampering, an offline regulatory-report and archive-manifest. MIT Community; a paid Pro edition is available.
Quickstart
Install it the way its author documents:
1. pip install mcp-glp-audit-proxy
2. Command: mcp-glp-audit-proxy --config config.json
Publisher
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts GxP Gateway Audit (mcp-glp-audit-proxy) as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Install it the way its author documents:
1. pip install mcp-glp-audit-proxy
2. Command: mcp-glp-audit-proxy --config config.json
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Verify the append-only hash chain and list integrity errors (QA, approver, admin).
No parameter schema on file.
Search the audit trail by record class, tool, principal, status, method, server or time range (QA, approver, admin).
No parameter schema on file.
Write an electronic export with a hash manifest using a configured reporter (default JSON) (QA, approver, admin).
No parameter schema on file.
Record an approval, review or rejection for a pending write; not an electronic signature (approver).
No parameter schema on file.
Replace the tool policy; the change is itself audited and auditing cannot be disabled (admin).
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install GxP Gateway Audit (mcp-glp-audit-proxy) or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 93 / 100
Release 0.4.0 · scanned 25 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings11 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digestd7aaad5c39608c78a1312b94ca0ed34eaf853e565488cdd462f4067239104bca
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfacenot available
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| No per-tool rows for this release — see the note below. | ||
can execute shell commands or code
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestd7aaad5c39608c78
Scanned2026-10-25
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.4.0. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.4.0
25 Oct 2026
latest- Community 0.4.0: HTTPS channels (mcp2mcp, mcp2api, api2mcp, api2api, mcp2llm, api2llm), configurable body_mode, fail-closed chain, regulatory-report and archive-manifest.
0.3.2
22 Oct 2026
No release note was published with this version.
0.3.0
22 Oct 2026
- Community 0.3.0. Designed to support GLP / 21 CFR Part 11 / EU GMP Annex 11 workflows. See CHANGELOG.md in the repository for changes since 0.2.0.
0.2.0
21 Oct 2026
- Version 0.2.0: audit-trail proxy with hash-chained log, verify CLI, allowlist and optional write-approval gate.
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