Server providing Argo CD integration for MCP clients.
Apexly is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
Add, check, diagnose and remove your SaaS customers' custom domains from any MCP client.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http apexly-mcp https://mcp.apexly.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${APEXLY_API_KEY}'
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# create_domain, get_domain, list_domains and 5 more
It needs APEXLY_API_KEY (Bearer <Apexly API key>, required): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.
Apexly costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads APEXLY_API_KEY (Bearer <Apexly API key>, required) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx APEXLY_API_KEY … and open a new terminal (Windows).
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http apexly-mcp https://mcp.apexly.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${APEXLY_API_KEY}'Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: Authorization header — Bearer <Apexly API key>, required. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
8 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Add a customer's hostname (e.g. careers.acme.com or acme.com) to the app this API key belongs to. Idempotent: adding a hostname the app already has returns the existing domain. The domain starts in pending_dns; the customer must then add the DNS record in status_explained / get_dns_instructions, or open the connect_url to be guided through it. Apexly checks DNS every 15 seconds and issues the TLS
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| hostname | string | yes | The customer's hostname, no scheme or path, e.g. careers.acme.com |
| metadata | object | no | Any JSON object up to 4 KB, e.g. {"customer": "Acme", "tenant_id": "42"} |
| apex_redirect | string | no | Apex domains only: also serve www.<apex> and redirect it |
| origin | string | no | Per-domain origin override (paid plans); omit to use the app origin |
Current state of one domain: status (pending_dns → verifying → issuing → active; or dns_broken, cert_failed, held, expired), the DNS record the customer must add, the connect_url and the certificate. status_explained says in one sentence why it is in that status and what to do next. Use it to poll after create_domain or verify_domain.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
The app's domains, newest first, one page at a time. Pass next_cursor back as cursor for the next page (null means there are no more). Filter by status or by hostname prefix to find a domain id.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | string | no | — |
| hostname | string | no | Hostname prefix, e.g. careers. |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| cursor | string | no | next_cursor of the previous page |
Queue a DNS check right away instead of waiting for the next scheduled one; use it after the customer says they added the record. On cert_failed it retries the certificate. At most one per 15 seconds per domain. The check runs in the background: call get_domain a few seconds later for the result.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
The link to send the customer (the domain owner): a page branded with the app that detects their DNS provider, shows the exact record with copy buttons and tells them when the domain is live. Prefer it when the customer is not technical. It is safe to share with the customer, not publicly.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
The exact DNS record(s) the customer must add for this domain, plus step-by-step instructions for their DNS provider (detected from the domain's nameservers: GoDaddy, Cloudflare, Namecheap, Route 53 and ~40 more; generic steps otherwise). Record names are relative to the registrable domain ("careers" in acme.com, "@" for the apex).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
Why a domain is not live and what to change (the domain doctor, same as GET /v1/domains/{id}/diagnose): runs every check live (the record at 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8 and the domain's own nameservers, other A and stale AAAA records, the Cloudflare proxy, CAA, the certificate, the origin, the www pair). Each check is pass, fail, warn or skip with what we saw (detail) and what to change (fix); blocking_check
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
Remove a domain: it stops being served within 5 seconds and its certificate is dropped. Irreversible (adding the hostname again starts over with a new record). Only call it after the user explicitly confirmed deleting this hostname, and pass confirm: true.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | The domain id (dom_…), from create_domain or list_domains |
| confirm | boolean | no | Must be true: the user confirmed deleting this domain |
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Apexly or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| create_domain | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| get_domain | no tags | |
| list_domains | no tags | |
| verify_domain | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| get_connect_url | no tags | |
| get_dns_instructions | no tags | |
| diagnose_domain | no tags | |
| delete_domain | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.0.0.
No release note was published with this version.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish Apexly can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.