Blender integration through the Model Context Protocol
Nothing to run from here
Audivo is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
94/100
trust score
8
downloads a day
local
or remote
1k
downloads in 30d
What it does
Podcast transcripts: send an episode link and get the transcript back, a page at a time.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'AUDIVO_API_KEY=${AUDIVO_API_KEY}' --transport stdio audivo-mcp '--' npx -y @audivo/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# upload_audio, youtube_search, chart_shows and 9 more
It needs AUDIVO_API_KEY: this reads it from your environment, so export it first.
Audivo costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
AUAll 1 server
AudivoDotDev1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one can run either way — at an address its publisher runs, or as a process under your own user, with your files and your network — and this marketplace is in the path of neither.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. Claude Code reads AUDIVO_API_KEY (An Audivo API key (hk_live_...) from https://dash.audivo.dev) from your environment each time it starts the server, so the value stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx AUDIVO_API_KEY … and open a new terminal (Windows). The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'AUDIVO_API_KEY=${AUDIVO_API_KEY}' --transport stdio audivo-mcp '--' npx -y @audivo/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Or connect to its publisher’s address
Its publisher also runs it at https://api.audivo.dev/mcp: nothing to start on your machine, and this marketplace is not in the path.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http audivo-mcp https://api.audivo.dev/mcpFree on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: AUDIVO_API_KEY — An Audivo API key (hk_live_...) from https://dash.audivo.dev. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
12 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Announces a file on this machine to Audivo, uploads it, and returns its upload_id, for
No parameter schema on file.
Find an episode on YouTube when it has no podcast feed. Runs yt-dlp on this machine.
No parameter schema on file.
One category's chart (e.g. Business): up to size shows, clamped to the tier and reported.
No parameter schema on file.
A show's episodes, newest first, with the episode_id transcribe (with this feed_url and
No parameter schema on file.
SPENDS CREDITS: turns a quote into a job group, reserving up to its total_ceiling_credits.
No parameter schema on file.
One job group's rollup: member states, credits reserved, settled and released, and for each
No parameter schema on file.
The account's job groups, newest first: id, status, size and timestamps, never members.
No parameter schema on file.
RELEASES RESERVED CREDITS: cancels every member that has not started and returns its
No parameter schema on file.
Exactly one of job_id (a job's status and, once completed, its transcript; wait_seconds
No parameter schema on file.
The account's recent transcripts, newest first: show and episode titles (fenced), status,
No parameter schema on file.
Find shows by name. Trusted block: show_id, feed_url, itunes_id, music_led. Fenced block:
No parameter schema on file.
Price a selection before spending; reserves nothing. Exactly one of shows (feed URLs from
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Audivo or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 94 / 100
Release 0.4.2 · scanned 14 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score94
Findings1 threat · 2 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digest7184632fd9db85480f1f20073ba020f3248f989d3175537a33985b1fce1d1a98
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 94
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| search_shows | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "rss", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| chart_shows | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| list_episodes | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| quote | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| confirm | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| group_status | no tags | |
| list_groups | no tags | |
| cancel_group | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| read_transcript | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest7184632fd9db8548
Scanned2026-10-14
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.4.2. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.4.2
2 Oct 2026
latestNo release note was published with this version.
0.3.0
undated
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Audivo can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.