Alpaca Trading API integration for Model Context Protocol (MCP)
Nothing to run from here
Wise is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
97/100
trust score
144
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
2k
downloads in 30d
What it does
Wise balances, card payments, transfers and recipients, plus transfers you approve twice.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'WISE_API_TOKEN=${WISE_API_TOKEN}' --transport stdio blanketbyte-wise-mcp '--' npx -y @blanketbyte/wise-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# list_profiles, list_balances, get_transactions and 11 more
It needs WISE_API_TOKEN: this reads it from your environment, so export it first.
Wise costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
BLAll 1 server
BlanketByte1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Wise as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. Claude Code reads WISE_API_TOKEN (Wise personal API token (Wise → Settings → API tokens). Full access to prepare transfers, Read only for answers) from your environment each time it starts the server, so the value stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx WISE_API_TOKEN … and open a new terminal (Windows). The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'WISE_API_TOKEN=${WISE_API_TOKEN}' --transport stdio blanketbyte-wise-mcp '--' npx -y @blanketbyte/wise-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: WISE_API_TOKEN — Wise personal API token (Wise → Settings → API tokens). Full access to prepare transfers, Read only for answers.. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
14 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
List the Wise profiles (personal and business) this token can access, with id, type and name.
No parameter schema on file.
Current balances in every currency plus Jars (savings). amount is what's available now; reserved (pending card payments) is already deducted from it, not extra money. Default: all profiles.
No parameter schema on file.
List activity on a Wise profile, newest first: card payments, transfers, conversions, cashback, direct debits.
No parameter schema on file.
Transfers (money sent or converted) on a profile, newest first, with both currencies, reference, status and recipient name.
No parameter schema on file.
Details of one transfer: amounts in both currencies, rate, reference, status, created date and recipient.
No parameter schema on file.
Saved recipients (name, currency, account type, account number/IBAN). Default: all profiles.
No parameter schema on file.
Wise's mid-market rate between two currencies, now or at a past date/time.
No parameter schema on file.
Price a transfer or conversion: rate, fee, amount received and estimated delivery. Creates nothing the user sees and moves no money.
No parameter schema on file.
Which bank details Wise needs to add a recipient in a currency (e.g. IBAN for EUR, sort code + account number for GBP).
No parameter schema on file.
Step 1 of 2 to save a new recipient. Use get_recipient_requirements first for the right type and details keys. Nothing is written to Wise yet: this returns a summary and a one-time confirmation_code. Show the summary to the user and call confirm_action ONLY if the user explicitly approves it…
No parameter schema on file.
Step 1 of 2 to send money to a saved recipient (list_recipients / prepare_recipient). Gets a live quote and checks Wise's requirements.
No parameter schema on file.
Step 1 of 2 to cancel a transfer that hasn't been paid yet (status incoming_payment_waiting). Nothing is written to Wise yet: this returns a summary and a one-time confirmation_code. Show the summary to the user and call confirm_action ONLY if the user explicitly approves it in their next message.
No parameter schema on file.
Step 2 of 2: performs a transfer, new recipient or cancellation prepared with a prepare_* tool. ONLY call this after the user has
No parameter schema on file.
Throw away an action prepared with a prepare_* tool, before it's confirmed.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Wise or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 97 / 100
Release 1.1.1 · scanned 14 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score97
Findings0 threat · 1 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digestb652731901aeaf65dd832cb6ee49fb61971bc9be1d4e5490a3f161de75cb8f95
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 97
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
7 of the 14 recovered tools are registered only when config.WRITES_ENABLED holds (dist/tools.js:159) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes only the other 7.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
7 tools are registered unconditionally · 7 more only when config.WRITES_ENABLED holds (dist/tools.js:159) — typically when a key or option is configured. All 14 are in the table below and were analysed; the conditional ones are marked.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| list_profiles | no tags | |
| list_balances | no tags | |
| get_transactions | no tags | |
| list_transfers | no tags | |
| get_transfer | no tags | |
| list_recipients | no tags | |
| get_exchange_rate | no tags | |
| get_quote conditional | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_recipient_requirements conditional | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| prepare_recipient conditional | no tags | |
| prepare_transfer conditional | external-sinkuntrusted-input | external-sink: parameter "recipient"; untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| prepare_cancel_transfer conditional | no tags | |
| confirm_action conditional | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
| discard_action conditional | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestb652731901aeaf65
Scanned2026-10-14
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 1.1.1. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
1.1.1
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Wise can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
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Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.