Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Strapi CMS - AI-powered content management with natural language. Create, manage, and publish blog
Free
Nothing to run from here
Drush is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
Open Installation—
p95 latency
—
call success
local
runs on your machine
—
calls last 7d
What it does
MCP server for Drupal via Drush
Quickstart
# 1 — run it from where its publisher ships it
npx -y @bloomidea/drush-mcp
# 2 — the plan is chosen at checkout, in the browser
# 3 — ask your agent something
> MCP server for Drupal via Drush
Publishernot claimed
BLAll 1 server
bloomidea1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Drush as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. It is scanned, signed and pinned to the version you choose — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command.
claude mcp add drush-mcp -- npx -y @bloomidea/drush-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
This is a paid listing, so the CLI has to be signed in and the licence has to be on your account — how the login works. Until then the install stops with the price rather than half-writing a config entry.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
19 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Create a new Drupal entity (node, comment, etc.) from JSON field values
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Load a Drupal entity by type and ID, returning all field values as JSON
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Update specific fields on an existing Drupal entity
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Query Drupal entities with filters, pagination, and sorting
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Delete a Drupal entity by type and ID
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Discover entity types, bundles, fields, and allowed values
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Clear all Drupal caches
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
View recent Drupal log entries
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Get Drupal site status (version, DB, PHP, etc.)
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Read a Drupal configuration value
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Write a Drupal configuration value
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Get field definitions for an entity type
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Create a new Drupal user account
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Block a Drupal user account
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Upload a file to the Drupal site and create a managed file entity. Returns the new fid, uri, and url. Provide bytes via content_base64 OR a local filesystem path via content_path.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Upload a file and attach it to a file/image field on an existing entity in one round trip. Image fields support optional alt and title. Provide bytes via content_base64 OR a local filesystem path via content_path.
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Run any Drush command
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Execute PHP code on the Drupal site
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Run a SQL query against the Drupal database
Takes no parameters.
Example callreturns →
Startermost installed
$10 / month
- 8,000 calls a month, included
- 96 calls a minute at peak
- Every tool the listing has
- Cancel any time — the unused days are credited
- Runs behind the gateway, so cancelling stops it
Team
$35 / month
- 40,000 calls a month, included
- 480 calls a minute at peak
- Every tool the listing has
- Cancel any time — the unused days are credited
- Runs behind the gateway, so cancelling stops it
Business
$75 / month
- 180,000 calls a month, included
- 2,160 calls a minute at peak
- Every tool the listing has
- Cancel any time — the unused days are credited
- Runs behind the gateway, so cancelling stops it
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
No call is billed on its own, and this plan carries no monthly call limit. $10 a month covers every tool at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: $8.42
$16.58 left
ATrust score 94 / 100
Release 0.3.1 · scanned 25 Aug 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score94
Findings2 threat · 3 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digest645187c72c52e80f36fa4108c11b31f104add32bb78607f0f1fcbfb42212befe
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 94
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| drupal_entity_create | no tags | |
| drupal_entity_read | no tags | |
| drupal_entity_update | no tags | |
| drupal_entity_list | no tags | |
| drupal_entity_delete | no tags | |
| drupal_introspect | no tags | |
| drupal_cache_rebuild | no tags | |
| drupal_watchdog | no tags | |
| drupal_status | no tags | |
| drupal_config_get | no tags | |
| drupal_config_set | no tags | |
| drupal_field_info | no tags | |
| drupal_user_create | no tags | |
| drupal_user_block | no tags | |
| drupal_file_upload | no tags | |
| drupal_file_attach | no tags | |
| drupal_drush | no tags | |
| drupal_php_eval | code-exec | |
| drupal_sql_query | sensitive-source |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: drupal_sql_query → drupal_php_eval.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest645187c72c52e80f
Scanned2026-08-25
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Pinned to 0.3.1 — the install command below asks for that release. A pin is part of an install, so it is kept for this visit and written down when you install.
0.3.1
undated
installedNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Reviews are earned
Only accounts with at least 50 real tool calls against this server in the last 90 days can post. Ratings are weighted by how much the reviewer actually uses it, and publishers can reply once per review.
Reviews are earned
Writing one takes an account with at least 50 real tool calls against Drush in the last 90 days. That is the whole gate — there is no other way to post, which is why the counts beside each review are worth reading.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes an account with 50 real tool calls against it.