Chroma’s official MCP server: vector search and collection management for RAG workflows.
Nothing to run from here
Archery is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
trust score
2
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
27
downloads in 30d
What it does
Archery SQL audit and query platform MCP Server - lets AI agents directly operate SQL tickets/queries/audits
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user archery-mcp '--' uvx --with 'mcp<2' --from archery-mcp-server archery-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# workflow_list, workflow_submit, workflow_audit and 24 more
Archery costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
CKAll 1 server
ckall1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Archery as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need uv (docs.astral.sh/uv): uvx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user archery-mcp '--' uvx --with 'mcp<2' --from archery-mcp-server archery-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
27 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
获取 SQL 上线工单列表。
No parameter schema on file.
提交 SQL 上线工单。
No parameter schema on file.
审核工单（通过或终止）。
No parameter schema on file.
执行已审核通过的工单。
No parameter schema on file.
获取指定用户待审核的工单列表。
No parameter schema on file.
获取工单操作日志。
No parameter schema on file.
SQL 语法审核检查（不执行），调用 goInception 返回审核结果。
No parameter schema on file.
获取当前用户可访问的查询实例列表。
No parameter schema on file.
获取实例内的资源列表（数据库/表/列）。
No parameter schema on file.
获取表结构详情（DESC TABLE）。
No parameter schema on file.
在线执行 SQL 查询（仅 SELECT），受权限管控。
No parameter schema on file.
获取 SQL 查询历史记录。
No parameter schema on file.
收藏或取消收藏查询记录。
No parameter schema on file.
获取数据库实例列表。
No parameter schema on file.
创建新的数据库实例配置。
No parameter schema on file.
更新实例配置。
No parameter schema on file.
删除实例配置。
No parameter schema on file.
获取实例内的资源信息（数据库/schema/表/列）。
No parameter schema on file.
按表名查找包含该表的实例列表。
No parameter schema on file.
获取用户列表。
No parameter schema on file.
创建新用户。
No parameter schema on file.
更新用户信息。
No parameter schema on file.
删除用户。
No parameter schema on file.
获取资源组列表。
No parameter schema on file.
创建资源组。
No parameter schema on file.
获取权限组列表。
No parameter schema on file.
创建权限组。
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Archery or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 93 / 100
Release 0.1.0 · scanned 14 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings0 threat · 5 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest1ca24bc35ca083bba057ba64c96a3a76a45fa29f97215e6bb0cd1d8f1d3c344e
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| workflow_list | no tags | |
| workflow_submit | sensitive-sourceexternal-sink | sensitive-source: parameter "sql"; external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/workflow/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:91 |
| workflow_audit | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/workflow/audit/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:112 |
| workflow_execute | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/workflow/execute/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:142 |
| workflow_pending_list | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/workflow/auditlist/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:153 |
| workflow_log | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/workflow/log/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:165 |
| sql_check | sensitive-sourceexternal-sink | sensitive-source: parameter "sql"; external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/workflow/sqlcheck/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:185 |
| sqlquery_instances | no tags | |
| sqlquery_resources | no tags | |
| sqlquery_describe_table | no tags | |
| sqlquery_execute | sensitive-source | sensitive-source: parameter "sql" |
| sqlquery_logs | no tags | |
| sqlquery_favorite | no tags | |
| instance_list | no tags | |
| instance_create | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/instance/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:377 |
| instance_update | no tags | |
| instance_delete | no tags | |
| instance_resource | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/instance/resource/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:450 |
| instance_table_lookup | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/instance/table-instances/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:461 |
| user_list | no tags | |
| user_create | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/user/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:500 |
| user_update | no tags | |
| user_delete | no tags | |
| resource_group_list | no tags | |
| resource_group_create | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/user/resourcegroup/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:568 |
| auth_group_list | no tags | |
| auth_group_create | external-sink | external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST ( client.post("/api/v1/user/group/") at src/archery_mcp/server.py:591 |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Tool "workflow_submit" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally.
flow-2
Tool "sql_check" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally.
sql_check → auth_group_create
A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: sql_check → auth_group_create.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest1ca24bc35ca083bb
Scanned2026-10-14
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.1.0. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.1.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Archery can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.