Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for freee API integration
CMD+RVL Receipts is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
Check claims against current public CMBS filings and NPORT-P coupons, with citations.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http cmd-rvl-receipts-mcp https://receipts.cmdrvl.com/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# quickstart, coverage, find_deals and 11 more
CMD+RVL Receipts costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http cmd-rvl-receipts-mcp https://receipts.cmdrvl.com/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
14 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Compact capability manifest for clients: purpose, workflow, routing table, examples, vocabulary guard, scope caveats, next actions, and contact. Use when new or context is tight; call coverage for coverage facts.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| detail | string | no | Default summary. Use routing for tool selection guidance, examples for more call examples. |
What this server covers: deals and loans against the universe, the field inventory with full bound definitions, counterparty roles, current-only scope, and dual-sourced agreement stats (single-source reported separately). Call before reading an UNVERIFIED as meaningful. Contact cairn@cmdrvl.com for deeper coverage, history, bonds, entitlements.
No parameter schema on file.
Search covered deals by id, trust name, CIK, alias, shelf, vintage or deal_ref. An EXACT query returns one dominant result: proceed. A fuzzy query returns a small ranked set with match reasons, periods and a suggested next call. Use covered_deals only when you need the full universe.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | yes | Deal name, ticker-style id, CIK, alias, shelf/vintage fragment, or deal_ref to search. |
| limit | integer | no | Maximum ranked candidates to return (default 5; 10 on the builtin fallback; max 25). |
List every deal this server can verify, with CIKs, aliases and filing periods. Use find_deals for a focused lookup.
No parameter schema on file.
Verify one loan-grain field of a CMBS loan against the SEC 10-D and ABS-EE filings. Values are TRUST-LEVEL (this trust's piece, not the whole loan). Always the CURRENT period; the receipt stamps its as-of. Pass claimed_value: you get CONFIRM / DENY / CONFLICT / UNVERIFIED plus an sf-receipt. No claim, or an unknown deal, loan or field: UNVERIFIED.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal | string | yes | Deal name or alias, e.g. 'WFCM 2020-C58' or 'Wells Fargo 2020-C58'. |
| loan_id | string | yes | Loan / entity id within the deal, e.g. '25'. |
| field | string | yes | The loan-grain field to verify. One of (full definitions: coverage, or the receipt's field_definition): • beginning_balance — trust-level SCHEDULED balance at period start • ending_balance — trust-lev |
| claimed_value | number/string | no | Claim to receipt (number, or date string for paid_through_date). Required: no claim = refusal, no value. |
Verify one pool-level field of a deal: the ABS-EE loan-tape rollup against the 10-D trustee's reported fact. These are COLLATERAL (loan-pool) balances and flows, NOT bond or certificate balances, and SCHEDULED and ACTUAL are different fields. No loan_id. Always the CURRENT period. Pass claimed_value; no claim or an unknown deal or field: UNVERIFIED.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal | string | yes | Deal name or alias, e.g. 'WFCM 2020-C58'. |
| field | string | yes | The deal-grain (pool) field to verify. One of (full definitions: coverage, or the receipt's field_definition): • beginning_scheduled_collateral_balance — pool SCHEDULED collateral balance at period st |
| claimed_value | number/string | no | Claim to receipt. Required: no claim = refusal, no value. |
Alias for verify_loan_field with field='ending_balance': a loan's trust-level SCHEDULED ending balance, current period. Prefer verify_loan_field.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal | string | yes | Deal name or alias, e.g. 'WFCM 2020-C58' or 'Wells Fargo 2020-C58'. |
| loan_id | string | yes | Loan / entity id within the deal, e.g. '25'. |
| claimed_value | number/string | no | Claim to receipt. Required: no claim = refusal, no value. |
Verify the NPORT cross-filer annualized coupon rate (annualized_rate) for one security identifier. Security-grain, N-source receipt: citations are peer NPORT-P filings by registrant CIK, dissenters included. CURRENT-ONLY (latest NPORT period exported). Ticker matches are not unique: set require_hard_identifier=true when a claim needs ISIN, CUSIP or other hard identity.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| identifier | string | yes | Security identifier to look up: ISIN, CUSIP, other identifier, or ticker. |
| security_id_source | string | no | Optional source filter. Default any. Use ticker only for ticker-sourced matches. |
| require_hard_identifier | boolean | no | When true, exclude ticker-sourced matches because tickers are not unique hard identifiers. |
| as_of | string | no | Optional NPORT period guard (YYYY-MM). The public corpus is latest-period-per-security, not historical. |
| claimed_value | number/string | no | Claim to receipt. Required: no claim = refusal, no value. |
Verify issuance building size (Annex A vs ABS-EE). Units matter: mismatched units return receipt status UNITS_INCOMMENSURATE, not CONFLICT/DENY. A deal or loan outside coverage returns UNVERIFIED.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal | string | yes | Deal name or alias, e.g. 'WFCM 2020-C58'. |
| loan_id | string | yes | Loan / entity id within the deal, e.g. '25'. |
| claimed_value | number/string | no | Claim to receipt. Required. |
| claimed_unit | string | no | Optional unit, e.g. square_feet or units. |
Verify issuance appraised value (Annex A vs ABS-EE). Date/basis mismatches return DATE_INCOMMENSURATE or BASIS_INCOMMENSURATE, not CONFLICT/DENY. A deal or loan outside coverage returns UNVERIFIED.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal | string | yes | Deal name or alias, e.g. 'WFCM 2020-C58'. |
| loan_id | string | yes | Loan / entity id within the deal, e.g. '25'. |
| claimed_value | number/string | no | Claim to receipt. Required. |
| claimed_value_date | string | no | Optional valuation date. |
| claimed_basis | string | no | Optional valuation basis. |
Adjudicate 'who is the <role> on deal X' against the SEC 10-D counterparty roster (today: master and special servicer). A SINGLE-SOURCE roster fact. Master is the roster party, NOT the ABS-EE tape's primary servicer. Pass claimed_name: CONFIRM/DENY under the ledger's name normalization, never fuzzy. Says WHO the party is, not that a loan is in special servicing. Unknown deal or role: UNVERIFIED.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal | string | yes | Deal name or alias, e.g. 'WFCM 2020-C58'. |
| role | string | no | Default special_servicer. Full definitions ride each receipt's field_definition. |
| claimed_name | string | no | Name to adjudicate (normalized comparison). |
Deprecated alias of verify_counterparty (claimed_servicer = claimed_name).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal | string | yes | Deal name or alias. |
| role | string | no | — |
| claimed_servicer | string | no | — |
Verify count claims over loan status ('N in special servicing / paid off / defeased') for a deal. Counts are DERIVED from the ABS-EE tape, not reported by any filing. Three grains, never mixed: activity (active, resolved_paid_off, defeased); servicing: in_special_servicing = loans CURRENTLY with the special servicer (the count for 'N in special servicing'; it OVERLAPS active, never sum); resolutio
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| deal | string | yes | Deal name or alias, e.g. 'WFCM 2020-C58'. |
| claimed | object | no | Optional claimed per-status counts, e.g. {"in_special_servicing": 10, "defeased": 2}. Each is adjudicated by EXACT match against the derived count. |
Bulk verifier: paste text, get per-claim statuses. ASSERTIONS ONLY: a QUESTION ('is it $9.4M?') binds nothing and returns total 0; route single-value questions to verify_loan_field / verify_deal_field. Deterministic grammar, four families: loan fields, pool fields, servicer identity, loan-status counts. Unparsed text is listed in unchecked_spans, never dropped. EXACT deal references (id, alias, CI
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | string | yes | The paragraph / memo excerpt to check. |
| deal_hint | string | no | Fallback deal context when a sentence names no deal (exact resolution only). |
| period_hint | string | no | YYYY-MM annotation only — latest-only server; a mismatch is noted and drops confidence one tier. |
| risk_tolerance | string | no | Default normal = max(ledger tolerance, stated precision); strict = ledger only; lenient = 2x stated precision. Counts and names are always exact. |
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install CMD+RVL Receipts or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| quickstart | no tags | |
| coverage | no tags | |
| find_deals | no tags | |
| covered_deals | no tags | |
| verify_loan_field | no tags | |
| verify_deal_field | no tags | |
| verify_ending_balance | no tags | |
| verify_fund_holding_coupon | no tags | |
| verify_building_size | no tags | |
| verify_appraised_value | no tags | |
| verify_counterparty | no tags | |
| verify_servicer | no tags | |
| verify_loan_status_counts | no tags | |
| verify_claims | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.1.0.
No release note was published with this version.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish CMD+RVL Receipts can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.