Local MCP capabilities provider for Expo
Nothing to run from here
Keyfold is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
91/100
trust score
7
tools declared
local
runs on your machine
214
downloads
What it does
Use API keys from your Keyfold vault in commands and .env files. No tool returns a secret value.
Quickstart
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download keyfold-1.0.1.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is d8d9f93513e7b3e137c2e7bb357600d358e6fda602de3e66e919a09b2463b876
The full guide: https://github.com/codewithkolin/keyfold/releases/download/v1.0.1/keyfold-1.0.1.mcpb
Publishernot claimed
COAll 1 server
codewithkolin1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Keyfold as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download keyfold-1.0.1.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is d8d9f93513e7b3e137c2e7bb357600d358e6fda602de3e66e919a09b2463b876
The full guide: https://github.com/codewithkolin/keyfold/releases/download/v1.0.1/keyfold-1.0.1.mcpb
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
List the user's Keyfold projects and their environments with secret counts. Names only.
No parameter schema on file.
List the secret names in one project environment. Values are never returned.
No parameter schema on file.
Write a .env file containing every secret of a project environment to the given path. The user approves in Keyfold. Returns the number of keys written; the values themselves are never returned to you.
No parameter schema on file.
Run a shell command with the environment's secrets injected as environment variables (for example npm test or python deploy.py). The user approves in Keyfold. Returns the exit code and output; secret values only appear if the command prints them.
No parameter schema on file.
Store or update one secret in a project environment, for example a key you just generated or the user pasted. The user approves in Keyfold.
No parameter schema on file.
Create a Keyfold project with environments (default: development and production). Safe to call twice; an existing project is left as is.
No parameter schema on file.
Import every KEY=VALUE pair from a .env file into a project environment. Existing keys are updated. The user approves in Keyfold; you receive counts, never the values.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under AGPL-3.0
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Keyfold or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 91 / 100
Release 1.0.1 · scanned 28 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score91
Findings1 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragemetadata
Verificationrepo
Surface digest2dc22d3bf39daa3966da07121ef3ae7218597d0cc75600bd6ac9471b4c82a657
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 91
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | metadata | inspection depth (metadata) — how much of the target the scan could see | −8 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfacenot available
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
The implementation source was not read — the published package was fetched but contains no source files the scanner reads.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| No per-tool rows for this release — see the note below. | ||
No tool surface was enumerated, so there is nothing to attribute a capability to.
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest2dc22d3bf39daa39
Scanned2026-10-28
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
It installs from its repository rather than from a versioned package, so the command cannot be pinned to a release. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.0.1.
1.0.1
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Keyfold can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.