Clean, LLM-optimized Reddit MCP server. Browse posts, search content, analyze users. No fluff, just Reddit data.
Nothing to run from here
CommentKeyword is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
96/100
trust score
6
tools declared
local
runs on your machine
36
downloads
What it does
Create and manage Instagram comment-to-DM keyword automations in CommentKeyword.
Quickstart
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download commentkeyword-mcp-0.2.0.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is 9473133d43ce3820abf92c499a6a0178cff36c6b27904025ba2f9caa640babd3
The full guide: https://github.com/commentkeyword/agent-toolkit/releases/download/v0.2.0/commentkeyword-mcp-0.2.0.mcpb
Publishernot claimed
COAll 1 server
commentkeyword1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts CommentKeyword as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download commentkeyword-mcp-0.2.0.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is 9473133d43ce3820abf92c499a6a0178cff36c6b27904025ba2f9caa640babd3
The full guide: https://github.com/commentkeyword/agent-toolkit/releases/download/v0.2.0/commentkeyword-mcp-0.2.0.mcpb
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
List the comment-keyword automations in the workspace, newest first. Use it to check whether a keyword already exists before creating one.
No parameter schema on file.
Get one keyword automation by its publicId, including whether it is still waiting for the next post (nextPostStatus).
No parameter schema on file.
Create a comment-to-DM automation: when someone comments the keyword, CommentKeyword sends them the DM (and optionally replies publicly). Confirm the details with the user first, because it messages real people. Fails with 409 if the keyword already exists for the same posts, or with…
No parameter schema on file.
Change a keyword automation. Only the fields you pass change. Passing target re-targets it (e.g. next_post to wait for the next upload again). dmMessages and commentReplies replace all existing variants. Set isActive false to pause it.
No parameter schema on file.
Permanently delete a keyword automation. Prefer update_keyword with isActive false to pause it instead. If the keyword has an AI agent, the first call returns DELETE_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED with an impact summary; show it to the user and call again with confirm true only if they agree.
No parameter schema on file.
List the AI agents already set up in the workspace (agents are created and edited in the CommentKeyword dashboard). Pass the publicId of a Live agent as aiAgentId to create_keyword or update_keyword so it keeps chatting after the first DM.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install CommentKeyword or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 96 / 100
Release 0.2.0 · scanned 28 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score96
Findings1 threat · 1 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest0d326b8908c083662d1768a87100ec1f472b04f4c498752d0a27b10795ed680e
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (6 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| list_keywords | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_keyword | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| create_keyword | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| update_keyword | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| delete_keyword | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
| list_agents | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest0d326b8908c08366
Scanned2026-10-28
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
It installs from its repository rather than from a versioned package, so the command cannot be pinned to a release. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.2.0.
0.2.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
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Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.