A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for interacting with Microsoft 365 and Office services through the Graph API
Nothing to run from here
Notion Full is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
94/100
trust score
22
downloads in 30d
local
runs on your machine
33
tools declared
What it does
Full-featured Notion MCP server with deep page reading, surgical editing, snapshot/restore, file uploads (Notion-hosted images/PDFs), table row manipulation, and all block types
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'NOTION_API_TOKEN=${NOTION_API_TOKEN}' --transport stdio notion-full-mcp '--' uvx --from notion-full-mcp notion-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# search_pages, search, get_page_info and 30 more
It needs NOTION_API_TOKEN: this reads it from your environment, so export it first.
Notion Full costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
CPAll 3 servers
cphoskins3 servers
3 categories
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Notion Full as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need uv (docs.astral.sh/uv): uvx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. Claude Code reads NOTION_API_TOKEN (Your Notion integration API token (starts with ntn_)) from your environment each time it starts the server, so the value stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx NOTION_API_TOKEN … and open a new terminal (Windows). The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'NOTION_API_TOKEN=${NOTION_API_TOKEN}' --transport stdio notion-full-mcp '--' uvx --from notion-full-mcp notion-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: NOTION_API_TOKEN — Your Notion integration API token (starts with ntn_). You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
33 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Search Notion pages by title
No parameter schema on file.
Search Notion pages and/or databases
No parameter schema on file.
Get page metadata (title, parent, dates, URL)
No parameter schema on file.
Create a new page under a parent page or database
No parameter schema on file.
Update a page's title, icon, or archive status
No parameter schema on file.
DEPRECATED: Notion's public API does not support moving pages. Returns a clear error pointing to copy_page_to_parent
No parameter schema on file.
Restore a page (and its cascade-archived children) from trash
No parameter schema on file.
Recreate a page under a new parent (destructive workaround since the public API does not support parent changes; archives the original by default)
No parameter schema on file.
Read page with all nested children recursively
No parameter schema on file.
List direct children of a block or page
No parameter schema on file.
Get a single block by ID
No parameter schema on file.
Replace all text in a block
No parameter schema on file.
Find/replace text preserving formatting
No parameter schema on file.
Update block with full rich text specification
No parameter schema on file.
Insert a text block after a specific block
No parameter schema on file.
Insert multiple blocks after a specific block
No parameter schema on file.
Append blocks to the end of a page
No parameter schema on file.
Delete a block by ID
No parameter schema on file.
Add a comment to a page
No parameter schema on file.
List all comments on a page or block
No parameter schema on file.
Get database metadata and schema
No parameter schema on file.
Query a database with filters and sorts
No parameter schema on file.
Get the current authenticated user/bot
No parameter schema on file.
List all workspace users
No parameter schema on file.
Save complete page structure as JSON snapshot
No parameter schema on file.
Restore page from a snapshot (destructive)
No parameter schema on file.
Upload a file to Notion's own storage and return a file_upload_id
No parameter schema on file.
Upload an image to Notion and insert it as an image block in one step
No parameter schema on file.
Replace an existing image block's content with a newly uploaded file
No parameter schema on file.
Download an image block's file to a local path
No parameter schema on file.
Upload any file (PDF, attachment) to Notion and insert it as a file block
No parameter schema on file.
Insert a new row into an existing table with width validation
No parameter schema on file.
Replace the text of a single cell in a table row
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Notion Full or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 94 / 100
Release 0.3.1 · scanned 14 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score94
Findings0 threat · 1 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digest4025142a909710e83b2a734f64fc09d7db3052c98dd54f45ed26394014aed3e4
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 94
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| search_pages | no tags | |
| search | no tags | |
| get_page_info | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "get_page" |
| read_page_deep | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch" |
| list_block_children | no tags | |
| update_block_text | no tags | |
| find_replace_in_block | no tags | |
| update_block_rich_text | no tags | |
| insert_blocks_after | no tags | |
| insert_text_after | no tags | |
| append_blocks_to_page | no tags | |
| upload_file | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "upload_file" |
| upload_image_as_block | no tags | |
| replace_image_block | no tags | |
| download_image_block | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "download" |
| upload_file_as_block | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "upload_file" |
| insert_table_row | no tags | |
| update_table_cell | no tags | |
| delete_block | no tags | |
| snapshot_page | no tags | |
| restore_page_from_snapshot | no tags | |
| create_page | no tags | |
| update_page | no tags | |
| move_page | no tags | |
| restore_page | no tags | |
| copy_page_to_parent | no tags | |
| create_comment | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "create_comment" |
| list_comments | no tags | |
| get_database | no tags | |
| query_database | untrusted-inputsensitive-source | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch"; sensitive-source: keyword "query database" |
| get_self | no tags | |
| list_users | no tags | |
| get_block | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
download_image_block → query_database → create_comment
A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: download_image_block → query_database ⇒ create_comment.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest4025142a909710e8
Scanned2026-10-14
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.3.1. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.3.1
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Notion Full can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
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Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.