Control a real Chrome browser to complete any task: fill forms, extract data, book flights.
Nothing to run from here
Android is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
94/100
trust score
9
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
107
downloads in 30d
What it does
Control Android devices over ADB from AI agents — safe-by-default, read-only by default, audited.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user dockndevai-android-mcp '--' npx -y @dockndevai/mcp-android
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# install_apk, uninstall_app, clear_app_data and 16 more
Android costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publisher
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Android as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user dockndevai-android-mcp '--' npx -y @dockndevai/mcp-androidReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take ANDROID_MODE (Access mode: read-only | read-write | admin.), ANDROID_ADB_PATH (Path to the adb binary (default: adb on PATH).), ANDROID_SERIAL (Target device serial from `adb devices`. Empty = the only connected device.), ANDROID_TIMEOUT_MS (Per-command adb timeout in milliseconds.), ANDROID_PACKAGE_ALLOWLIST (Comma-separated package allowlist for launch/uninstall/clear. Empty = all.), ANDROID_PROTECTED_PACKAGES (Packages that can be launched/inspected but never uninstalled or data-cleared.), ANDROID_ALLOW_INSTALL (Enable install_apk / uninstall_app / clear_app_data (requires admin mode too).), ANDROID_ALLOW_SHELL (Enable run_shell (arbitrary adb shell; requires admin mode too).), ANDROID_DRY_RUN (Validate + log write/admin actions without executing them on the device.), ANDROID_AUDIT_LOG (Emit a JSON audit line to stderr per guarded operation (default true).) if you want to set them.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
19 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
Install (or update) an APK from a local path. Requires admin mode AND ANDROID_ALLOW_INSTALL=true.
No parameter schema on file.
Uninstall a package. Requires admin mode AND ANDROID_ALLOW_INSTALL=true. Protected packages refused. Irreversible.
No parameter schema on file.
Wipe an app's data (like a factory reset of that app). Requires admin + ANDROID_ALLOW_INSTALL. Protected packages refused. Irreversible.
No parameter schema on file.
Run an arbitrary adb shell command. Very powerful — requires admin mode AND ANDROID_ALLOW_SHELL=true.
No parameter schema on file.
List connected adb devices and their state.
No parameter schema on file.
Model, manufacturer, Android version, and screen size.
No parameter schema on file.
Capture the current screen as a PNG image so you can see what's on the phone before acting.
No parameter schema on file.
Dump the current screen's UI hierarchy (uiautomator XML) with element text and bounds — use it to find exact tap coordinates.
No parameter schema on file.
The package/activity currently in the foreground.
No parameter schema on file.
List installed packages. Third-party only by default.
No parameter schema on file.
Read current notifications (package + title/text), best-effort. Useful for clearing the pile-up.
No parameter schema on file.
Tap at screen coordinates (x, y). Get coordinates from screenshot + ui_dump first.
No parameter schema on file.
Swipe/scroll from (x1,y1) to (x2,y2) over a duration.
No parameter schema on file.
Type text into the currently focused field.
No parameter schema on file.
Press a hardware/navigation key (HOME, BACK, APP_SWITCH, ENTER, volume, media, …).
No parameter schema on file.
Open an app by package name (e.g. com.android.deskclock).
No parameter schema on file.
Open a URL / deep link in the default handler.
No parameter schema on file.
Set a native alarm at a given hour (0-23) and minute via the system Clock.
No parameter schema on file.
Start a countdown timer for N seconds via the system Clock.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Android or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 94 / 100
Release 0.1.0 · scanned 15 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score94
Findings1 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digestd3390f76114a4087aca484229702e8e4af9f49734f3d757b0ed34c7961208c04
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 94
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfacenot available
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| No per-tool rows for this release — see the note below. | ||
can execute shell commands or code
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestd3390f76114a4087
Scanned2026-10-15
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.1.0. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.1.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Android can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.