The official Svelte MCP server providing docs and autofixing tools for Svelte development
Nothing to run from here
GitHub Enterprise is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
100/100
trust score
38
tools declared
local
runs on your machine
—
downloads a day
What it does
Govern GitHub Enterprise orgs, repos, rulesets, security alerts & Actions for AI agents.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'GHE_TOKEN=${GHE_TOKEN}' --transport stdio github-enterprise-mcp '--' npx -y @dockndevai/mcp-github-enterprise
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# create_repository, delete_repository, remove_member and 35 more
It needs GHE_TOKEN: this reads it from your environment, so export it first.
GitHub Enterprise costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publisher
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts GitHub Enterprise as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. Claude Code reads GHE_TOKEN (GitHub token (fine-grained PAT, classic PAT, or App installation token). Read-only scopes to start) from your environment each time it starts the server, so the value stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx GHE_TOKEN … and open a new terminal (Windows). The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'GHE_TOKEN=${GHE_TOKEN}' --transport stdio github-enterprise-mcp '--' npx -y @dockndevai/mcp-github-enterpriseReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: GHE_TOKEN — GitHub token (fine-grained PAT, classic PAT, or App installation token). Read-only scopes to start.. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
38 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
Create a repository in an organization. Requires admin mode. Defaults to private with auto-init; secret scanning and push protection are requested on creation where the plan allows.
No parameter schema on file.
Permanently delete a repository (code, issues, PRs, releases). Requires admin mode, GHE_ALLOW_DELETE=true, and a typed confirmation equal to 'org/repo'. Irreversible.
No parameter schema on file.
Remove a user from the organization (revokes access to all org repos and teams). Requires admin mode, GHE_ALLOW_DELETE=true, and a typed confirmation equal to the username.
No parameter schema on file.
Delete a team (and its sub-teams' parent link). Requires admin mode, GHE_ALLOW_DELETE=true, and a typed confirmation equal to the team slug.
No parameter schema on file.
Delete an org ruleset (removes that branch/tag protection org-wide). Requires admin mode, GHE_ALLOW_DELETE=true, and a typed confirmation equal to the ruleset id.
No parameter schema on file.
Delete an organization webhook. Requires admin mode, GHE_ALLOW_DELETE=true, and a typed confirmation equal to the webhook id.
No parameter schema on file.
Return the identity behind the configured GHE_TOKEN (login, type, and whether it is a user or an app). Use this first to confirm the token and base URL are wired correctly before anything else.
No parameter schema on file.
Report the current REST API rate-limit budget (core, search, graphql) and reset times. Use to pace bulk reads.
No parameter schema on file.
List the organizations the token can see (filtered by GHE_ORG_ALLOWLIST), each flagged if it is protected (readable but never mutated). Start here to discover valid org logins.
No parameter schema on file.
Fetch an organization's full profile and security-relevant settings (2FA, base permission, secret scanning & Dependabot defaults).
No parameter schema on file.
List an organization's members, optionally filtered by role (admin = owners, member = everyone else).
No parameter schema on file.
List an organization's teams with their slugs, privacy, and permissions. Use a team slug with the team tools.
No parameter schema on file.
List the teams granted the organization's security-manager role (least-privilege security triage).
No parameter schema on file.
List an organization's repositories (name, visibility, default branch, archived), optionally filtered by type.
No parameter schema on file.
Fetch a single repository including its security_and_analysis settings (secret scanning, push protection, advanced security).
No parameter schema on file.
Fetch the protection settings for a branch (required reviews, status checks, signatures, force-push rules).
No parameter schema on file.
List the organization's rulesets (the modern, org-wide replacement for per-repo branch protection).
No parameter schema on file.
List the organization's webhooks and their events. Webhook secrets are redacted and never returned.
No parameter schema on file.
Fetch the organization's GitHub Actions policy (which repos may run Actions, and which actions are allowed).
No parameter schema on file.
List the organization's self-hosted Actions runners (name, status, labels, busy). Use with runner groups to audit where CI executes — e.g. Kubernetes runners managed by actions-runner-controller.
No parameter schema on file.
List the organization's self-hosted runner groups and which repositories may use them (runner isolation).
No parameter schema on file.
Report GitHub Actions cache usage — org-wide, or for one repository. Use to spot caches near the 10 GB/repo limit and to size a caching strategy for faster pipelines.
No parameter schema on file.
List the Actions workflows defined in a repository (name, path, state). Starting point for pipeline optimization.
No parameter schema on file.
List the organization's secret-scanning alerts (type, state, repo, location). The matched secret value itself is dropped and never returned.
No parameter schema on file.
List the organization's code-scanning (CodeQL/SARIF) alerts with rule, severity, state, and location.
No parameter schema on file.
List the organization's Dependabot (vulnerable dependency) alerts with package, severity, state, and the fixing version.
No parameter schema on file.
Fetch recent audit-log events for the organization (or the enterprise, when GHE_ENTERPRISE is set), optionally filtered by a search phrase like 'action:repo.destroy' or 'actor:octocat'.
No parameter schema on file.
Score an organization against the built-in security baseline (2FA, base permission, secret scanning + push protection, Dependabot, Actions policy). Returns per-control findings (pass/fail/unknown with severity and the exact remediation tool) plus a summary grade. Read-only — it changes nothing;…
No parameter schema on file.
Return the staged secure-setup template for a GitHub Enterprise — enterprise, organization, and repository level controls with the rationale for each, plus the exact org-settings baseline that harden_org_settings applies. Pure guidance; use assess_org_posture to measure a specific org against it.
No parameter schema on file.
Apply the recommended org security baseline in one call: base read permission, no public-repo creation, no private forks, secret scanning + push protection and Dependabot defaults for new repos, and web commit sign-off. Preview with assess_org_posture first. Honors dry-run and asks for…
No parameter schema on file.
Update specific organization settings. Only known security/permission fields are accepted (others are ignored). Use harden_org_settings to apply the full baseline at once.
No parameter schema on file.
Set the organization's GitHub Actions policy — which repositories may run Actions and which actions are allowed (restrict to 'selected' or 'local_only' to keep untrusted marketplace actions out of CI).
No parameter schema on file.
Create a team in an organization with a name, optional description, and privacy (closed/secret).
No parameter schema on file.
Set a user's organization membership role (admin = owner, member). Also invites the user if not yet a member.
No parameter schema on file.
Create an org-wide ruleset (branch/tag protection). Pass the GitHub ruleset JSON (name, target, enforcement, conditions, rules). Example rules: pull_request (required reviews), required_status_checks, non_fast_forward.
No parameter schema on file.
Apply branch protection to a repository branch. With no explicit rules it applies a sensible default: require a pull request with 1 approval, dismiss stale reviews, enforce for admins, and block force-pushes/deletions.
No parameter schema on file.
Enable/disable a repository's security_and_analysis features — secret scanning, push protection, and (where licensed) GitHub Advanced Security.
No parameter schema on file.
Create an organization webhook. Provide the payload URL, events, and (recommended) a signing secret — the secret is sent to GitHub but never echoed back in any response.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install GitHub Enterprise or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 100 / 100
Release 0.1.1 · scanned 7 Nov 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score100
Findings0 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digest648bcc4740b484a7b1e4ca51406c2241a96a283b800e258ffbed6cdf9f449ec5
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 100
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfacenot available
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| No per-tool rows for this release — see the note below. | ||
No tool surface was enumerated, so there is nothing to attribute a capability to.
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest648bcc4740b484a7
Scanned2026-11-07
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.1.1. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.1.1
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish GitHub Enterprise can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.