Pack local or remote codebases into AI-friendly files that LLMs and coding agents can read or search
Megalinter is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
MCP server for running Ox Security MegaLinter via mega-linter-runner
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user megalinter-mcp '--' npx -y @downatthebottomofthemolehole/megalinter-mcp-server
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# Semgrep, Bandit, DevSkim and 32 more
Megalinter costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Megalinter as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user megalinter-mcp '--' npx -y @downatthebottomofthemolehole/megalinter-mcp-serverReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
35 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Static analysis engine for finding bugs, security issues, and antipatterns
No parameter schema on file.
Security issue scanner for Python code
No parameter schema on file.
Security focused static analysis tool
No parameter schema on file.
Scans repositories for secrets like credentials
No parameter schema on file.
Linter to find and prevent passwords and other secrets
No parameter schema on file.
Finds and verifies credentials
No parameter schema on file.
Vulnerability scanner for dependencies and container images
No parameter schema on file.
Container/artifact vulnerability scanner
No parameter schema on file.
Linter for Dockerfile best practices and security
No parameter schema on file.
Kubernetes security posture management tool
No parameter schema on file.
Terraform linter with security checks
No parameter schema on file.
Infrastructure-as-code security scanning
No parameter schema on file.
Ansible playbook linter with security policies
No parameter schema on file.
CloudFormation linter with security checks
No parameter schema on file.
Infrastructure-as-code security scanning framework
No parameter schema on file.
Infrastructure configuration secrets scanning
No parameter schema on file.
Find and fix problems in JavaScript code
No parameter schema on file.
Analyse Python source code looking for bugs
No parameter schema on file.
Rust linter catching common mistakes
No parameter schema on file.
Aggregated SARIF output for IDE integration
No parameter schema on file.
Interactive shortcut tool for short requests (for example: quick scan, security scan, summarise errors, list python security linters).
No parameter schema on file.
Run Ox Security MegaLinter using mega-linter-runner with full low-level control. For short prompts, use megalinter_quick_action.
No parameter schema on file.
Generate a minimal .mega-linter.yml configuration file.
No parameter schema on file.
List commonly used MegaLinter flavors.
No parameter schema on file.
Discover available linters by language, security category, or auto-fix capability.
No parameter schema on file.
Get comprehensive information about security-focused linters organized by category (SAST, secrets, supply-chain, container, infrastructure).
No parameter schema on file.
List all available MegaLinter reporters and their configuration options.
No parameter schema on file.
Parse MegaLinter JSON or SARIF reports from the reports directory. Returns structured report data for analysis.
No parameter schema on file.
Analyze and summarize issues from MegaLinter reports by severity, linter, and category. Enables filtering and targeted remediation.
No parameter schema on file.
Generate security-focused recommendations based on active linters and common threat categories (SAST, secrets, container, infrastructure).
No parameter schema on file.
Get context-aware help and examples based on your current repository. Suggests relevant commands for detected languages and frameworks.
No parameter schema on file.
Ultra-short alias for quick scan. Same as megalinter_quick_action with action=
No parameter schema on file.
Ultra-short alias for error summary. Same as megalinter_quick_action with action=
No parameter schema on file.
Ultra-short alias for context-aware help. Same as megalinter_help_quick.
No parameter schema on file.
Ultra-short alias for report parsing. Same as megalinter_quick_action with action=
No parameter schema on file.
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Megalinter or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| megalinter_run | no tags | |
| megalinter_write_config | no tags | |
| megalinter_list_flavors | no tags | |
| megalinter_get_linters | no tags | |
| megalinter_get_security_info | no tags | |
| megalinter_get_reporters | no tags | |
| megalinter_parse_reports | no tags | |
| megalinter_get_issue_summary | no tags | |
| megalinter_get_security_recommendations | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 3.0.2. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
No release note was published with this version.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish Megalinter can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.