Control a real Chrome browser to complete any task: fill forms, extract data, book flights.
Nothing to run from here
jevnav is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
94/100
trust score
10
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
544
downloads in 30d
What it does
Replayable browser automation: Jev picks the element, a gate blocks risky actions, every run traces.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user jevnav-mcp '--' uvx jevnav mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# browse, goto, goal and 30 more
jevnav costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publisher
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts jevnav as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need uv (docs.astral.sh/uv): uvx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user jevnav-mcp '--' uvx jevnav mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take TYPESAFE_API_KEY (TypeSafe API key for Jev decisions (optional if ~/.config/typesafe/apikey.txt exists)) if you want to set it.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
33 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
No parameter schema on file.
Open a URL in jevnav's browser and report what is on the page.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
Current URL, title and the interactive elements jevnav can see.
No parameter schema on file.
Recent console messages and page errors (observation only, never traced).
No parameter schema on file.
Recent network requests; only_failed keeps 4xx/5xx and transport errors.
No parameter schema on file.
Save a PNG of the page (or one element) to a path, for a human to look at.
No parameter schema on file.
Set files on a file input, chosen by selector or by an intent Jev resolves.
No parameter schema on file.
Drag one element onto another.
No parameter schema on file.
Press a key or combination ("Control+A", "Shift+Enter"), optionally on an element.
No parameter schema on file.
Fill several fields in one call: a JSON list of {selector|intent, value, action?}.
No parameter schema on file.
Headers and body of one recorded request (newest match when filtering by URL).
No parameter schema on file.
Answer dialogs from now on: the default (match=None) or one whose text matches.
No parameter schema on file.
Resize the browser viewport.
No parameter schema on file.
Emulate media, geolocation ("lat,lon") and connectivity.
No parameter schema on file.
Stub or block requests matching a URL pattern (testing; not part of a trace).
No parameter schema on file.
Remove one route stub, or all of them.
No parameter schema on file.
Chromium performance counters for the current page (CDP).
No parameter schema on file.
Write a Chromium heap snapshot to a file.
No parameter schema on file.
Run Lighthouse (through npx) against the current or given URL and return the scores.
No parameter schema on file.
Start a Playwright trace (open it later with npx playwright show-trace).
No parameter schema on file.
Stop tracing and write the trace zip.
No parameter schema on file.
Every alert/confirm/prompt seen, with the policy that resolved it.
No parameter schema on file.
Structural outline of a page or region: tags, headings, text, boxes.
No parameter schema on file.
Computed styles for the elements matching a selector (the facts behind a visual diff).
No parameter schema on file.
Evaluate a JS expression in the page and return its value (observation only).
No parameter schema on file.
Wait until text or a selector appears, then report the page.
No parameter schema on file.
Scroll the page down or up by pixels of document height.
No parameter schema on file.
List the open pages and which one jevnav is driving.
No parameter schema on file.
Open a new tab (optionally at a URL) and drive it from now on.
No parameter schema on file.
Drive the tab at this index (see tabs).
No parameter schema on file.
Close the tab at this index and keep driving a remaining one.
No parameter schema on file.
This session so far: steps, auto/review/blocked counts, cost, latency.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under Apache-2.0
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install jevnav or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 94 / 100
Release 0.2.2 · scanned 14 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score94
Findings4 threat · 1 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digest87af9aa9221eb9257117ef9eca95a200037f30888b1e6d151da0957dff86fa16
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 94
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| browse | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "browse" |
| goto | no tags | |
| goal | no tags | |
| page_state | no tags | |
| console | no tags | |
| network | no tags | |
| screenshot | no tags | |
| upload_files | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "upload_file" |
| drag | no tags | |
| press_key | no tags | |
| fill_form | no tags | |
| network_detail | no tags | |
| dialog_policy | no tags | |
| resize | no tags | |
| emulate | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "download" |
| route | no tags | |
| unroute | no tags | |
| perf_metrics | no tags | |
| heap_snapshot | no tags | |
| lighthouse | no tags | |
| trace_start | no tags | |
| trace_stop | no tags | |
| dialogs | no tags | |
| outline | no tags | |
| styles | no tags | |
| read_js | no tags | |
| wait_for | no tags | |
| scroll | no tags | |
| tabs | no tags | |
| new_page | no tags | |
| select_page | no tags | |
| close_page | no tags | |
| summary | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest87af9aa9221eb925
Scanned2026-10-14
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.2.2. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.2.2
26 Sep 2026
latestNo release note was published with this version.
0.1.14
23 Sep 2026
No release note was published with this version.
0.1.12
undated
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish jevnav can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.