Local MCP capabilities provider for Expo
Nothing to run from here
Gpg is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
90/100
trust score
10
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
90
downloads in 30d
What it does
Security-focused MCP server for GnuPG signing, encryption and key management.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user gpg-mcp '--' uvx gpg-mcp serve
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# list_keys, get_key, export_public_key and 27 more
Gpg costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
EGAll 1 server
emiliano-go1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Gpg as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need uv (docs.astral.sh/uv): uvx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user gpg-mcp '--' uvx gpg-mcp serveReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take GPG_MCP_CONFIG (Optional path to the gpg-mcp config file.) if you want to set it.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
30 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
List public keys, or secret key metadata (never secret key material).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | no | — |
| secret | boolean | no | — |
| with_sigs | boolean | no | — |
Return public metadata for one key identified by full fingerprint.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| with_sigs | boolean | no | — |
Export a public key. Secret keys are never exported.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| armor | boolean | no | — |
Export an authentication subkey in OpenSSH public key format.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
Inspect OpenPGP data without importing or decrypting it. Secret keys are rejected.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | string | no | — |
| data_base64 | string | no | — |
| packets | boolean | no | — |
List the recipients of an encrypted message without decrypting it.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ciphertext | string | no | — |
| ciphertext_base64 | string | no | — |
Verify a detached, cleartext or inline OpenPGP signature.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | string | no | — |
| data_base64 | string | no | — |
| signature | string | no | — |
| signature_base64 | string | no | — |
| mode | string | no | — |
Show OpenPGP smartcard status. No private key material is returned.
Takes no parameters.
Show gpg and gpg-agent configuration relevant to this server.
Takes no parameters.
Run read-only health checks for the binary, keyring and policy.
Takes no parameters.
Sign data with an allow-listed key. The private key stays in gpg-agent.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | string | no | — |
| data_base64 | string | no | — |
| signer | string | no | — |
| mode | string | no | — |
| armor | boolean | no | — |
| hash_algo | string | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Encrypt data to one or more full recipient fingerprints.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | string | no | — |
| data_base64 | string | no | — |
| recipients | array | no | — |
| sign_with | string | no | — |
| armor | boolean | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Sign with an allow-listed key and encrypt to the recipients.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | string | no | — |
| data_base64 | string | no | — |
| recipients | array | no | — |
| signer | string | no | — |
| armor | boolean | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Decrypt data addressed to an allow-listed key. Invalid embedded signatures abort.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ciphertext | string | no | — |
| ciphertext_base64 | string | no | — |
| verify | boolean | no | — |
| expected_key | string | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Encrypt with a passphrase entered only into pinentry. Disabled by default.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | string | no | — |
| data_base64 | string | no | — |
| armor | boolean | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Decrypt a symmetric message with a passphrase entered only into pinentry.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ciphertext | string | no | — |
| ciphertext_base64 | string | no | — |
| verify | boolean | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Create a key. The passphrase is entered only into pinentry.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| uid | string | yes | — |
| algo | string | no | — |
| expire | string | no | — |
| protect | boolean | no | — |
| subkey_algo | string | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Add a subkey to an existing key.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| algo | string | no | — |
| expire | string | no | — |
| usage | string | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Add a user ID to an existing key.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| uid | string | yes | — |
| approval | no | — |
Set the expiry of a key and optionally its subkeys.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| expire | string | yes | — |
| subkeys | boolean | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Change a key passphrase. Old and new passphrases go only to pinentry.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| approval | no | — |
Import public key material. Secret and revocation material is rejected.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | string | no | — |
| key_base64 | string | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Permanently delete a public key, or a secret and public key. Requires typed confirmation.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| secret | boolean | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Set ownertrust for a key. Ultimate trust is deliberately unavailable over MCP.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| level | string | yes | — |
| approval | no | — |
Return the pre-generated revocation certificate for a key. Treat it as sensitive.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| approval | no | — |
Apply a revocation certificate. Requires typed confirmation of the fingerprint.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| certificate | string | no | — |
| certificate_base64 | string | no | — |
| apply | boolean | no | — |
| approval | no | — |
Permanently revoke a key using its stored revocation certificate.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| approval | no | — |
Search the configured keyserver. Network operations are disabled by default.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | yes | — |
Fetch and import a public key by full fingerprint from the configured keyserver.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| approval | no | — |
Publish a public key to the configured keyserver.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| fingerprint | string | yes | — |
| approval | no | — |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Gpg or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 90 / 100
Release 0.1.0 · scanned 28 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score90
Findings8 threat · 1 capability
Capabilitycritical
Coveragesource
Verificationsource
Surface digesteed457e20a48376c2e9687273456e7f1ca7cfd17e6d3c54deb19ba40704a416f
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 90
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | critical | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −10 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. critical is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| list_keys | sensitive-source | sensitive-source: keyword "list_keys", parameter "secret" |
| get_key | no tags | |
| export_public_key | no tags | |
| export_ssh_key | no tags | |
| inspect | no tags | |
| inspect_recipients | no tags | |
| verify | no tags | |
| card_status | no tags | |
| agent_info | no tags | |
| doctor | no tags | |
| sign | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| encrypt | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| sign_and_encrypt | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| decrypt | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| symmetric_encrypt | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| symmetric_decrypt | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| create_key | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| add_subkey | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| add_uid | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| set_expiry | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| change_passphrase | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| import_public_key | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| delete_key | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| set_ownertrust | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| generate_revocation | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| import_revocation | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| revoke_key | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true |
| search_keyserver | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| fetch_key | untrusted-inputexternal-sink | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch"; external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| send_key | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
fetch_key → list_keys → send_key
A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: fetch_key ⇒ list_keys → send_key.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digesteed457e20a48376c
Scanned2026-10-28
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.1.0. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.1.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Gpg can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
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Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.