Fidacy action firewall for AI agents. Mandate-gated payment authorization as an MCP server.
Nothing to run from here
TradeCheck Local Invoice Review is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
trust score
15
tools declared
local
runs on your machine
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Review orders and supplier invoices locally with exact arithmetic and source-linked findings.
Quickstart
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download tradecheck-0.2.0.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is f048f04b20624a2cae976e77bffc545e12a5ad91d51ff8dfbaae2d1fe3e11e11
The full guide: https://github.com/f-tiger/agi-site/releases/download/fleet-mcp-registry-2026-10-10/tradecheck-0.2.0.mcpb
Publishernot claimed
FTAll 24 servers
f-tiger24 servers
10 categories
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts TradeCheck Local Invoice Review as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download tradecheck-0.2.0.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is f048f04b20624a2cae976e77bffc545e12a5ad91d51ff8dfbaae2d1fe3e11e11
The full guide: https://github.com/f-tiger/agi-site/releases/download/fleet-mcp-registry-2026-10-10/tradecheck-0.2.0.mcpb
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
Convert supplied CSV or tab-separated PO and invoice rows using explicit zero-based column mappings. Supply every header amount and source name; never infer missing tax, charges, IDs, currency or units. Returns unreviewed data with unknown prior history, not an audit. Ask the user to confirm…
No parameter schema on file.
Return the stable fictional PO-1042 example and input contract. It contains a EUR 44.00 signed price increase and cumulative quantity 320 against 300 ordered. Use this to learn the schema; never mix sample records with buyer data.
No parameter schema on file.
Compare caller-supplied normalized PO, invoice and prior history using exact decimal arithmetic. Flag price, identity, currency, quantity, duplicates and total discrepancies with caller-supplied source locators. Does not read source files or approve payment. Return summary plus a page of findings;…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | yes | — | |
| offset | integer | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Recompute the document review and return an unsent English or Chinese-introduction draft for up to 20 exceptions/gaps. Does not send messages. Chinese introductions preserve English diagnostic lines for exact traceability; the host can translate them. Use reconcile pagination for all findings.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | yes | — | |
| language | string | no | — |
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source is public, though no licence is declared for it
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install TradeCheck Local Invoice Review or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 93 / 100
Release 0.2.0 · scanned 28 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings29 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest30ddc773de372c9250b7aad9a01e16f783ac03503c99b32d1a4bcdb1c5159e5a
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
8 of the 15 recovered tools are registered only when rpc.method === 'tools/list' holds (sites/agiscorecard/tools/analytics-worker/index.js:291) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes only the other 7.
sites/agiscorecard/tools/roadmap/verify.mjs (1 KB) was not read: over the file-count budget.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
7 tools are registered unconditionally · 8 more only when rpc.method === 'tools/list' holds (sites/agiscorecard/tools/analytics-worker/index.js:291) — typically when a key or option is configured. All 15 are in the table below and were analysed; the conditional ones are marked.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| filinglens_example | no tags | |
| filinglens_periods | no tags | |
| filinglens_compare | no tags | |
| tradecheck_import_tables | no tags | |
| tradecheck_example | no tags | |
| tradecheck_reconcile | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch" |
| tradecheck_supplier_draft | no tags | |
| get_portfolio_returns conditional | no tags | |
| get_thesis_tracker conditional | no tags | |
| get_verdicts conditional | no tags | |
| get_sunwatch_track_record conditional | no tags | |
| get_claim_ledger conditional | no tags | |
| get_invest_positions conditional | no tags | |
| get_agi_consensus conditional | no tags | |
| search_site conditional | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest30ddc773de372c92
Scanned2026-10-28
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
It installs from its repository rather than from a versioned package, so the command cannot be pinned to a release. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.2.0.
0.2.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish TradeCheck Local Invoice Review can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.