Name: FeatQ
Author: featq

FeatQ MCP

Feature-request board for software teams: users vote, your coding agent pulls top requests over MCP

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP API key 7 tools v1.0.1

No reviews yet by featq The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

96/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Feature-request board for software teams: users vote, your coding agent pulls top requests over MCP

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http featq-mcp https://featq.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   list_requests, get_request, get_board_stats and 4 more

It needs AUTHORIZATION (Bearer fq_<your FeatQ board key> (from the board admin page, 'Connect your coding agent')): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.

FeatQ costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

featq1 server

1 category

All 1 server

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads AUTHORIZATION (Bearer fq_<your FeatQ board key> (from the board admin page, 'Connect your coding agent')) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx AUTHORIZATION … and open a new terminal (Windows).

claude mcp add --scope user --transport http featq-mcp https://featq.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.

What it asks of you

It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: Authorization header — Bearer fq_<your FeatQ board key> (from the board admin page, 'Connect your coding agent'). You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.

What it writes

One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.

What you approve

7 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

List feature requests for the connected FeatQ board.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
status	string	no	—
sort	string	no	—
limit	integer	no	—

Get one feature request with its comments for the connected FeatQ board.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
id	string	yes	—

Get request counts, vote totals, and top requests for the connected FeatQ board.

No parameter schema on file.

Get the top feature requests by demand score, excluding requests already marked done. Requests are ranked by demand: each vote counts as one point and each comment as half a point, with scores gradually decaying as a request ages (90-day scale) so recent demand ranks higher, and ties going to the newer request.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
limit	integer	no	—

Generate an agent-ready markdown implementation spec for one feature request.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
id	string	yes	—

Update the status of a feature request. Marking a request done makes it appear in the public changelog.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
id	string	yes	—
status	string	yes	—

List what watched competitor comparison pages say about this product. Read only. Claims are signals, not votes.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
state	string	no	—
limit	integer	no	—

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install FeatQ or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 96 / 100

Release 1.0.1 · scanned 28 Oct 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score96

Findings0 threat · 0 capability

Capabilityminimal

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digesta5cb2629951c75af6e0ecc0a830e0234f28d0284e283c08aee73a754142d93a4

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	minimal	capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−0
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
list_requests	no tags
get_request	no tags
get_board_stats	no tags
get_ranked_requests	no tags
generate_spec	no tags
update_request_status	no tags
list_competitor_claims	no tags

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digesta5cb2629951c75af

Scanned2026-10-28

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.