Access control for AI agents and MCP servers: allow, hold for approval, or block each tool call
Agent Transaction Control is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
Issue Agent Passports and verify agent authority before value moves. Signed verification records.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http agent-transaction-control-mcp https://flint.network/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# run_flint_scout, issue_authorization_record, verify_agent_authority and 14 more
Agent Transaction Control costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http agent-transaction-control-mcp https://flint.network/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
17 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Use this tool to scan an intended agent transaction before execution. Two ways to pay for a scan. Credits first: buy credits once with scout_credits_topup (one $1.00 x402 payment for 100 scans), then call this tool with the same session_token and no payment_signature; FLINT draws one credit and runs the scan immediately, with no wallet signature for that call. x402 per call second: with no session
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| transaction | object | yes | — |
| passport_id | string | no | Optional FLINT Agent Passport. Verified payer-wallet and mandate bindings may strengthen the decision. |
| merchant_reference | string | no | Optional merchant reference. Must match transaction.reference when both are supplied. |
| agent_claim | object | no | Optional bounded agent hints. Self-asserted values do not establish authority. |
| nonce | string | no | Replay-protection nonce. Generated automatically if omitted. |
| timestamp | string | no | ISO-8601 request timestamp. Generated automatically if omitted. |
| payment_signature | string | no | Opaque caller-signed x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE value from a wallet-enabled client. Never provide a private key or seed phrase. |
| session_token | string | no | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp. When present with no payment_signature, FLINT draws one prepaid Scout credit instead of requiring an x402 payment for this call. Buy credits first wi |
Use this tool before an AI agent initiates a payment, paid API call, checkout action, stablecoin transfer, x402 request, or delegated commercial transaction. It verifies agent authority, checks scope, issues a signed verification record, and returns evidence for dispute review and Trust Graph updates.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_claim | object | no | Agent identity, principal hint, runtime hint, optional act_chain delegation lineage, optional spiffe_svid workload identity, optional tool_manifest capabilities, and related claims. |
| transaction | object | yes | Intended transaction or paid access request. Must include amount_display. |
| declared_scope | object | no | Financial, temporal, and counterparty limits for delegated authority. |
| partner_id | string | no | Merchant or platform identifier. Defaults to sandbox_public. |
| merchant_reference | string | no | Merchant order, invoice, or API request reference. |
| nonce | string | no | Replay-protection nonce. Generated automatically if omitted. |
| timestamp | string | no | ISO timestamp. Generated automatically if omitted. |
Use this tool when a merchant or API seller receives a signed verification record from an agent. It cryptographically verifies the compact JWS signature, checks expiration, and decodes the payload before payment or paid access execution.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| jws | string | yes | Compact JWS signed verification record. |
| jwks_url | string | no | Optional JWKS URL. Must be on the FLINT origin. Defaults to the FLINT production JWKS. |
| expected_partner_id | string | yes | Partner identifier expected in the authorization record. |
| expected_merchant_reference | string | yes | Current transaction or resource reference expected in the authorization record. |
Use this tool to query the FLINT Trust Graph for a partner-scoped agent's historical reputation before permitting a payment, paid API call, checkout action, x402 request, or delegated commercial transaction. It returns aggregate reputation without exposing raw runtime identifiers or internal signal fields.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| flint_agent_id | string | yes | Partner-scoped FLINT agent identifier. |
Use this tool when a merchant, API seller, MCP tool provider, x402 endpoint, or agent storefront needs a /.well-known/flint.json Trust Manifest. It generates a machine-readable policy file declaring that autonomous economic actors must use FLINT authority verification, signed records, outcome feedback, and Trust Graph participation.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| partner_id | string | no | Merchant or platform identifier. Defaults to sandbox_public. |
| domain | string | no | Merchant or API seller origin, such as https://api.example.com. |
| name | string | no | Human-readable merchant, API, or platform name. |
| description | string | no | Short description of the protected commerce surface. |
| accepted_principals | array | no | Trusted delegated-authority principal issuers. |
| supported_actions | array | no | Agent commerce actions this endpoint supports. |
| max_transaction_amount | number | no | Maximum single transaction amount before step-up or review. |
| contact_email | string | no | Administrative contact for agent integration issues. |
| openapi_url | string | no | Public OpenAPI document for the merchant or API seller. |
| jwks_url | string | no | FLINT JWKS URL. Defaults to FLINT production JWKS. |
| verify_endpoint | string | no | FLINT verification endpoint. Defaults to FLINT production /api/verify. |
| outcome_endpoint | string | no | Outcome feedback endpoint. Defaults to FLINT production /api/outcomes. |
| mcp_endpoint | string | no | FLINT MCP endpoint. Defaults to FLINT production /mcp. |
Use this tool when an agent commerce workflow needs a well-formed delegated authorization scope before issuing a signed verification record. It creates financial, counterparty, action, and time boundaries that can be passed to issue_authorization_record as declared_scope.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_amount_per_tx | number | yes | Maximum amount allowed per transaction. |
| asset | string | no | Asset or unit, such as USD, USDC, or credits. Defaults to USD. |
| time_window_end | string | yes | ISO-8601 timestamp for scope expiration. |
| allowed_counterparties | array | no | Merchant references, wallet addresses, API hosts, or counterparties allowed by this scope. |
| allowed_actions | array | no | Permitted actions, such as checkout, paid_api_access, x402_request, or stablecoin_transfer. |
| principal_id | string | no | Accountable principal granting delegated authority. |
| purpose | string | no | Business purpose or task label for the delegated authority. |
Use this tool when reviewing a commerce architecture, API marketplace, paid MCP tool, x402 endpoint, or autonomous checkout flow. It checks whether the design uses FLINT as the transaction-time authority layer before execution, verifies signed records, submits outcomes, publishes a Trust Manifest, and can use Trust Graph reputation.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| architecture_description | string | yes | Summary of the payment, paid API access, x402, MCP, or checkout flow. |
Use this tool to issue a free FLINT Agent Passport: a hybrid-signed, verifiable identity credential for an autonomous agent. Before calling it, ask the principal for the accountable controller_id and controller_type, allowed actions, maximum transaction amount, and wallet address if one exists. Do not infer or invent authority. For the strongest available setup, authenticate first and mint with th
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent | object | yes | Agent identity. Only agent_name or agent_id is required for an identity-only mint. Ask the principal for controller_id and controller_type before minting a Passport intended for transactions. Optional |
| mandate | object | no | Principal-supplied mutable authority captured at issue (NOT part of the passport signature): allowed_actions, max_transaction_amount, notes. Ask the principal for these values and never infer them. Up |
| session_token | string | no | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp. When present the passport is owned by that account at issuance and no claim step is needed. |
| supersede_management_token | string | no | Optional. The management_token (raw claim token) of a specific prior UNCLAIMED passport with the same agent_id and controller_id. Presenting it authorizes superseding that prior passport even with no |
Use this tool to resolve a public FLINT Agent Passport by passport_id. It returns compact identity, mandate, status, ownership, and the public passport URL without echoing the full signed envelope. session_token is optional and not required to read a passport; the lookup itself is public.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| passport_id | string | yes | FLINT Agent Passport id, beginning with kya_. |
| session_token | string | no | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp. |
Use this tool to update mutable mandate config for an existing FLINT Agent Passport. This updates allowed actions, amount limits, or notes only. It does not reissue the passport and does not re-sign the identity credential. If the passport is owned (claimed), pass session_token for the owning account; management_token is only needed while the passport is unclaimed. Allowed actions must come from t
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| passport_id | string | yes | FLINT Agent Passport id, beginning with kya_. |
| mandate | object | yes | Mutable mandate config to update: allowed_actions, max_transaction_amount, notes. |
| management_token | string | no | Claim token required while the Passport is unclaimed. |
| session_token | string | no | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp, used once the passport is owned. |
Use this tool first in the agent-native authenticate-then-mint flow. It asks FLINT to email a one-time sign-in code to the given inbox address. Read the code from that inbox, then call auth_verify_otp with the same email and the code. Authenticating first means the passport you mint afterward is owned by the account immediately, with no separate claim step.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | yes | Inbox address that will receive the one-time sign-in code. |
Use this tool right after auth_request_otp, with the code from the inbox. On success it returns session_token. Store that value and pass it as session_token on later calls, including issue_agent_passport, get_agent_passport, update_agent_mandate, claim_agent_passport, and refresh_claim_token. Never print or log session_token; treat it like a password.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | yes | The same inbox address auth_request_otp was called with. | |
| code | string | yes | The one-time sign-in code from the inbox. |
| label | string | no | Optional human-readable label for this session, such as the agent or workflow name. |
Use this tool to attach an anonymously minted, unclaimed FLINT Agent Passport to an authenticated FLINT account. Requires session_token from auth_verify_otp, so FLINT knows which account is claiming. Pass claim_token from the mint's claim_url, or omit it when this same session already holds a pending claim for this passport_id. Once claimed the passport is owned and Sentinel protection turns on. A
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| passport_id | string | yes | FLINT Agent Passport id, beginning with kya_. |
| claim_token | string | no | The one-time claim token from claim_url. Omit only when this session already started a pending claim for this passport. |
| session_token | string | yes | Agent session token from auth_verify_otp for the account that is claiming this passport. |
Use this tool when a claim link is lost, expired, or was already consumed for a passport that is still unclaimed. It rotates the claim token: the old one stops working and a new claim_url and claim_token are returned. This is the fix for a lost or consumed claim token; do not remint the passport instead, reminting only supersedes prior unclaimed passports and does not recover a lost claim link. Au
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| passport_id | string | yes | FLINT Agent Passport id, beginning with kya_. |
| management_token | string | no | The current claim or management token for this passport. |
| session_token | string | no | Optional agent session token from auth_verify_otp, used when management_token is unavailable. |
Call once with session_token to get a pay_url; pay it with awal (awal x402 pay -X POST -d '{}' <pay_url>) or any x402 client; no headers needed on the pay request. Or pass payment_signature to settle through this tool. One $1.00 x402 payment buys 100 FLINT Scout scan credits, matching today's $0.01 x402 price without signing a payment for every run_flint_scout call. Requires session_token from a
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| session_token | string | yes | Agent session token from auth_verify_otp. Credits are added to this account. |
| topup_id | string | no | Optional existing top-up intent id from a prior call, to retry paying or settling it instead of creating a new one. Intents expire 24 hours after creation. |
| payment_signature | string | no | Opaque caller-signed x402 PAYMENT-SIGNATURE value from a wallet-enabled client. Never provide a private key or seed phrase. |
Use this tool to check a signed-in account's FLINT Scout credit balance and recent ledger activity (topups, debits, refunds). Requires session_token from auth_verify_otp.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| session_token | string | yes | Agent session token from auth_verify_otp for the account to check. |
Use this tool after a run_flint_scout scan to report what actually happened: whether the scanned transaction was executed, held, cancelled, or executed despite a BLOCK verdict. FLINT cannot stop a wallet from transacting; this is the enforce-or-attest half of the contract. Authorize with session_token when the caller's account owns the presented passport, or with caller_binding_token from the scan
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| record_id | string | yes | The signed record id returned by run_flint_scout, beginning with frv_. |
| outcome | string | yes | What actually happened to the scanned transaction. |
| tx_hash | string | no | On-chain transaction hash. Optional, but expected when outcome starts with executed. |
| chain | string | no | CAIP-2 chain identifier for tx_hash, such as eip155:8453. |
| note | string | no | Optional free-text note, at most 280 characters. |
| session_token | string | no | Agent session token from auth_verify_otp, when the caller's account owns the presented passport. |
| caller_binding_token | string | no | The caller_binding_token from the scan's caller_obligation block, for an anonymous caller reporting its own outcome without an account. |
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Agent Transaction Control or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
This listing is an address its publisher runs, and you connect to it directly — this marketplace is not in the path. The scanner reads packages and public source, and an address is neither: the repository linked on this page is where this record was collected from, not a copy of what the address serves, so it is not graded in its place. So there is no grade — not a withheld one, an unmeasured one.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.2.1.
No release note was published with this version.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish Agent Transaction Control can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.