Name: Foca Upscaler
Author: focaupscaler

Foca Upscaler MCP

Upscale images from HTTPS URLs with account credits and retrieve async results.

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP API key 3 tools v1.0.0

No reviews yet by focaupscaler The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

93/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Upscale images from HTTPS URLs with account credits and retrieve async results.

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http foca-upscaler-mcp https://focaupscaler.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}'

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   get_upscale_info, upscale_image, get_upscale_task

It needs API_KEY (Create an API key in Foca account settings and provide it as a Bearer token): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.

Foca Upscaler costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

focaupscaler1 server

1 category

All 1 server

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads API_KEY (Create an API key in Foca account settings and provide it as a Bearer token) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx API_KEY … and open a new terminal (Windows).

claude mcp add --scope user --transport http foca-upscaler-mcp https://focaupscaler.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}'

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.

What it asks of you

It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: Authorization header — Create an API key in Foca account settings and provide it as a Bearer token.. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.

What it writes

One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.

What you approve

3 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

Check top-level balance and can_create_tasks, available output tiers, prices, and input limits before creating paid tasks.

No parameter schema on file.

Create a paid asynchronous task from an HTTPS image URL using the physics engine. Requires an active paid subscription or a previously successful credit-pack purchase, sufficient credits, and tier access under the account's plan. The 2K/4K/8K/16K tiers cost 15/30/60/120 credits. Retry the same request with the same idempotency_key, image URL, and resolution_tier.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
image_url	string	yes	Publicly retrievable HTTPS image URL.
resolution_tier	number	no	Output tier: 2, 4, 8, or 16. Defaults to 2.
idempotency_key	string	yes	A 1–128 character key. Preserve it when retrying the same image URL and tier. Idempotency records are retained for at least 30 days; after retention expires, reusing an old key may create a new task a

Read an account-owned task in pending, processing, succeeded, or failed state with top-level credits_remaining. Repeat this tool call about every 5 seconds until the task reaches succeeded or failed; each call reads the stored database state without polling the image provider. A successful result includes a temporary download_url and expires_at.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
task_id	string	yes	The UUID returned when creating an upscaling task.

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Foca Upscaler or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100

Release 1.0.0 · scanned 22 Oct 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score93

Findings0 threat · 2 capability

Capabilitymoderate

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digest3a72e061ecbd1ac1afd21379bd1fdb0eb304eca031a861df7a73a021a3663a69

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	moderate	capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−3
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
get_upscale_info	no tags
upscale_image	external-sink	external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true
get_upscale_task	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: keyword "download"

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

flow-1

Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digest3a72e061ecbd1ac1

Scanned2026-10-22

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.