Fidacy action firewall for AI agents. Mandate-gated payment authorization as an MCP server.
ANAF e-Factura is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
Read, check and file a Romanian company's e-invoices and e-Transport declarations with ANAF.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'ANAF_CONFIG=${ANAF_CONFIG}' --transport stdio anaf-e-factura-mcp '--' npx -y @foreverworks/mcp-anaf-efactura
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# begin_authorization, complete_authorization, build_invoice and 17 more
It needs ANAF_CONFIG: this reads it from your environment, so export it first.
ANAF e-Factura costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts ANAF e-Factura as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. Claude Code reads ANAF_CONFIG (Path of app.json: the OAuth app you registered with ANAF (its client id and secret, the callback URL) and the company's CIF, as the README shows.…) from your environment each time it starts the server, so the value stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx ANAF_CONFIG … and open a new terminal (Windows). The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user --env 'ANAF_CONFIG=${ANAF_CONFIG}' --transport stdio anaf-e-factura-mcp '--' npx -y @foreverworks/mcp-anaf-efacturaReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
It reaches a system of yours, so it needs settings only you can give it: ANAF_CONFIG — Path of app.json: the OAuth app you registered with ANAF (its client id and secret, the callback URL) and the company's CIF, as the README shows. lookup_company, validate_invoice and parse_invoice work without it.. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
20 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
Start (re)authorizing this server with ANAF when the grant is dead or about to end. Returns authorizeUrl
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| redirect_uri | string | no | One of the redirect URIs registered in app.json. Empty means the first one. |
Finish what begin_authorization started: exchanges ANAF's code for tokens and stores them where this
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| redirect_url | string | no | The full address with ?code=...&state=... in it. |
| code | string | no | Only instead of redirect_url. |
| state | string | no | Only with code. |
Write a Romanian e-Factura invoice (UBL 2.1, CIUS-RO) from fields: seller and buyer, lines with their net
No parameter schema on file.
Look up companies in ANAF's public VAT registry by CIF: name, trade register number, registered
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| cifs | array | yes | 1 to … CIFs, with or without the RO prefix. |
| date | string | no | YYYY-MM-DD: the statuses as they stood that day. Empty means today in Bucharest. |
Check a UBL invoice or credit note against ANAF's own schema and CIUS-RO rules without
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| xml | yes | — |
Read a UBL invoice or credit note into plain JSON: seller and buyer (names, VAT and legal ids,
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| xml | yes | — | |
| archive | string | no | A .zip in the downloads outbox, from download_invoice: its name, or its path under the outbox. |
Have ANAF render an invoice as its official PDF and save it to the downloads outbox. Give message_id
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| message_id | string | no | The id field from list_invoices (digits), not requestId. |
| xml | yes | — | |
| validate | boolean | no | For a document only: validate before converting. |
| save_dir | string | no | A folder INSIDE the downloads outbox (e.g. "2026-09"); empty means the outbox itself. A path outside it is refused. |
| test | boolean | no | For message_id only: fetch it from ANAF's test environment. |
Check that an invoice is the file ANAF stored, under ANAF's seal (semnatura_*.xml). Give ONE of:
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| message_id | string | no | The id field from list_invoices (digits), not requestId. |
| archive | string | no | A .zip in the downloads outbox: its name, or its path under the outbox. |
| xml | yes | — | |
| signature | yes | — | |
| test | boolean | no | For message_id only: fetch it from ANAF's test environment. |
List e-Transport declarations from the last N days (at most …): UIT code, declarant, trading
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| zile | integer | no | Lookback in days, 1 to …. |
| cif | string | no | Defaults to the CIF in app.json. |
| test | boolean | no | Query ANAF's test environment instead of production. |
File an e-Transport declaration XML (ANAF's schema v2) with ANAF: a new transport (notificare), its
No parameter schema on file.
How an e-Transport declaration filed with etransport_file was processed, by its uploadId: state ok (the
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id_incarcare | string | yes | The uploadId etransport_file returned: digits. |
| test | yes | — |
Check that the integration is alive and say so in detail: the ANAF app it authenticates as,
No parameter schema on file.
Report on the stored OAuth tokens without contacting ANAF and without refreshing.
No parameter schema on file.
Mint a new access token. Does nothing while the current one still has its three-day cushion
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | boolean | no | Refresh even when the access token has time left. |
List e-Factura messages from the last N days (ANAF allows at most …). Each message has a
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| zile | integer | no | Lookback in days, 1 to …. |
| cif | string | no | Defaults to the CIF in app.json. With or without the RO prefix; both are accepted. |
| test | boolean | no | Query ANAF's test environment instead of production. |
List messages over an inclusive YYYY-MM-DD window, paginated, in the same shape as list_invoices
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| start_date | string | yes | YYYY-MM-DD, inclusive. |
| end_date | string | yes | YYYY-MM-DD, inclusive. |
| cif | string | no | Defaults to the CIF in app.json. With or without the RO prefix; both are accepted. |
| page | integer | no | — |
| filtru | string | no | Empty means every type. |
| test | boolean | no | Query ANAF's test environment instead of production. |
Download the signed ZIP for a message id from list_invoices and save it to the downloads outbox (a name
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| message_id | string | yes | The id field from list_invoices (digits), not requestId. |
| save_dir | string | no | A folder INSIDE the downloads outbox (e.g. "2026-09"); empty means the outbox itself. A path outside it is refused. |
| test | boolean | no | Query ANAF's test environment instead of production. |
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install ANAF e-Factura or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| begin_authorization | no tags | |
| complete_authorization | no tags | |
| build_invoice | no tags | |
| lookup_company | no tags | |
| validate_invoice | no tags | |
| parse_invoice | no tags | |
| invoice_pdf | no tags | |
| verify_signature | no tags | |
| etransport_list | no tags | |
| etransport_file | no tags | |
| etransport_status | no tags | |
| health | no tags | |
| token_status | no tags | |
| refresh_token | no tags | |
| list_invoices | no tags | |
| list_invoices_window | no tags | |
| download_invoice | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "download" |
| upload_invoice | no tags | |
| upload_invoice_b2c | no tags | |
| upload_status | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.1.0. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
No release note was published with this version.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish ANAF e-Factura can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.