Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for freee API integration
ANAF SPV is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
Download what ANAF posts to your SPV inbox, request documents, and validate or file declarations.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user anaf-spv-mcp '--' npx -y @foreverworks/mcp-anaf-spv
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# submit_contact_form, validate_declaration, submit_declaration and 13 more
ANAF SPV costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts ANAF SPV as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user anaf-spv-mcp '--' npx -y @foreverworks/mcp-anaf-spvReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Nothing is required, but it can take ANAF_SPV_USERNAME (Your SPV user name, when the password comes from a file.), ANAF_SPV_PASSWORD_FILE (Path of a file holding your SPV password. The README also shows how to read it from a vault MCP server instead.), ANAF_SPV_MAIL_MCP_URL (A mail MCP server over Streamable HTTP that reads the mailbox SPV sends its codes to, so a sign-in reads the code by itself. Without one (or a command below), every sign-in asks you for the code.), ANAF_SPV_MAIL_MCP_TOKEN_FILE (Path of a file holding that mail server's bearer token, if it wants one.), ANAF_SPV_MAIL_MCP_COMMAND (Instead of a URL: a mail MCP server to start over stdio, as a JSON array such as ["npx","-y","some-mail-mcp"].) if you want to set them.
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
16 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
Send a message through SPV's contact form ("Formular de contact"): a question or request about the taxpayer's own record, registered at ANAF
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| cif | string | yes | The tax id to write as: one of the form's identities (the dry run lists them). Required: the form preselects the first. |
| category | integer | no | The form's category. 3 (the default): "Asistență și îndrumare de specialitate în domeniul fiscal", the one answered on the merits. |
| subcategory | integer | no | Only for categories 1, 2 and 5, which require one; the error lists them. |
| text | string | yes | The message. Sent without diacritics (stripped here) and at most 1,500 characters after that; put a longer wording in an attached PDF. |
| attachment | string | no | A file to attach (…, at most 10 MB): …. Taken by path only, byte for byte. |
| attachment_sha256 | string | no | The attachment's hex SHA-256, as sha256sum prints it; a mismatch fails and nothing is sent. |
| dry_run | boolean | no | true (the default): read the form and check the message, send nothing. false: send it to ANAF. |
| again | boolean | no | Send even though this same message was sent, or tried, before. |
Validate a declaration's XML with ANAF's own validator for its form and period (DUKIntegrator with the "soft J" jars of ANAF's package
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| form | string | no | The form: …. |
| xml | string | yes | The declaration's XML: …. Taken by path only, byte for byte. |
| xml_sha256 | string | no | Its hex SHA-256; a mismatch fails before anything runs. |
| year | integer | no | The period's year (D212: the reporting year), checked against the XML's. |
| month | integer | no | The period's month, checked against the XML's (D212's is 12). |
| boolean | no | Also make the filing PDF when the XML is valid. | |
| save_dir | yes | — |
File a D212 with ANAF at formularespv-pf, in the account holder's name: the PDF validate_declaration made, and only that (its SHA-256,
No parameter schema on file.
A filed declaration's state at ANAF and its receipt (recipisa), by its number, from ANAF's public status service (StareD112): no sign-in,
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| reference | string | yes | The index de încărcare (digits), the registration number INTERNT-<index>-<year>, or submit_declaration's index de depunere. |
| cif | string | no | The CNP or CUI it was filed for; default the one this server filed it for, when it did. |
| receipt | boolean | no | Save the receipt's signed PDF to the outbox when ANAF still serves it. |
| save_dir | yes | — |
SPV's message list ("Mesaje"): every document ANAF has put in the taxpayer's virtual space and not yet archived, newest first: decisions,
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| request_id | string | no | Only the answer to this request (request_document's request_id). |
| text | string | no | Only messages whose details contain this phrase (case and diacritics ignored). |
| limit | integer | no | At most this many items; more says how many were left out. |
Download one message's document (a signed PDF, as SPV serves it) into the downloads outbox, named <posted date>_<type>_<SPV's file name>.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | string | yes | The message's key, from list_messages. |
| save_dir | yes | — |
Download every message this server has not saved before (oldest first) and remember it, so a scheduled call keeps a complete archive:
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| save_dir | yes | — | |
| limit | integer | no | At most this many downloads in this call. |
When SPV posted documents, from its alert e-mails ("Documente noi SPV" from Portal.ANAF@anaf.ro) in the mailbox its sign-in codes go to:
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| since | yes | — | |
| until | yes | — | |
| text | string | no | Only lines whose details contain this phrase (case and diacritics ignored), e.g. D256. |
| limit | integer | no | At most this many alert e-mails read. |
Wait for SPV's answer to a request_document (a RASPUNS SOLICITARE message carrying its id), checking the list every few seconds for up
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| request_id | string | yes | The request_id request_document returned. |
| wait_seconds | integer | no | How long to keep checking; 0 checks once. |
| download | boolean | no | Save the answer's document to the outbox when it is there. |
| save_dir | yes | — |
What SPV lets this account request ("Solicitări"), read from the live form: the identities it may request for, and for one of them every
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| cif | string | no | The tax id to request for, one of identities; default the form's first (the account holder). |
Ask SPV for a document, as its "Solicitări" form does. SPV registers the request (the answer carries its request_id) and posts the document
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| type | string | yes | The document type, as list_document_types names it (case and diacritics ignored). |
| cif | string | no | The tax id to request for, one of identities; default the form's first (the account holder). |
| year | integer | no | The reporting year, for the types that take one (Duplicat declaratie unica: 2025 = the return filed in 2025). |
| month | integer | no | The reporting month, for the types that take one. |
| registration_number | string | no | A filing's registration number, for Duplicat Recipisa (e.g. INTERNT-123456789-2026). |
| pui | string | no | The PUI, for the Fisa Rol types. |
| month_from | integer | no | The first month, for the types that take a range (Neconcordante D394). |
| month_to | integer | no | The last month of that range. |
Whether this server can work: where the SPV credential comes from (a vault MCP, a file, or none), which mail driver reads the e-mailed code
No parameter schema on file.
Is a session stored, since when, and when it last worked; with probe, loads one SPV page to prove SPV still honours it. Never signs in
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| probe | boolean | no | Load one page to prove the session is alive. |
Sign in to SPV now. Rarely needed: every tool signs in by itself when the session is missing or has ended. The server reads the password from
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| force | boolean | no | Sign in again even when the stored session still works. |
| code_by_hand | boolean | no | Do not read the code from the mailbox: stop at awaiting_code and wait for complete_login. |
Finish a sign-in that waits for its code (login answered awaiting_code, or a tool failed with needs_login): pass the digits of the newest
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | The security code from the mail, e.g. 246810. |
Sign out at SPV and forget the session here. The next tool that needs SPV signs in again (and SPV e-mails a new code).
No parameter schema on file.
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install ANAF SPV or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| submit_contact_form | no tags | |
| validate_declaration | no tags | |
| submit_declaration | no tags | |
| declaration_status | no tags | |
| list_messages | no tags | |
| download_message | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "download" |
| sync_messages | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "download" |
| posting_dates | no tags | |
| await_reply | no tags | |
| list_document_types | no tags | |
| request_document | no tags | |
| health | no tags | |
| session_status | no tags | |
| login | no tags | |
| complete_login | no tags | |
| logout | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.1.2. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
No release note was published with this version.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish ANAF SPV can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.