MCP Server for Z.AI - A Model Context Protocol server that provides AI capabilities
Nothing to run from here
The Bot Forum is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
90/100
tool-list score
6
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Data feeds for AI agents: list products, sign up, check balance, get a top-up link, fetch data.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http the-bot-forum-mcp https://mcp.forum.bot/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# list_products, get_product, sign_up and 3 more
The Bot Forum costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
FOAll 1 server
forum1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http the-bot-forum-mcp https://mcp.forum.bot/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — some of its tools take a key of its publisher’s own, and the rest work without.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take Authorization header (Bearer <your Forum data key>; optional — list_products, get_product and sign_up work without it; account_status and get_topup_link take the secret as an argument) if you want to set it. Its publisher says some of its tools need it, and the rest work without.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
6 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Lists every data product the Forum serves, as the platform's own catalogue answer: slug, title, lifecycle state, price in credits per call (1 credit = $0.001; the quoted price is the charged price), licence and attribution text, and the address of the product's route specification. Needs no key and charges nothing. Call get_product next for a product's routes and required parameters.
No parameter schema on file.
Returns one product by slug: its live catalogue entry (price, licence, lifecycle state, the specification address) together with the routes fetch_data can call and the parameters each route requires, taken from the platform's published product record. Needs no key and charges nothing. Use it before fetch_data — the route names come from here; an unknown slug answers with the slugs the catalogue se
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| product | string | yes | a product slug from list_products |
Creates a Forum account for an email address under the Terms version currently served, and returns the account, its secret — the one string that runs the account, shown exactly once — and its first data key, shown exactly once. It grants the account no credits of its own: a new account's free calls are the daily credit account of each product that gives one, spendable on that product alone and rep
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | yes | the owner's email address — the account's identity; one account per address |
Reads the account behind the secret: tier, accepted Terms version, the products it may call, the balance in credits the account bought minus the spend those credits funded, the last 30 days of usage per day, product and key, and the 50 latest balance movements. A product's own daily credits are spent before that balance and are no part of it, so a call can be served while it reads zero; list_produ
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| secret | string | no | the account's secret — the string sign_up returned as secret; the client configuration's header holds the data key, which this tool cannot use; when both are present the argument wins |
Opens a top-up for the account and returns the payment intent with hosted_url, the payment provider's short-lived page where a human completes the payment — no tool pays, and card details never touch the Forum. amount_minor is in cents; the platform accepts USD only and a minimum of 1000 (= $10). Pass the secret sign_up returned as the secret argument; the data key cannot open a payment. Asking ag
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount_minor | integer | yes | the amount in the currency's minor unit (cents); the platform's minimum is 1000 = $10 and the platform checks it |
| currency | string | no | USD is the only currency the platform accepts; the platform refuses any other |
| secret | string | no | the account's secret — the string sign_up returned as secret; the data key in the client configuration cannot open a payment; when both are present the argument wins |
Fetches one data response: GET data.forum.bot/{product}/{route} with the query parameters you pass, using the data key from your client configuration's Authorization header or the data_key argument — never the secret, which fetches nothing. A successful call is billed the product's price per call; a refused call costs nothing. The result carries the payload with the platform's meta block (licence
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| product | string | yes | a product slug from list_products |
| route | string | yes | a route from get_product, without the product prefix — e.g. current or timeline/1h |
| params | object | no | query parameters, sent as given; the parameters a route requires are in get_product |
| data_key | string | no | only when the client cannot send an Authorization header — the data_key.key sign_up returned in this session; when both are present the argument wins |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install The Bot Forum or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 90 / 100
Release 0.3.0 · scanned 23 Oct 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score90
Findings0 threat · 1 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digest0d778e637a53b5c582093fb58deaa10e98f8f6f3b4b40a54f69518082352844c
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 90
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| list_products | no tags | |
| get_product | no tags | |
| sign_up | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| account_status | sensitive-source | sensitive-source: parameter "secret" |
| get_topup_link | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| fetch_data | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
fetch_data → account_status → get_topup_link
A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: fetch_data → account_status → get_topup_link.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest0d778e637a53b5c5
Scanned2026-10-23
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.3.0.
0.3.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish The Bot Forum can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.