A2A Governance Bridge MCP server. Tools: verify agent compliance, authorize a2a transaction, get trust registry. Built by MEOK AI Labs.
Tokesave is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
Open InstallationWhat it does
The ultimate AI token-saving MCP middleware — compression, caching, injection shield, multi-server routing, and more.
Quickstart
# 1 — run it from where its publisher ships it
npx -y tokesave-mcp
# 2 — the plan is chosen at checkout, in the browser
# 3 — ask your agent something
> The ultimate AI token-saving MCP middleware — compression, caching, injection shield, multi-server routing, and more.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Tokesave as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. It is scanned, signed and pinned to the version you choose — read the surface before you approve it.
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command.
claude mcp add tokesave-mcp -- npx -y tokesave-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
26 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
CALL THIS FIRST on every new session. Prints optimal tool routing rules for this session + current config status. Ensures TokeSave is active and correctly configured.
Takes no parameters.
USE THIS before sending any long text (>200 words) to save tokens. Strips filler words, abbreviates common terms, removes articles. Pass filename for code files to enable AST skeleton mode.
Takes no parameters.
USE THIS when you need to read multiple files at once. Single tool call instead of N calls. Compresses all files concurrently and returns results together.
Takes no parameters.
USE THIS when you only need to understand a file, not quote it verbatim. Returns file content within a token budget — auto-escalates compression mode to fit. Ideal for large files where full content is not needed.
Takes no parameters.
USE THIS instead of reading an entire file when you only need one function or class. Extracts just the target function — reads only what
Takes no parameters.
USE THIS when comparing file versions. Returns only changed lines instead of both full files — saves tokens proportional to file size.
Takes no parameters.
USE THIS instead of fetching URLs directly. Fetches + strips HTML boilerplate (scripts, styles, nav, ads) + compresses. Returns clean readable text at fraction of original token cost.
Takes no parameters.
USE THIS for very large files (>50KB) that need to be processed in parts. Splits compressed content into chunks of specified token size.
Takes no parameters.
Search previously read/compressed content by semantic similarity. USE THIS before re-reading files — if content was compressed before, this returns it instantly without disk I/O or re-compression.
Takes no parameters.
Scan external content (web pages, tool outputs, user input) for prompt injection attempts before processing. Returns sanitized text.
Takes no parameters.
Change compression intensity. lite=minimal, standard=no articles, aggressive=abbreviations (default), brutal=symbols, oblivion=vowel removal. Higher = more savings but less readable.
Takes no parameters.
Get token savings statistics for current session and lifetime.
Takes no parameters.
Get current TokeSave state: active compression mode, which features are enabled, session stats.
Takes no parameters.
Create a named virtual agent with a role for task delegation tracking. NOTE: multi-agent delegation increases total token usage — do not use this for token-saving purposes.
Takes no parameters.
Assign a task to an existing swarm agent. NOTE: this triggers additional model calls per agent — not a token-saving tool.
Takes no parameters.
Get status of all swarm agents and their current tasks.
Takes no parameters.
Test all 5 compression modes on text/file and compare savings, readability, info loss. Returns recommended mode.
Takes no parameters.
Scan git repo for token waste: large files, binaries, generated code. Estimates potential token savings.
Takes no parameters.
Analyze repo + generate .gitignore + list files to remove from tracking. Detects project type automatically.
Takes no parameters.
Apply the cleanup: generate .gitignore + git rm --cached for binaries/generated files. Must commit separately.
Takes no parameters.
Search files for pattern, return only matching lines with context. Avoids reading full files. Scans up to 500 files, caps at 200 matches to prevent hang on large repos.
Takes no parameters.
Read specific line range from a file. Avoids reading huge files entirely just for a few lines.
Takes no parameters.
Lightweight directory tree with file sizes and token estimates. No file content read.
Takes no parameters.
Detect existing MCP servers from Cursor/Claude/Kiro configs and generate tokesave.config.json with servers:{} auto-filled. Prints instructions for updating mcp.json.
Takes no parameters.
Check session context window pressure based on total tokens processed. Returns recommended compression mode and auto-escalates if pressure is high.
Takes no parameters.
Compress a long AI response for storage/reference in multi-turn conversations. Optionally stores compressed summary in vector memory for later recall.
Takes no parameters.
- 12,000 calls a month, included
- 144 calls a minute at peak
- Every tool the listing has
- Cancel any time — the unused days are credited
- Runs behind the gateway, so cancelling stops it
- 100,000 calls a month, included
- 1,200 calls a minute at peak
- Every tool the listing has
- Cancel any time — the unused days are credited
- Runs behind the gateway, so cancelling stops it
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
No call is billed on its own, and this plan carries no monthly call limit. $15 a month covers every tool at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| TokeSave System Prompt | no tags | |
| auto_setup | no tags | |
| compress_text | no tags | |
| compress_file | no tags | |
| compress_batch | no tags | |
| summarize_file | no tags | |
| read_function_body | no tags | |
| diff_files | no tags | |
| compress_url | no tags | |
| compress_file_chunked | no tags | |
| recall_memory | no tags | |
| scan_injection | no tags | |
| set_mode | no tags | |
| get_stats | sensitive-source | |
| get_status | no tags | |
| swarm_create_agent | no tags | |
| swarm_assign_task | no tags | |
| swarm_get_status | no tags | |
| benchmark | no tags | |
| repo_audit | no tags | |
| repo_cleanup | sensitive-source | |
| repo_cleanup_apply | no tags | |
| grep_files | no tags | |
| read_file_range | sensitive-source | |
| file_mtree | no tags | |
| generate_proxy_config | no tags | |
| check_context_pressure | no tags | |
| compress_output | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Pinned to 1.0.5 — the install command below asks for that release. A pin is part of an install, so it is kept for this visit and written down when you install.
No release note was published with this version.
Only accounts with at least 50 real tool calls against this server in the last 90 days can post. Ratings are weighted by how much the reviewer actually uses it, and publishers can reply once per review.
Writing one takes an account with at least 50 real tool calls against Tokesave in the last 90 days. That is the whole gate — there is no other way to post, which is why the counts beside each review are worth reading.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes an account with 50 real tool calls against it.