Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for freee API integration
Nothing to run from here
xProof is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
tool-list score
13
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Proof primitive for AI agents on MultiversX. Anchor file hashes on-chain as verifiable proofs.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http xproof-mcp https://xproof.app/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# register_trial, certify_file, certify_with_confidence and 10 more
xProof costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
JAAll 1 server
jasonxkensei1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http xproof-mcp https://xproof.app/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take Authorization header (Bearer API key (format: Bearer pm_xxx). Optional — x402 payment works without authentication.) if you want to set it.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
13 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
START HERE if you have no API key. Get 10 free on-chain certifications instantly — no wallet, no credit card, no account required. Call this once with any agent_name, receive a pm_ key, then use certify_file or audit_agent_session immediately. Takes under 1 second.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_name | string | yes | A short identifier for your agent (e.g. 'trading-bot', 'my-langchain-agent'). Must be unique across the platform. |
Create a blockchain certification for a file. Records the SHA-256 hash on MultiversX blockchain as immutable proof of existence and ownership. Cost: $0.01 per certification, paid in EGLD.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_hash | string | yes | SHA-256 hash of the file (64 hex characters) |
| filename | string | yes | Original filename with extension (max 255 chars) |
| author_name | string | no | Name of the certifier (default: AI Agent, max 128 chars) |
| webhook_url | string | no | Optional HTTPS URL for on-chain confirmation callback |
Create a staged blockchain certification with a confidence score. Use this when your decision builds progressively — certify at 60% (initial assessment), 80% (pre-commitment), and 100% (final decision). Each stage shares the same decision_id, creating an on-chain audit trail of the decision process. Governance: set reversibility_class='irreversible' for actions that cannot be undone — xproof will
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| file_hash | string | yes | SHA-256 hash of the decision or output file (64 hex characters) |
| filename | string | yes | Original filename with extension (e.g. decision.json, max 255 chars) |
| decision_id | string | yes | Shared UUID linking all confidence stages for the same decision. Generate once and reuse across all stages. |
| confidence_level | number | yes | Confidence score from 0.0 to 1.0. Typical values: 0.6 (initial), 0.8 (pre-commitment), 1.0 (final). |
| threshold_stage | string | yes | Named stage of the decision: initial (first assessment), partial (gathering info), pre-commitment (almost certain), final (committed). |
| author_name | string | no | Name of the certifying agent (default: AI Agent, max 128 chars) |
| why | string | no | Reason or instruction hash driving this decision |
| who | string | no | Agent identity (wallet address, name, or agent ID) |
| reversibility_class | string | no | Governance: how reversible is this action? 'reversible' = can be undone, 'costly' = reversible but expensive, 'irreversible' = cannot be undone (on-chain settlement, data deletion, sent email). When ' |
Verify an existing xproof certification. Returns proof details including file hash, timestamp, blockchain transaction, and verification status.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| proof_id | string | yes | UUID of the certification to verify |
Retrieve a proof in structured JSON or Markdown format. Use JSON for machine processing, Markdown for LLM consumption.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| proof_id | string | yes | UUID of the certification |
| format | string | no | Output format: json or md |
Discover available Prove Before Act certification services, live pricing, and capabilities. No authentication required.
No parameter schema on file.
Certify an AI agent's work session on the MultiversX blockchain before a critical action (trade, deploy, data access). Returns a proof_id that an operator can use in its own compliance policy. This tool records certification; whether a missing or failed certification blocks execution is an operator-implemented policy decision. Governance: set reversibility_class='irreversible' for actions that can
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Identifier of the agent making the decision |
| session_id | string | yes | Unique session identifier (UUID or timestamp-based) |
| action_type | string | yes | Category of the action being certified |
| action_description | string | yes | Human-readable description of the specific action |
| inputs_hash | string | yes | SHA-256 of all inputs analyzed before making the decision |
| risk_level | string | yes | Assessed risk level of the action |
| decision | string | yes | Agent's decision about whether to proceed |
| timestamp | string | yes | ISO 8601 timestamp of when the decision was made |
| risk_summary | string | no | Optional brief risk analysis justifying the decision |
| context | object | no | Optional additional context (model version, environment, tool chain, etc.) |
| reversibility_class | string | no | Governance: how reversible is this action? 'reversible' = can be undone at low cost, 'costly' = reversible but expensive (fees, slippage, delay), 'irreversible' = cannot be undone (on-chain settlement |
Check domain-specific attestations for an AI agent wallet on Prove Before Act. Returns active attestations issued by third-party certifying bodies (healthcare, finance, legal, security, research). Use the returned attestation data when assessing credentials before delegating a sensitive task.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| wallet | string | yes | MultiversX wallet address (erd1...) of the agent to check |
Reconstruct the full 4W audit trail for a contested agent action. Returns WHO (agent identity + SIGIL), WHAT (SHA-256 hash on-chain), WHEN (MultiversX block timestamp), WHY (declared decision basis anchored before acting, never internal chain-of-thought). Includes verification summary with intent_preceded_execution flag, chronological timeline of WHY/WHAT proofs, and session heartbeat anchor. Requ
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| proof_id | string | yes | UUID of any proof in the action pair — WHY (declared decision basis), WHAT (action), or heartbeat session proof |
| wallet | string | yes | Agent wallet address (erd1...) that owns the proof |
Submit the actual outcome for a decision previously anchored with metadata.confidence_level. Computes the confidence gap (anchored − actual) and stores it for calibration tracking. Operator-only — you must own the proof. Each proof can only have one outcome.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| proof_id | string | yes | UUID of the certification that was anchored with metadata.confidence_level |
| outcome_score | number | yes | Actual outcome quality (0.0 = complete failure, 1.0 = fully successful) |
| visibility | string | no | Whether this outcome is publicly visible (default: public) |
Query an agent's calibration quality over time: mean confidence gap, variance, bias label (overconfident / underconfident / calibrated), and per-decision time series. Fully public — use this to evaluate another agent before trusting it. agentId accepts a MultiversX wallet address (erd1...) or internal user id.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | string | yes | Agent wallet address (erd1...) or internal user id |
| n | integer | no | Number of recent outcomes to include (default 50, max 200) |
Anchor your agent's declared decision basis as an immutable WHY proof BEFORE executing an action — never internal chain-of-thought. Implements the Prove Before Act / Coherence Layer pattern. Pass intent (goal), context (facts considered), and decision (action about to execute). Receives: proof_id, coherence_anchor (SHA-256 of the payload), timestamp. Link the returned proof_id to your WHAT proof v
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| intent | string | yes | The agent's stated goal or objective for this action (e.g. 'Optimize portfolio allocation for Q3') |
| context | string | yes | Relevant facts, constraints, and inputs considered before the decision (e.g. 'BTC RSI=38, allocation 2.1%, policy v3.1') |
| decision | string | yes | The specific action the agent is about to execute (e.g. 'BUY 0.5 BTC at market') |
| who | string | no | Agent identifier — wallet address, agent name, or model id (default: derived from API key owner) |
Optional operator policy: authorize only an unexpired WHY anchor belonging to the calling account whose exact hash and transaction payload are independently confirmed by the MultiversX API and Gateway. A recent coherence row or stored confirmed status is not sufficient. Pass intent_hash (the coherence_anchor from check_coherence) or the identical intent + context + decision payload. Returns { allo
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| intent_hash | string | no | The coherence_anchor hash returned by check_coherence (64 hex chars). Fastest path — pass this if you have it. |
| intent | string | no | The stated goal — must be byte-identical to the check_coherence call (used with context + decision to recompute the anchor hash) |
| context | string | no | The facts considered — must be byte-identical to the check_coherence call |
| decision | string | no | The action to execute — must be byte-identical to the check_coherence call |
| who | string | no | Agent identifier — must match the value used in check_coherence (default: derived from API key owner) |
| max_age_minutes | integer | no | Anchor validity window in minutes (default 120 = 2h). Anchors older than this are considered expired/divergent. |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install xProof or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100
Release 1.2.0 · scanned 23 Oct 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings0 threat · 1 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digestbc25ba7e15605aa21d9d40a0452dfa87a32a9ad8d7b8f6efe8c66ad896dc97bf
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| register_trial | no tags | |
| certify_file | external-sink | external-sink: parameter "webhook" |
| certify_with_confidence | no tags | |
| verify_proof | no tags | |
| get_proof | no tags | |
| discover_services | no tags | |
| audit_agent_session | no tags | |
| check_attestations | no tags | |
| investigate_proof | no tags | |
| submit_outcome | no tags | |
| get_calibration | no tags | |
| check_coherence | no tags | |
| require_coherence_anchor | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestbc25ba7e15605aa2
Scanned2026-10-23
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.2.0.
1.2.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish xProof can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.