Name: IA-QA Security — 30 tools
Author: JcJamet

IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP

Agent security: prompt injection, PII & secret scans, TLS/header/CORS audits, MCP checks. Free.

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP No auth needed 30 tools v1.0.1 MIT

No reviews yet by JcJametGitHub The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

93/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Agent security: prompt injection, PII & secret scans, TLS/header/CORS audits, MCP checks. Free.

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http ia-qa-security-30-tools-mcp https://www.ia-qa.com/mcp/security

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   find_tool, prompt_injection_scan, guardrail_test and 27 more

IA-QA Security — 30 tools costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

JcJamet4 servers

3 categories

All 4 servers

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

Search available MCP tools by keyword or category before calling them. Returns matching tool names, descriptions, and optionally their inputSchemas. Call this when you are unsure which tool to use or want to explore the catalogue. Categories: data, encoding, text, llm, qa, rag, dev, security, web.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
query	string	yes	Keyword(s) to search in tool name and description (e.g. "cors", "token", "vector", "json")
category	string	no	Optional: filter by category — data \| encoding \| text \| llm \| qa \| rag \| dev \| security \| web
with_schema	boolean	no	Set true to include inputSchema in results (default: false)
max_results	number	no	Maximum tools to return (default 10, max 50). Results are ranked by IDF-weighted relevance, so common words like "test" do not inflate the list.

Scan user input or prompts for common prompt injection patterns. Pattern-based: it recognises known phrasings and structural markers, not intent — a paraphrase it has no pattern for, or a language it does not cover, reads clean, so a clean result is not proof of safety. The instruction-override phrasing is covered in English, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Russian, Chinese, J

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
input	string	yes	The user input or prompt to scan for injection patterns
sensitivity	string	no	Detection sensitivity (default: medium)

Test an LLM response against a set of guardrail rules: must-include, must-not-include, max length, required format, language, forbidden patterns, and custom regex. Returns pass/fail per rule.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
response	string	yes	The LLM response to test
rules	array	yes	Array of guardrail rules to check

Automatically detect and redact Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from text. Replaces emails, phone numbers, SSNs, IBANs, credit cards, IP addresses, and JWT tokens with [REDACTED_TYPE] placeholders. Safe to use before logging or sending to an LLM.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
input	string	yes	Text to redact PII from
types	string	no	Comma-separated types to redact (default: all). Options: email, phone, ssn, iban, credit_card, ip_address, jwt
marker	string	no	Custom replacement marker (default: "REDACTED"). Result: [REDACTED_EMAIL]

Scan text or code for leaked secrets: API keys (AWS, GCP, Azure, OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, GitHub, GitLab, Slack, Twilio, SendGrid, HuggingFace), private keys (RSA/EC/PGP), JWTs, database connection strings, Bearer tokens, and Basic auth headers. Returns a list of findings with type, severity, line number, and a redacted preview. Use before committing code, sharing logs, or sending text to an LLM

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
input	string	yes	Text or code to scan for secrets
types	string	no	Comma-separated families to scan (default: all): aws, gcp, azure, openai, anthropic, huggingface, github, gitlab, stripe, slack, twilio, sendgrid, jwt, private_key, connection_string, bearer, basic_au

Run declarative assertions on an agent trace (OpenAI tool-call messages, Anthropic tool_use/tool_result blocks, LangChain run trees, or plain text ReAct logs). No LLM call — deterministic. Assertion types: order (tool A before B), must_call, must_not_call, max_calls, min_calls, no_error, recovery (agent completes a successful step after its last error). A step counts as errored when the trace says

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
trace		yes	Agent execution trace as JSON (OpenAI messages array, LangChain run tree) or plain text log (Thought/Action/Observation format).
assertions	array	yes	List of assertions to validate against the trace.
format	string	no	Trace format. auto (default) detects automatically.

Validate that an MCP tool response conforms to expected format, schema, and content rules. Use this to QA-test any MCP server tool. Supply the tool's actual JSON result and a set of checks to perform.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
response	string	yes	The MCP tool result as a JSON string to validate
expected_type	string	no	Expected top-level type: "object", "array", "string", "number"
required_keys	string	no	Comma-separated list of keys that MUST exist in the response (dot-notation for nested: "data.id, data.name")
forbidden_keys	string	no	Comma-separated list of keys that MUST NOT exist (e.g. "password, secret, token")
max_response_ms	number	no	Maximum acceptable latency in ms (will be compared if provided)
actual_latency	number	no	Actual measured latency in ms (from the call)
min_items	number	no	If response is an array, minimum number of items expected
max_size_bytes	number	no	Maximum acceptable response size in bytes

Check an MCP server's tool definitions without contacting it — for a server not deployed yet, a stdio server, or a CI gate. Paste the answer to tools/list (raw JSON-RPC or its result), a bare array of tools, one tool definition, or a manifest carrying name/description; input_shape says which one was read. Validates every tool against the MCP spec (name 1-128 chars of A-Z a-z 0-9 _ - .; camelCase a

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
manifest	string	yes	JSON text: the answer to tools/list (raw JSON-RPC or its result), an array of tools, one tool definition, or a manifest with name/description/tools.
strict	boolean	no	Also require documentation: every description ≥ 20 characters, every parameter with a description and a type.

Run a compliance evaluation against a live MCP server over Streamable HTTP, the way a client meets it. Checks: initialize (protocol version, serverInfo, Mcp-Session-Id carried afterwards), notifications/initialized (202), tools/list with pagination, the spec's tool-definition rules, ping, an unknown method (-32601), one tools/call, GET on the endpoint (SSE or 405), and P50/P95 latency over pings.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
url	string	yes	Public URL of the MCP endpoint (e.g. https://mcp.example.com/mcp). An origin alone (https://www.ia-qa.com) tries /mcp, then /.
test_tool_name	string	no	Tool to call in the tools/call step. Without it, the first tool annotated readOnlyHint: true is called, or none.

Scan text for toxic language, hate speech, bias/stereotype framing, violence, sexual and self-harm content. Lexical + structural pattern matching (identity term + predicate), not a semantic classifier — returns per-category risk plus the named rules that fired, so every finding can be checked. Languages: English for every category; French for insults, coarse language, direct threats and self-harm

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
text	string	yes	Text to scan
categories	array	no	Categories to check (default: all)

Validate an LLM function call / tool_use output: check that function name is in allowed list, arguments match expected schema (types, enums, ranges), no extra/missing args. Reads the definitions as OpenAI (parameters), MCP (inputSchema) or Anthropic (input_schema) write them, or as plain required_args/optional_args; reads the call as arguments (object or JSON string), input (Anthropi

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
function_call	object	yes	The function call object from LLM (e.g. { "name": "get_weather", "arguments": {"city":"Paris"} })
allowed_functions	array	yes	List of allowed function definitions, in OpenAI, MCP or Anthropic form, or as {name, required_args, optional_args}

Lint an MCP tool definition for best practices: naming conventions, description quality, schema completeness, required fields consistency, description length. Returns actionable warnings.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
tool_definition	object	yes	MCP tool definition object with name, description, inputSchema

Analyse a set of LLM responses generated from the same prompt template but with different demographic variants (gender, origin, age, tone). Returns a bias score (0-100), sentiment analysis per variant, pairwise Jaccard similarity, and a human-readable verdict. No API key needed — runs entirely locally.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
responses	array	yes	Array of variant responses to compare for bias

Run a comprehensive AI guardrail analysis on an LLM response. Orchestrates 7 deterministic safety checks plus an optional LLM-powered deep analysis in parallel: hallucination detection (grounding score), prompt injection scan on BOTH the response and the original prompt (reported separately as checks.injection / checks.injection_prompt, scored once at the worse of the two), toxicity scan, output v

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
response	string	yes	The LLM-generated response to analyze
source	string	no	Optional reference/source text for hallucination grounding check
prompt	string	no	Optional original prompt. Used for quality scoring AND scanned for prompt injection in its own right (checks.injection_prompt) — pass it whenever you have it, it is where the attack actually lands.
rules	array	no	Optional guardrail rules array (same format as guardrail_test tool)
model	string	no	LLM model for AI-powered deep analysis (default: "openai/gpt-oss-20b"). Set to "none" to skip LLM check. Supports any model from list_llm_models.

Analyse the HTTP security headers of a public URL OR of raw response headers you paste in. Grades each header (A–F) for: Strict-Transport-Security, Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, X-XSS-Protection, Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy, Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy, and Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy. Returns an overall score (0–100), per-h

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
url	string	no	Optional. Full public URL to check (e.g. https://example.com). Omit it entirely when using headers. The server cannot reach localhost/private IPs.
headers		no	Optional, and sufficient on its own (no url needed). The response headers to grade, either as an object {"strict-transport-security": "max-age=...", ...} or as the raw header block pasted as a string

Analyse the SSL/TLS certificate of any HTTPS host. Returns certificate subject, issuer, validity dates, days until expiry, protocol version, cipher suite, key exchange info, and an overall grade (A+, A, B, C, F). Detects expired, self-signed, and weak certificates. Use this to audit TLS posture before production deployment or during security reviews.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
host	string	yes	Hostname to check (e.g. example.com). Do not include https:// prefix.
port	number	no	Port number (default: 443)

Test a URL for CORS misconfigurations. Sends preflight (OPTIONS) requests with various Origin headers to detect: wildcard origins with credentials, origin reflection (echoing any origin), null origin acceptance, subdomain wildcard bypass, and missing Vary headers. Returns risk level (safe/low/medium/high/critical) plus per-origin results. "unknown" means nothing was actually tested — every origin

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
url	string	yes	Full URL to test (e.g. https://api.example.com/endpoint)
origin	string	no	Custom Origin header to test (default: tests multiple origins automatically)

Check the CORS configuration of a URL the same way a browser would. Returns the main response status, all Access-Control-* headers, the tested origin, and the preflight OPTIONS response. Use this for direct CORS debugging, not just security auditing.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
url	string	yes	Full URL to test, e.g. https://api.example.com/resource
origin	string	no	Origin header to simulate (default: https://yourdomain.com)
method	string	no	HTTP method to simulate (default: GET)

Audit the security attributes of cookies set by any URL. Fetches the URL and inspects all Set-Cookie headers for: HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite, Domain scope, Path scope, Max-Age/Expires, __Host-/__Secure- prefixes. Flags insecure patterns: missing HttpOnly on session cookies, missing Secure flag, SameSite=None without Secure, overly broad Domain, and excessive TTL. Returns per-cookie grades and an o

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
url	string	yes	Full URL to audit (e.g. https://example.com/login)

Run a comprehensive web security audit combining headers, SSL, CORS, and cookies checks — then use an LLM to produce a prioritised remediation plan. Orchestrates security_headers_check + ssl_certificate_check + cors_test + cookie_security_audit in parallel, merges all findings, then asks an AI model to: (1) rank vulnerabilities by real-world exploitability, (2) generate a remediation roadmap, (3)

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
url	string	yes	Full URL to audit (e.g. https://example.com)
model	string	no	LLM model for AI analysis (default: "openai/gpt-oss-20b"). Set to "none" to skip AI analysis.
api_key	string	no	Your Groq or HuggingFace API key. Required to enable AI analysis.

Give honest usage feedback on an IA-QA MCP tool. Provide a score (1-5) and a comment. Rate low (1-2) if the tool was wrong, irrelevant, or a poor fit; rate high (4-5) only if it genuinely solved your need. Ratings are read by the IA-QA maintainers and are not published, one vote per agent and tool a month. Comments are screened before storing: one carrying a credential is not stored and personal d

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
tool_name	string	yes	Name of the MCP tool to rate (e.g. "format_json", "shield_analyze")
score	number	yes	Rating from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent)
comment	string	no	Strongly encouraged — explain what you were trying to do and whether the tool got you there. Be specific about what was missing, wrong, or a poor fit. This is the most valuable part of the rating. Up

Decode a JWT (JSON Web Token) and return its header and payload without verifying the signature. Also reports whether the token is expired and the exact expiry date. Use to inspect claims (sub, iss, exp, roles) during debugging or when integrating with an auth provider.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
token	string	yes	The JWT string to decode (header.payload.signature)

Parse and validate a URL. Returns decomposed components: protocol, hostname, port, path, query parameters, hash, and origin.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
input	string	yes	URL to validate and parse

Look up detailed information about any HTTP status code: class, name, description, cacheability, typical causes, and handling best practices. Covers every code in the IANA HTTP Status Code Registry (1xx-5xx, including 226, 425, 451, 508, 511 and the WebDAV codes) with its defining RFC; anything outside the registry is reported as registered: false rather than described. cacheable means heurist

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
code	number	yes	HTTP status code (e.g. 200, 404, 429, 503)

Parse a raw HTTP headers block into a structured JSON object. Detects multi-value headers, masks Authorization values, and optionally audits for missing security headers (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, etc.).

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
headers	string	yes	Raw HTTP headers (one "Name: Value" per line)
analyze_security	boolean	no	Audit for missing security headers (default: true)

Scan code or config files for hardcoded secrets: AWS keys, GitHub tokens, OpenAI/Anthropic API keys, Stripe secrets, JWTs, database connection strings, and generic passwords. Returns findings with severity. Run before every commit.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
input	string	yes	Code or config content to scan (max 500KB)
filename	string	no	Optional filename for context (e.g. ".env", "config.js")

Measure response time of one or more HTTP endpoints (GET/POST). Runs N iterations and returns min/max/avg/p95 latency. Useful for API and MCP server benchmarking.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
endpoints	string/array	yes	Endpoints to benchmark. Accepts a single URL string, an array of URL strings, or an array of {url, method?, body?, headers?, label?} objects.
iterations	number	no	Number of iterations per endpoint (default: 3, max: 10)

Compute a cryptographic hash of a text string. Use when you need to verify data integrity, generate content fingerprints, hash passwords (prefer SHA-256+), or produce a fixed-length digest of any input. Supports SHA-256 (default), SHA-512, SHA-1, and MD5.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
input	string	yes	Text to hash
algorithm	string	no	Hash algorithm: sha256 (default), sha512, sha1, md5

Generate a cryptographically secure random password using crypto.randomBytes. Configurable length (4–128), uppercase letters, digits, and symbols. Use when resetting user passwords, seeding test accounts, or generating API secrets.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
length	number	no	Password length (4–128, default: 16)
uppercase	boolean	no	Include uppercase letters (default: true)
numbers	boolean	no	Include digits (default: true)
symbols	boolean	no	Include symbols like !@#$ (default: false)

Compute an HMAC signature for a message using a secret key. Supports SHA-256 (default), SHA-512, SHA-1, and MD5. Used for API request signing, webhook verification (GitHub, Stripe, Twilio), and JWT validation.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
message	string	yes	Message to sign
secret	string	yes	Secret key
algorithm	string	no	Hash algorithm: sha256 (default), sha512, sha1, md5
encoding	string	no	Output encoding (default: hex)

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install IA-QA Security — 30 tools or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100

Release 1.0.1 · scanned 28 Oct 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score93

Findings0 threat · 8 capability

Capabilitymoderate

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digest522b30f897359f0ab2ae6815993d7ec8662fe18f23ff9ef3361570387315f4db

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	moderate	capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−3
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
find_tool	no tags
prompt_injection_scan	no tags
guardrail_test	no tags
redact_pii	no tags
secret_scan	no tags
validate_agent_trajectory	no tags
validate_mcp_response	no tags
mcp_server_health_check	no tags
mcp_server_evaluate	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
toxicity_scan	no tags
function_call_validate	no tags
mcp_schema_lint	no tags
bias_detect	no tags
shield_analyze	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
security_headers_check	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
ssl_certificate_check	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
cors_test	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
cors_checker	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
cookie_security_audit	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
web_security_audit	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
rate_tool	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false
decode_jwt	no tags
validate_url	no tags
http_status_lookup	no tags
parse_http_headers	no tags
detect_secrets	no tags
latency_benchmark	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
hash_text	no tags
generate_password	no tags
generate_hmac	external-sink	external-sink: keyword "webhook"

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

flow-1

Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digest522b30f897359f0a

Scanned2026-10-28

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.

Where are you running it?

Tool surface

Release history

IA-QA Security — 30 tools MCP

What it does

Quickstart

Where are you running it?

Tool surface

What counts against your monthly calls

What the scan could actually read

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Toxic-flow graph

Supply chain and provenance

Release history

See also