Check an x402 seller before paying: verdict, failure rate and evidence from paid calls on Base.
Nothing to run from here
Jami is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
96/100
trust score
11
downloads a day
local
runs on your machine
954
downloads in 30d
What it does
Jami creator payouts for your agent: ETB checkouts, orders, payouts, webhooks. Powered by ArifPay.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user jami-mcp '--' npx -y jami-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# jami_create_checkout, jami_get_checkout_status, jami_wait_for_checkout and 20 more
Jami costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
KEAll 1 server
kenawak1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Jami as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user jami-mcp '--' npx -y jami-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take JAMI_TOKEN (JamiDev API token (jamidev_test_… for sandbox, jamidev_live_… for production). Optional: docs and offline tools work without it.), JAMI_WEBHOOK_SECRET (Default webhook subscription secret for the webhook tools.) if you want to set them.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
23 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
Start a checkout and get back how the buyer pays — either for one of the organization's published products, or for ANY amount with no product ("charge this buyer 1,237 ETB for order #1042"). Buyers pay in ETB via Telebirr, M-Pesa or CBE Birr; nothing is added on top. In LIVE mode a "direct"…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| product_id | string | no | Product token (p_…) or id. Omit for a custom-amount checkout. |
| description | string | no | Custom amount only: what the buyer is paying for, e.g. "Order #1042" |
| metadata | object | no | Your own key/values, returned on order webhooks (max 20 keys) |
| customer_email | string | no | Buyer email for the receipt. Required with gateway; optional for a payment link |
| customer_phone | string | no | Buyer phone, e.g. "251911223344" |
| customer_name | string | no | — |
| customer_external_id | string | no | Your own user id, stored on the customer record |
| gateway | string | no | Payment method for paid products |
| amount_minor | integer | no | Integer santim. Required for custom amounts (≥ 100) and pay-what-you-want products; ignored for fixed prices |
| checkout_link | string | no | Checkout link token (cl_…) to attribute this session to |
| success_url | string | no | Where to send the buyer after paying |
| collected_fields | object | no | Answers to the product's checkout fields, keyed by field id |
Check a checkout session once. The server reconciles with the payment provider on every call, so this resolves even when webhooks are late. Args: - session_id: from jami_create_checkout. Returns: { session_id, status: 'open' | 'completed' | 'expired', order_id, order_status, amount_minor,…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| session_id | string | yes | Checkout session id returned by jami_create_checkout, e.g. "6710c2e8b1a2f0012ab34cd9" |
| response_format | yes | — |
Poll a checkout session until it's paid or ends, up to timeout_seconds. Reports progress while it waits. If the buyer hasn't finished when the timeout hits, this returns status 'open' (not an error) — call it again to keep waiting. Sessions expire 30 minutes after creation. Args: - session_id:…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| session_id | string | yes | Checkout session id returned by jami_create_checkout, e.g. "6710c2e8b1a2f0012ab34cd9" |
| timeout_seconds | integer | no | — |
| interval_seconds | integer | no | — |
| response_format | yes | — |
Search the official JamiDev developer docs (…/docs) — the source of truth for integrating Jami payments. Works without an API token. Use this before writing integration code: SDK usage, REST endpoints, webhooks and signature checks, sandbox magic numbers, Sign in with Jami (OAuth/OIDC), the…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | yes | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Read one JamiDev docs page as markdown, with every code sample intact. Args: - path: a docs path from jami_search_docs, e.g. "/docs/webhooks", "api/checkout", or a full URL. Use "/docs" for the overview. - offset: character offset for long pages (default 0); the result says where to continue.…
No parameter schema on file.
List the organization's orders, newest first, one page at a time. Args: - status: 'paid' | 'pending' | 'failed' (optional filter). - page: 1-based page (default 1). - limit: 1–100 per page (default 20). Returns: { orders: [{ order_id, status, amount_minor, amount, product: { id, title },…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | string | no | — |
| page | integer | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| response_format | yes | — |
Create a product the organization sells, and get its public Jami page (url) and p_… token. Published by default, so the page and checkouts work immediately. Pricing (can't be changed after creation; the amounts can): - fixed: amount_minor is the price, e.g. 250000 = 2,500.00 ETB. - pwyw…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| title | string | yes | — |
| pricing_model | string | yes | — |
| amount_minor | integer | no | Fixed price in santim |
| minimum_amount_minor | integer | no | Flexible price floor in santim |
| description | string | no | — |
| status | string | no | — |
| response_format | yes | — |
Change a product's title, description, status or price amount. The pricing model itself is locked. Args: product_id (p_… token or id), and any of: title, description, status ('published' | 'draft' | 'archived' — archived stops new sales), amount_minor (fixed price), minimum_amount_minor (flexible…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| product_id | string | yes | Product p_… token or id |
| title | string | no | — |
| description | string | no | — |
| status | string | no | — |
| amount_minor | integer | no | — |
| minimum_amount_minor | integer | no | — |
| response_format | yes | — |
Fetch one product by its p_… token or id: price, status, and its public page url.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| product_id | string | yes | Product p_… token or id |
| response_format | yes | — |
List the organization's products, newest first. Args: status ('published' | 'draft' | 'archived', optional), page (default 1), limit 1–100 (default 20). Returns: { products: [{ product_id, token, url, title, status, pricing_model, price }], total, page, limit, count, has_more, next_page }.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| status | string | no | — |
| page | integer | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| response_format | yes | — |
Check whether a webhook delivery is genuine — the same timing-safe HMAC check and replay guard the SDK runs. Use it to debug "signature mismatch" errors in a handler. Args: - payload: the RAW request body exactly as received (not re-serialized JSON — whitespace matters). - signature: the…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| payload | string | yes | Raw request body |
| signature | string | yes | X-JamiDev-Signature header value |
| secret | string | no | — |
| tolerance_seconds | integer | no | — |
Build a correctly signed JamiDev webhook delivery for testing a handler locally — no real event needed. Args: - type: ${EVENT_TYPES.map((t) =>
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| type | string | yes | — |
| secret | string | no | — |
| data | object | no | — |
| livemode | boolean | no | — |
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Jami or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 96 / 100
Release 0.3.0 · scanned 28 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score96
Findings0 threat · 1 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest1ddcbe8ac06985d3dbd22c2cd179c46897d0fc60f12529171e46b962c0fff49a
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
1 of the 23 recovered tools are registered only when !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:485) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes only the other 15.
2 of the 23 recovered tools are registered only when !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:939) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes only the other 15.
1 of the 23 recovered tools are registered only when !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:1246) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes only the other 15.
3 of the 23 recovered tools are registered only when !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:1396) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes only the other 15.
1 of the 23 recovered tools are registered only when ctx.config.withdrawals && !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:1987) — typically when a key or option is configured. They are part of the server's surface and were analysed; a server started without that configuration exposes only the other 15.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
15 tools are registered unconditionally · (1) 1 more only when !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:485) · (2) 2 more only when !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:939) · (3) 1 more only when !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:1246) · (4) 3 more only when !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:1396) · (5) 1 more only when ctx.config.withdrawals && !ctx.config.readOnly holds (dist/chunk-FWMQFORX.js:1987) — typically when a key or option is configured. All 23 are in the table below and were analysed; the conditional ones are marked.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| jami_create_checkout conditional (1) | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "sms", declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| jami_get_checkout_status | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_wait_for_checkout | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_search_docs | external-sinkuntrusted-input | external-sink: keyword "webhook"; untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_read_doc | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_list_orders | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_create_product conditional (2) | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| jami_update_product conditional (2) | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| jami_get_product | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_list_products | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_create_subscription_link conditional (3) | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| jami_list_subscriptions | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_get_subscription | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_cancel_subscription conditional (4) | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
| jami_resume_subscription conditional (4) | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| jami_simulate_subscription_renewal conditional (4) | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| jami_verify_webhook | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "webhook" |
| jami_create_test_webhook | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "webhook" |
| jami_get_balance | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_quote_withdrawal | no tags | |
| jami_create_withdrawal conditional (5) | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true |
| jami_get_withdrawal | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| jami_list_withdrawals | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest1ddcbe8ac06985d3
Scanned2026-10-28
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.3.0. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.3.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Jami can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.