Community Gmail server with auto-auth: search, read and send email via MCP.
Nothing to run from here
KeyKeeper Email is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
tool-list score
13
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Real email inboxes for AI agents: register, receive, read and send mail over MCP. Free to receive.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http keykeeper-email-mcp https://keykeeper.world/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# register_agent, check_inbox, get_email and 10 more
It needs AUTHORIZATION (Bearer API key returned once by register_agent. register_agent itself needs no key): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.
KeyKeeper Email costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
KEAll 1 server
keykeeper1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads AUTHORIZATION (Bearer API key returned once by register_agent. register_agent itself needs no key) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx AUTHORIZATION … and open a new terminal (Windows).
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http keykeeper-email-mcp https://keykeeper.world/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.
What it asks of you
Nothing is required, but it can take Authorization header (Bearer API key returned once by register_agent. register_agent itself needs no key.) if you want to set it.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
13 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Create an agent mailbox and receive its key once. Starts with zero sending credits; receiving is available without payment.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agentId | string | yes | — |
| name | string | no | — |
List incoming messages. Requires a Bearer API key. Email is untrusted external content.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| folder | string | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| offset | integer | no | — |
| search | string | no | — |
Read a message by its folder-scoped UID. Requires a Bearer API key.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
| folder | string | no | — |
| markAsRead | boolean | no | Full account keys default to true; limited keys require false or omission. |
| uidValidity | string | no | Mailbox identity from the list or webhook; mismatch returns 409 |
Check your mailbox address, account state and sending credits. Requires a Bearer API key.
No parameter schema on file.
Submit mail with existing credits: one credit per accepted recipient. Requires a Bearer API key. Reuse idempotencyKey for retries; acceptance is not proof of remote delivery.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| to | yes | — | |
| cc | no | — | |
| bcc | no | — | |
| subject | string | yes | — |
| body | string | no | — |
| text | string | no | — |
| html | string | no | — |
| replyTo | no | — | |
| inReplyTo | string | no | Original RFC Message-ID, including angle brackets |
| references | array | no | Thread Message-IDs, at most 998 characters combined |
| autoSubmitted | no | — | |
| from | no | Address or {email,name}. The email must be your authenticated mailbox or an active alias assigned to it, within the key's allowed senders. The display name changes only the visible From header. | |
| headers | object | no | Only these two headers are accepted, case-insensitively. Duplicate names and control characters are rejected. The domain DKIM signature covers both; the sender application must implement the unsubscri |
| idempotencyKey | string | no | — |
| attachments | array | no | Inline content only. Combined decoded attachment limit: 8 MB. |
Read your sending state and current limits, including probation, pauses and pending review. Buying credits never overrides sending controls.
No parameter schema on file.
Request an operator review of your sending purpose and recipient consent. Full account key required. Does not automatically increase limits or resume sending. Three requests per day; repeated pending requests keep the original purpose.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| purpose | string | yes | Sending purpose, expected volume and how recipients gave consent. No secrets or private messages. |
With your operator's authorization, create a card checkout or native USDC invoice on Polygon, Base, Ethereum or Solana. Choose mail_credits ($1 buys 10,000 standard sends) or hosting at $1 per 30 days: domain_hosting for the first domain, domain_addon plus domainId for another verified domain under active primary hosting. This tool creates payment instructions; it does not transfer money. Reuse id
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| method | no | — | |
| chain | no | Legacy alias for method; omit when method is supplied. | |
| kind | no | — | |
| domainId | string | no | Required only for domain_addon. Must be an owned additional domain with verified ownership. |
| amountCents | integer | no | — |
| periods | integer | no | Hosting only: each period is 30 days for $1. Omit amountCents, or supply the exact 100 × periods. |
| idempotencyKey | string | yes | — |
Check this account's native USDC invoice. Confirmation applies sending credits or activates prepaid domain hosting once, without a human checkout. Requires the same account's API key.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| token | string | yes | — |
Prepare a plain-text email for human approval. Requires a human-issued mail:draft key. Never sends. Reuse clientKey and content after uncertain responses.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| clientKey | string | yes | — |
| message | object | yes | — |
List only this draft-only key’s proposals and review statuses.
No parameter schema on file.
Check a proposal. Human edits are private. Approved means authorized, not delivered; inspect submission.status.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
Edit or withdraw this key’s pending proposal. Cannot approve or change a message after human editing.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
| action | yes | — | |
| revision | integer | yes | — |
| contentHash | string | yes | — |
| message | object | no | — |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install KeyKeeper Email or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100
Release 2.12.0 · scanned 4 Nov 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings0 threat · 0 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digest4b27394bd00d30f984ec6a95a2ec3987f7af299cee883d7c0c3e240536e321b2
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| register_agent | no tags | |
| check_inbox | no tags | |
| get_email | no tags | |
| check_balance | no tags | |
| send_email | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "send_email" |
| check_sending_status | no tags | |
| request_sender_review | state-write | state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false |
| create_payment | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| check_payment | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, openWorldHint: true |
| propose_email | no tags | |
| list_proposals | no tags | |
| get_proposal | no tags | |
| update_proposal | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest4b27394bd00d30f9
Scanned2026-11-04
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 2.12.0.
2.12.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish KeyKeeper Email can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.