Name: Dependency check
Author: ladanyin

Dependency check MCP

Check a package version for known vulnerabilities and Packagist release facts.

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP API key 2 tools v1.0.0

No reviews yet by ladanyinGitHub The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

96/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Check a package version for known vulnerabilities and Packagist release facts.

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http dependency-check-mcp https://deps.bestsmartgoods.com/mcp --header 'X-API-Key: ${X_API_KEY}'

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   check_package, check_dependency

It needs X_API_KEY (API key from https://firm.bestsmartgoods.com/signup): this sends it in the X-API-Key header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.

Dependency check costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

ladanyin6 servers

6 categories

All 6 servers

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads X_API_KEY (API key from https://firm.bestsmartgoods.com/signup) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the X-API-Key header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx X_API_KEY … and open a new terminal (Windows).

claude mcp add --scope user --transport http dependency-check-mcp https://deps.bestsmartgoods.com/mcp --header 'X-API-Key: ${X_API_KEY}'

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.

What it asks of you

It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: X-API-Key header — API key from https://firm.bestsmartgoods.com/signup. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.

What it writes

One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.

What you approve

2 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

Read the current Packagist facts for one PHP package: latest stable version, required PHP, license, and whether it is abandoned. Use it before composer require. Send vendor/package. Set version to ask about one release; version_found is false when that release is absent, and the latest stable is still returned. This does not list vulnerabilities. The first 5 successful calls each UTC day from one

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
name	string	yes	Packagist name, vendor/package.
version	string	no	Optional release to select. Omit it for the latest stable.

Look up known vulnerabilities for one package version from OSV. Returns advisory id, summary, CVE aliases, severity string, and fixed versions when the advisory lists them. Ecosystems: packagist, npm, pypi, go, crates.io, maven, rubygems, nuget. Omit ecosystem and a vendor/package name uses Packagist, otherwise npm. An empty list means OSV returned none, and that successful lookup is charged. This

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
name	string	yes	Package name, for example guzzlehttp/guzzle or lodash.
version	string	yes	The exact version to check, for example 6.5.0.
ecosystem	string	no	OSV ecosystem. Omit it and a vendor/package name uses Packagist, otherwise npm.

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Dependency check or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 96 / 100

Release 1.0.0 · scanned 5 Nov 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score96

Findings0 threat · 0 capability

Capabilityminimal

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digest454dff8ad61ffe3cc2ea049253f6d3c93758e2cfc02415eb1e429350ee66fc88

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	minimal	capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−0
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
check_package	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)
check_dependency	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server)

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digest454dff8ad61ffe3c

Scanned2026-11-05

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.