Comprehensive Model Context Protocol server for managing Home Assistant through AI assistants.
Localgov Jp is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
Japan central + municipal subsidies (20,810 grants, 1,627 munis). 8 tools beyond Jグランツ MCP.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user localgov-jp-mcp '--' npx -y @localgov-jp/mcp-server
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# search_subsidies, get_subsidy_detail, get_municipality_grants and 10 more
Localgov Jp costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one can run either way — at an address its publisher runs, or as a process under your own user, with your files and your network — and this marketplace is in the path of neither.
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user localgov-jp-mcp '--' npx -y @localgov-jp/mcp-serverReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Its publisher also runs it at https://localgov.jp/mcp: nothing to start on your machine, and this marketplace is not in the path.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http localgov-jp-mcp https://localgov.jp/mcpOne config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
13 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Search Japanese central + municipal subsidies. Combine keyword (Japanese), prefecture, category, or minimum amount.
No parameter schema on file.
Fetch the full record for a single subsidy by id. Returns title, summary, eligibility, amount cap, deadline,
No parameter schema on file.
List all subsidies for a specific municipality by JIS X 0402 6-digit code (e.g. 131105 = 杉並区).
No parameter schema on file.
Given a central J-Grants subsidy id, search for municipal grants that supplement it
No parameter schema on file.
Compare same-category subsidies across nearby municipalities — useful for relocation / siting decisions.
No parameter schema on file.
Create a webhook subscription that pushes grant-change events matching a filter.
No parameter schema on file.
Verify an Ed25519-signed citation receipt previously issued by /api/cite/:grant_id.
No parameter schema on file.
Recommend 3 Japanese licensed practitioners (行政書士 / 税理士 / 中小企業診断士 / 社会保険労務士)
No parameter schema on file.
日本の不動産競売物件を検索 (BIT, bit.courts.go.jp 由来の構造化データ).
No parameter schema on file.
一件の競売物件の構造化データを取得. Fetch one auction by case_id (e.g.
No parameter schema on file.
近日開札予定の競売物件を一覧取得. List auctions whose opening_date falls within the next N days
No parameter schema on file.
裁判所の連絡先・管轄情報を取得. Look up a Japanese district court (本庁 or 支部) by code. Returns name,
No parameter schema on file.
落札・入札に関連する士業を返す (司法書士・弁護士・不動産鑑定士・土地家屋調査士).
No parameter schema on file.
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Localgov Jp or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| search_subsidies | no tags | |
| get_subsidy_detail | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch" |
| get_municipality_grants | no tags | |
| find_supplementary_grants | no tags | |
| compare_municipal_subsidies | no tags | |
| subscribe_changes | external-sink | external-sink: keyword "webhook", handler sends an HTTP POST (fetch(api.base + '/api/webhooks/subscribe') at dist/index.js:222 |
| verify_receipt | no tags | |
| find_practitioner | no tags | |
| search_auctions | no tags | |
| get_auction_detail | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "fetch" |
| list_upcoming_sales | no tags | |
| get_court_directory | no tags | |
| find_practitioner_for_auction | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.2.3. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
No release note was published with this version.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish Localgov Jp can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.