MCP server for DeepL translation API
Nothing to run from here
TunnelMind Data API is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93
tools declared
—
trust score
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Tracker / Sigil / Cross-lens — every TunnelMind Data API operation as one MCP surface.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http tunnelmind-data-api-mcp https://mcp-data.tunnelmind.ai/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# health_check, get_domain, list_domains and 90 more
TunnelMind Data API costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
MDAll 1 server
mcp-data.tunnelmind.ai1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http tunnelmind-data-api-mcp https://mcp-data.tunnelmind.ai/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
93 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Returns a minimal status object confirming the API is alive. Use this to verify connectivity before chaining other calls, or as a liveness check in a workflow. Use this tool when: - You need to verify the API is reachable before starting a multi-step investigation. - A prior call failed with a 503 or 504 and you want to confirm the service recovered. - You are debugging connectivity from a new en
No parameter schema on file.
Returns the complete surveillance intelligence record for a domain name. If the domain is in TunnelMind's tracker database (80,000+ entries), the response includes tracker category, risk score, fingerprinting data, cookie persistence, IAB TCF purposes, and the owning corporate entity. If the domain is not in the database, a live probe is automatically run: RDAP registration data, DNS records (MX,
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Domain name to look up (www. prefix stripped automatically) |
Returns a paginated list of domains from the tracker database. Results are ordered alphabetically by domain name and support cursor-based pagination for full traversal. Filtering by category and minimum score allows targeted data extraction. Use this tool when: - You want to enumerate all known ad-tech or analytics domains above a risk threshold. - You need a dataset of tracker domains for offlin
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| category | string | no | — |
| min_score | integer | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| cursor | string | no | — |
Returns an entity record for a surveillance company or data broker, including its industry, estimated annual data value per user (in USD), categories of personal data collected, and the full list of domains it controls. Free tier returns 5 domains, paid returns up to 200. Use this tool when: - You want to understand what corporate entity owns or controls a tracker domain. - You need to assess the
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| slug | string | yes | — |
Returns a paginated list of corporate entities in the TunnelMind surveillance database. Includes data categories, estimated data value, and industry classification. Useful for enumerating the surveillance ecosystem by sector. Use this tool when: - You want to enumerate all entities in a specific industry (e.g., all ad-tech companies). - You need a dataset of surveillance entities for analysis or
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| industry | string | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
| cursor | string | no | — |
Searches both the domains table and the entities table simultaneously. Returns matching domains (by domain name) and entities (by name or slug) in a single response. Minimum 2 characters, maximum 100 characters. Use this tool when: - You have a partial name and need to identify what tracker or entity it belongs to. - You want to find all TunnelMind records related to a company name like "Google"
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | string | yes | — |
Makes a live HEAD request to the target domain from the Cloudflare edge, follows up to 5 redirects, and returns the full redirect chain, final HTTP status, key response headers, a security header score, and any third-party surveillance actors referenced in the Content-Security-Policy header. Use this tool when: - You want to verify whether a site enforces HTTPS and HSTS. - You need to inspect wha
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | boolean | no | When true, attach a signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log. Additive — a signing failure never costs you the observation (ADR-014). |
| domain | string | yes | — |
| async | boolean | no | When true, return a task handle immediately instead of blocking. Poll get_task for the result. |
Fetches up to 32KB of the domain's HTML and response headers from the edge, then fingerprints the content for known CMS platforms, JavaScript frameworks, CDN providers, and analytics tools. Detection is based on meta generator tags, script src patterns, response headers, and cookie names. Use this tool when: - You need to know what CMS (WordPress, Drupal, Shopify) a site runs. - You are assessing
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | boolean | no | When true, attach a signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log. Additive — a signing failure never costs you the observation (ADR-014). |
| domain | string | yes | — |
| async | boolean | no | When true, return a task handle immediately instead of blocking. Poll get_task for the result. |
Retrieves the target domain's robots.txt file and parses it for AI crawler disallow rules. Specifically detects policies for known AI crawlers (GPTBot, ClaudeBot, CCBot, Bytespider, etc.) and returns a structured summary of the crawling policy. Use this tool when: - You need to know whether a domain has opted out of AI training data collection. - You want to check if a specific AI crawler is bl
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | boolean | no | When true, attach a signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log. Additive — a signing failure never costs you the observation (ADR-014). |
| domain | string | yes | — |
| async | boolean | no | When true, return a task handle immediately instead of blocking. Poll get_task for the result. |
Probes a domain for known AI agent integration signals: llms.txt, ai.txt, /.well-known/ai-plugin.json, openapi.json, swagger.json, MCP manifest, MCP SSE endpoint. Returns a score based on the count of signals detected. Use this to assess whether a domain is ready for agent-to-agent interaction. Use this tool when: - You want to know whether a domain exposes an MCP server or OpenAPI spec
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | boolean | no | When true, attach a signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log. Additive — a signing failure never costs you the observation (ADR-014). |
| domain | string | yes | — |
| async | boolean | no | When true, return a task handle immediately instead of blocking. Poll get_task for the result. |
Fetches a domain's homepage and checks for content patterns that could constitute prompt injection attacks against AI agents that visit and ingest the page. Signals include hidden text, invisible divs, <!-- AI: ignore --> style comments, and known injection patterns. Use this tool when: - You are vetting a domain before feeding its content into an LLM context. - You want to assess the prompt in
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | boolean | no | When true, attach a signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log. Additive — a signing failure never costs you the observation (ADR-014). |
| domain | string | yes | — |
| async | boolean | no | When true, return a task handle immediately instead of blocking. Poll get_task for the result. |
Checks a domain for all known AI training data opt-out mechanisms beyond robots.txt: TDM (Text and Data Mining) reservation headers, <meta name="ai"> tags, Creative Commons NonCommercial licenses, and other machine-readable opt-out signals. Use this tool when: - You need to determine whether a domain has opted out of AI training data collection. - You are checking compliance before using a doma
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | boolean | no | When true, attach a signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log. Additive — a signing failure never costs you the observation (ADR-014). |
| domain | string | yes | — |
| async | boolean | no | When true, return a task handle immediately instead of blocking. Poll get_task for the result. |
Returns metadata for a TunnelMind surveillance receipt — a signed document proving that a specific user's surveillance exposure was observed, measured, and recorded at a specific time. Does NOT return the receipt's signature (anti-phishing protection). To verify a receipt's content integrity, use verify_receipt with the hash and signature from the receipt document itself. Use this tool when: -
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | string | yes | — |
Tamper-detection verification for TunnelMind surveillance receipts. Submit the receipt ID, the SHA-256 content hash, and the Ed25519 signature from the receipt document. The registry compares these against what was recorded at issuance time. Returns VALID if both match exactly, INVALID with a specific mismatch reason otherwise. Use this tool when: - You received a surveillance receipt document an
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | string | yes | — |
| content_hash | string | yes | SHA-256 hex hash of the receipt JSON content |
| signature | string | yes | Ed25519 signature from the receipt document |
Self-serve free tier — the rung between anonymous access and paid blocks. One email in, one API key out, shown exactly once. Use this tool when: - You are calling anonymously and hitting the anonymous rate limit. - You want your calls identified so usage survives IP changes. Limits: - 50 requests/day (same endpoints as anonymous, higher ceiling). - One active free key per email; 3 signups per IP
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| string | yes | — |
Returns the tier, label, masked owner email, creation date, last-used timestamp, today's request count, and daily request limit for the API key used in this request. Useful for agents that need to monitor their own quota consumption. Use this tool when: - You want to check how many requests your key has used today. - You need to know your current tier or daily limit. - You want to confirm that yo
No parameter schema on file.
Permanently deactivates the API key used to make this request. This action is irreversible. After revocation, the key will return 401 on all subsequent calls. If you have an active Stripe subscription, you must separately cancel it at stripe.com — revoking the key does not cancel billing. Use this tool when: - You want to rotate your API key (revoke old, then provision a new one). - You believe y
No parameter schema on file.
Returns the current status of a task created by an ?async=true intel request. Poll this endpoint until status is one of: complete, failed, cancelled, expired. On complete, the result field contains the same payload the sync endpoint would have returned. On failed, error.message explains the failure. Use this tool when: - You submitted an intel probe with ?async=true and need
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| task_id | string | yes | — |
Marks the task as cancelled. If the task is already in a terminal state (complete, failed, expired), returns 409 Conflict. Only the identity that created the task may cancel it. Use this tool when: - You submitted a probe with ?async=true and no longer need the result. - You want to free up a pending task before it expires. Do NOT use this tool when: - The task is already complete — ca
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| task_id | string | yes | — |
Opens a persistent SSE connection that emits events as the task progresses. The stream closes automatically when the task reaches a terminal state or after ~90 seconds (timeout). Heartbeat comments are sent every ~15 seconds to keep the connection alive through proxies. Event types: - status — emitted when status changes (pending → running → complete/failed) - result — emitted on complete w
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| task_id | string | yes | — |
Returns NDJSON (one JSON object per line) of audit log entries. Each entry records the operation called, the identity, hashes of the request and response, duration, and an Ed25519 signature over the canonical entry JSON. Entries are hash-chained: each entry's prev_entry_hash is SHA-256 of the previous entry's signature, making deletion of any entry detectable offline. Authenticated callers rece
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| from | string | no | — |
| to | string | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Looks up each submitted domain in the TunnelMind tracker database, aggregates risk metrics (avg score, max score, fingerprinters, high-risk domains, entity ownership), and issues a signed surveillance receipt. The receipt is stored in the public registry and can be verified at /verify/{receipt_id}. Use this tool when: - You want a verifiable record of which trackers were observed in a context (
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| domains | array | no | Domain names to look up (1–50) |
| domain | string | no | Single domain shorthand (alternative to domains) |
Confirms whether an SSP/exchange is authorized to sell a publisher's inventory according to that publisher's ads.txt. This is a cache lookup against ads.txt files crawled daily across the top 10,000 publisher domains — it does NOT fetch the publisher's ads.txt live, so it is fast and adds no latency to a real-time bidding decision. Use this tool when: - You are an ad-buying agent and want to conf
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | boolean | no | When true, attach a signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log. Additive — the response shape is otherwise unchanged, and a signing failure never costs you the verdict (ADR-014). |
| publisher_domain | string | yes | Publisher domain (www. prefix and scheme stripped) |
| exchange_domain | string | yes | Exchange/SSP domain as listed in ads.txt |
| seller_id | string | yes | Publisher's seller/account ID at the exchange |
| seller_type | string | no | Optional — checked against the ads.txt entry |
| resolve_chain | boolean | no | When true, a matched RESELLER entry is cross-checked against the exchange's sellers.json |
Runs up to 100 ads.txt verifications in a single call — the endpoint an ad-buying agent uses for pre-bid checks across a whole campaign's supply. Each item is the same shape as sigil_verify_ads_txt. Per-item validation failures are reported inline; the batch never fails as a whole. Publisher records are fetched once per unique domain. Use this tool when: - You are evaluating many supply paths a
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| items | array | yes | 1–100 verification requests |
| resolve_chain | boolean | no | Resolve reseller chains for every RESELLER item |
Live traction numbers computed from sources the Worker owns: the hash-chained D1 audit log (7-day call volume, distinct identified callers, top operations), the stored-receipt table, and Stripe (succeeded charges → paying customers, gross USD). Ed25519-signed with the same attestation envelope as /v1/status so the numbers can be replayed to an auditor. Use this tool when: - You are evaluating whe
No parameter schema on file.
P4 corpus replication, the OPA "push data into the PDP" pattern. A daily snapshot of the domain corpus (domain, score, category, fingerprinting, entity) is published as deterministic JSONL with a manifest carrying row_count, sha256 over the exact bytes, a diff summary vs the previous day, and an Ed25519-signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log — a PDP that replicates the data can veri
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| date | string | yes | — |
The exact bytes the manifest's sha256 commits to. Content-Type application/x-ndjson; rows ordered by domain. Verify: sha256(body) == manifest.sha256.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| date | string | yes | — |
JSONL diff vs the previous snapshot — apply +/~/- lines instead of re-pulling the corpus.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| date | string | yes | — |
One sample per 20-minute monitor sweep. uptime_pct is the share of sweeps in which every fail point was green (the strictest read); per_monitor lists only monitors that failed at least once in the window. History begins at feature deploy and is never extrapolated backwards — an empty window returns uptime_pct: null, not 100.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| days | integer | no | — |
P83 Gate 1. The caller is the subject: every fact here comes from the TLS handshake and headers the caller has already sent, so there is no render, no browser, and nothing to authorize. Three surfaces: - client — user-agent, HTTP protocol, TLS version/cipher, ClientHello length, the pre-hashed JA3/JA4 input components, header order. - state — how many cookies were sent (never their values),
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | boolean | no | — |
P75 registry aggregation: the cross-lens join applied to agent identity. Incumbent providers each consult only their own registry; this endpoint checks every registry TunnelMind can reach and labels each answer with an explicit state, so a gap can never be mistaken for a clean result: - observed — the subject IS in this registry (record attached) - not_present — checked, and it isn't (an obse
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| subject | string | yes | IP address, domain, or agent name / User-Agent fragment. |
| receipt | string | no | Attach a signed TunnelMind Receipt v1.0 over the aggregation. |
Reconciles a claimed bot User-Agent against the operator's OWN published IP-range feed (Googlebot, GPTBot, OAI-SearchBot, ChatGPT-User, PerplexityBot, Perplexity-User, Bingbot). A User-Agent is trivial to forge; membership in the operator's published CIDR ranges is not. This exposes the common attack: a scraper sending User-Agent: Googlebot from an IP in none of Google's ranges. Use this tool w
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ip | string | yes | — |
| ua | string | no | — |
Neutral third-party Web Bot Auth verification. An origin — or the PDP deciding for it — received a request from a claimed agent carrying the Web Bot Auth headers (Signature, Signature-Input, Signature-Agent). Relay those headers here, plus the authority the request was addressed to, and TunnelMind verifies the Ed25519 signature against the agent's own published key directory (https://<agent>/.well
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| signature | string | yes | — |
| signature_input | string | yes | — |
| signature_agent | string | yes | — |
| authority | string | yes | — |
| method | string | no | — |
| path | string | no | — |
| scheme | string | no | — |
Subscribe to a node (ip, domain, asn, or entity slug). On a recurring sweep (~20 min) TunnelMind re-runs the fused POST /v1/verify verdict and, when the *material* result changes — the verdict label flips, the trust score crosses a band, or the signal set changes — POSTs a signed event to your callback_url. Webhook authenticity: every delivery carries an X-TunnelMind-Signature: sha256=<hex>
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| node | string | yes | — |
| callback_url | string | yes | — |
| events | array | no | — |
Returns the caller's active and inactive subscriptions (signing_key redacted). Requires an API key.
No parameter schema on file.
Read one of your subscriptions (signing_key redacted).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
Cancel a subscription.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
P72 RFC 6962 transparency log over the unified receipt ledger (ADR-010). The STH commits to the entire log: tree_size, root_hash (0x + SHA-256), timestamp, and an Ed25519 signature (with key_id and embedded public key) over the RFC 8785 canonicalization of the body. Hashes only — receipt bodies are never on this surface. Verify offline with scripts/verify-log.mjs sth (zero TunnelMind
No parameter schema on file.
Proves a specific receipt (by unified receipt_id, lens alias, or raw leaf_index) is included in the tree at tree_size (default: the latest STH's). Returns leaf_hash, the audit_path, the recomputed root_hash, and the matching STH. What this proves: the receipt in your hand is byte-identical to the one sequenced into the log — not that the observation inside it was correct (ADR-010). Ve
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | string | no | — |
| leaf_index | integer | no | — |
| tree_size | integer | no | — |
Proves the log at size second is an append-only extension of the log at size first — history was never rewritten. Returns both roots and the proof path. Verify offline with scripts/verify-log.mjs consistency <proof.json>.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| first | integer | yes | — |
| second | integer | yes | — |
P72 unified receipt ledger (ADR-010): every receipt-issuing surface (cross-lens verify, tracker verify, verdict, profile, explain, GhostRoute, Sigil/ATAP, compliance export) records the exact signed document it returned, keyed by one ID space. Use this tool when: - An agent holds a receipt and wants to confirm TunnelMind logged it (existence + canonical hash) before trusting it in an audit trai
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
P73 fast attributes endpoint (PIP-PLAN P3): a full POST /v1/verify resolve fans out across four lenses (~2s) — fine for preflight, fatal inside a per-request authorization loop. This endpoint serves the last-known signed bundle from a single KV read, with the P69 freshness contract deciding how much to trust it. Use this tool when: - A policy decision point (OPA, Cerbos, Cedar) needs node attri
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| node | string | yes | — |
The Tracker lens-owned verify surface: a per-node verdict over the normalized DDG Tracker Radar / IAB TCF / Disconnect.me corpus, with an optional signed TunnelMind Receipt v1.0. This is the single-lens ground truth the fused POST /v1/verify cites for its tracker block. Use this tool when: - You need to know whether a domain is tracking/surveillance infrastructure and which entity operates it
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| node | string | yes | — |
| receipt | boolean | no | — |
Confirms a publisher controls a domain by checking for a DNS TXT record the owner publishes under _tunnelmind.{domain}. A DNS record can only be set by whoever controls the zone, so its presence proves control — a stronger signal than ads.txt, which is just a file anything in the request path can serve. Use this tool when: - You want proof a publisher actually owns the domain it claims. - You a
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | — |
Classifies an IPv4 or IPv6 address by network type — the high-value ad-fraud signal being datacenter traffic posing as residential or living-room (CTV) devices. IP→ASN resolution uses Team Cymru's public service; the ASN is then classified by its registered organization name. It also cross-references the Scry attacker-observation corpus to detect anonymizing EGRESS — the thing a rotating-resident
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ip | string | yes | — |
Reports whether a domain publishes ads.cert (IAB Tech Lab Authenticated Connections) DNS records — a readiness signal showing the domain supports cryptographically authenticated ad-tech connections. This is not signature verification: ads.cert is pairwise, so verifying a signed bid request requires Sigil to be a delegated participant (a future build). DNS-only and stateless. Inputs: - domain (q
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | — |
Verifies that a mobile or CTV app bundle ID actually exists in the relevant app store — used to detect bundle spoofing in bid requests. Platform support (v1): - ios: verified live via Apple's iTunes Lookup API. - android: verified live via the Google Play store listing page. - ctv_* / web: no public store API — returns verified=null. Inputs: - bundle_id (body, required): e.g. `com.nyti
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| bundle_id | string | yes | — |
| platform | string | yes | — |
| claimed_developer | string | no | — |
A2 — the cross-lens join. TunnelMind owns multiple halves of the open-web graph: Scry sees who is on every IP (attacker intelligence, actor class, Augur threat-intel overlap); Sigil sees the supply graph (publishers, SSPs, DSPs, ads.txt + sellers.json + SupplyChain Object); GhostRoute sees routing integrity & sovereignty (RPKI origin validity, BGP prefix, claimed sovereign zone, sanctions, AI-infr
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| node | string | yes | The node to verify. Type is auto-detected: IPv4/IPv6 address, domain, ASN with optional AS prefix, or entity_slug. |
| weights | object | no | Per-component weight overrides |
| thresholds | object | no | { pass, fail } verdict cutoffs (defaults 0.7 / 0.3) |
| claimed_zone | string | no | Caller-asserted sovereign zone for the subject (e.g. EU) — "the vendor's contract says EU-only; score the routing against that claim." Validated against the sovereign-zone reference; an unknown code |
| ait | string | no | Optional ATAP AIT id (AIT-<uuidv7>). When present, the verdict is wrapped in a witness-tier cross_lens:verified event chained onto the AIT and signed by Sigil (witness OAI-2026-0000201). Independe |
Returns all three lens views for a single node key without computing a fused verdict. Use this when you want raw transparency — the Tracker catalog presence, Scry attacker observations, and Sigil supply-graph position — and intend to make your own decision. For an opinionated verdict, call cross_lens_verify instead. For an agent-side allow/caution/deny gate plus signed consultation receipt, call
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| node | string | yes | IPv4/IPv6 address, domain, ASN with optional AS prefix, or entity_slug. Type is auto-detected. |
The reconciliation layer in one call. Where cross_lens_verify answers "what is this network destination," verdict_lookup answers a different, sharper question about a key-addressed ACTOR: does what this key claims about itself match what the network has seen it do? It fuses two sides: - claim — what the key can prove about itself: its attestation_tier across roots of trust (bare E
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| key | string | yes | The actor's Ed25519 public key, as hex (64 chars, optional 0x), base64url (43 chars, unpadded), or did:key (did:key:z6Mk…). |
| subject | string | no | An ip / domain / ASN / entity_slug the key claims to act as. Drives the conduct (graph behavior) side of the reconciliation. Omit for a claim-only verdict. |
| nonce | string | no | Binding nonce for a bare-Ed25519 self-attestation (paired with sig). |
| sig | string | no | Base64 Ed25519 signature over nonce, proving control of the key. |
| eat | string | no | A RATS/EAT compact JWS (EdDSA) attesting this key, signed by a trusted anchor. |
| claims | string | no | URL-encoded JSON array of raw claim objects, e.g. [{"type":"ed25519-self","signature":"…","nonce":"…"},{"type":"eat","token":"…"}]. Overrides the nonce/sig/eat convenience params when present. |
The single call an agent makes before transacting with a destination on the open web. Composes the cross-lens verdict with a bounded Tracker-presence bonus, maps the adjusted trust score to a tri-state decision (allow / caution / deny), and returns a 5-minute signed consultation receipt (sigil_token with sub: preflight:consulted). The receipt is the load-bearing artifact: the agent atta
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| node | string | yes | IPv4/IPv6 address, domain, ASN with optional AS prefix, or entity_slug. |
| intent | string | no | Free-form context — recorded in the receipt, never affects the decision. Validated against /^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,64}$/. |
| agent_id | string | no | Caller's stable agent identifier, recorded in the receipt. Validated against /^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,128}$/. |
| thresholds | object | no | Optional overrides; must satisfy 0 <= caution < allow <= 1. |
| ait | string | no | Optional ATAP AIT id. When present, chains a witness-tier preflight:consulted event onto the AIT. |
Call this when you need to ACT ON a verdict and prove why. It returns the exact verdict /v1/verify/{node} computes (same fusion, same weights) PLUS a traced evidence chain: every claim is attributed to where it came from — the attested sensor fleet (with attestation tier), a named Augur threat feed, sellers.json/ads.txt supply-graph presence, the cross-lens co-observation join, the DDG/IAB track
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| node | string | yes | IPv4/IPv6, ASN (AS####), domain, or entity_slug. |
Call this before routing traffic, bidding on inventory, or trusting a counterparty. It fuses ALL THREE TunnelMind lenses for one subject — Scry (attacker intelligence + threat feeds + open ports), Sigil (ad-supply-chain position + trust score + ATAP witness count), and Tracker (DDG/IAB catalog + prevalence + categories) — into a single confidence-scored profile plus a signed P38 receipt. The `cro
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ip | string | no | IPv4 or IPv6 address of the subject (Scry lens). |
| domain | string | no | Domain of the subject (Sigil + Tracker lenses). |
| entity | string | no | entity_slug of the subject (Sigil + Tracker lenses). |
Observed component counts first, a labelled derived roll-up second. The components — data_categories, supply-surface counts (ssp + publisher + dsp + owns_seat + buys_through), and corroborating sources — are facts. derived.tracker_density (0–100) is a weighted blend of those counts, not a measurement; data_cost_usd is deliberately excluded (non-zero only for a curated seed, so weighting by
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| entity_slug | string | yes | Stable kebab-case entity identifier ([a-z0-9-], 1–255 chars). |
Reconciles every sell path a publisher declares (sells_through) against each SSP's own sellers.json (exchange_seat) and keeps three classes strictly separate: corroborated (seat present), contradicted (SSP crawled but seller_id absent — real risk), and unchecked (SSP not yet crawled — excluded from risk, lowers confidence). Combined with publisher-side ads.txt opacity. Two-sided corrobor
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Publisher hostname. |
Scores an entity by the trust character of its neighbours — the SSPs its publishers sell through and the DSPs it buys through. Reports neighbour counts, mean/min neighbour trust, and how many neighbours are adversary-classified (P46). derived.halo_score (0–100, or null when no neighbour has a computed trust) is mean neighbour trust dragged down by adversary-neighbour share. Evidence about an ent
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| entity_slug | string | yes | Stable kebab-case entity identifier. |
Surfaces other entities that operate as a coordinated team with this one: they share a NARROWLY-held direct seller account (2–8 entities — network house accounts shared by hundreds are separated into house_accounts_excluded, not counted) or co-own an exchange seat. derived.team_signal (0–100) is a coordination magnitude over teammate count, shared-account breadth, and co-owned seats.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| entity_slug | string | yes | Stable kebab-case entity identifier. |
The core Sigil pre-bid call. Submit a supply path; Sigil composes its individual checks into one trust verdict and returns a signed sigil_token the agent can attach to its bid as proof of verification. Checks composed: - ads_txt — exchange authorized in the publisher's ads.txt. - datacenter_ip — is the IP a datacenter posing as a real user. - fraud_signals — is the IP in Scry's attacker-i
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | boolean | no | When true, attach a signed Receipt v1.0 committed to the transparency log. Additive — the response shape is otherwise unchanged, and a signing failure never costs you the verdict (ADR-014). |
| supply_path | object | yes | — |
| weights | object | no | Per-check weight overrides |
| thresholds | object | no | { pass, fail } verdict cutoffs |
| buyer | object | no | Optional. When present and the verdict is not fail, Sigil opportunistically records a buys_through edge linking the buyer entity to the resolved DSP. Side-effect persistence only — never affects t |
Verifies the authenticity and expiry of a sigil_token returned by sigil_verify_supply_path. Anyone can call this — no key needed; Sigil verifies the Ed25519 signature server-side. Tokens live 5 minutes. Returns valid (boolean), reason (when invalid: malformed / expired / bad_signature / unsigned), and the decoded payload.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| token | string | yes | — |
The bid-time contract. Pass the SupplyChain object from an OpenRTB bid request (source.ext.schain) verbatim, plus the originating site domain or app bundle. Sigil verifies, per node and in aggregate: - origin ads.txt — the publisher's ads.txt authorizes node[0] (asi + sid). - per node — the node's asi sellers.json declares the node's sid. - owner-domain — node[0]'s sellers.json seller `doma
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| site_domain | string | no | — |
| app_bundle | string | no | — |
| schain | object | yes | — |
| buyer | object | no | Optional. When present and the verdict is not fail, Sigil opportunistically records a buys_through edge linking the buyer entity to the resolved DSP. Side-effect persistence only — never affects t |
Reconstructs the supply paths for a publisher domain from Sigil's own crawl and returns them ITEMIZED — distinct from sigil_verify_supply_chain (which verifies a schain the caller brings) and from signal_dark_pool_risk (which returns only aggregate counts). Every SSP the publisher declares it sells through is joined to that SSP's identity and classified two-sided against the SSP's sellers.json
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | Publisher hostname to traverse. |
| limit | integer | no | Max paths returned (default 200, hard cap 500). |
One public "state of the corpus" readout — the whole graph in a single call. Distinct from the Scry-only sensor stats at api.tunnelmind.ai/v1/stats (which this reuses for the scry block): this spans Scry, Sigil, and Tracker plus the attestation and routing layers. Use it to cite live coverage — how many publishers / SSPs / DSPs / sell paths / sellers.json seats are in the Sigil supply graph, ho
No parameter schema on file.
The over-time layer behind the site's website map (the radar's evolution). Every domain verify appends the domain's machinery tuple — origin AS, RPKI state, announced prefix, network country, CDN, certificate authority, registrar, owning entity, and the per-lens coverage tri-states — to an append-only change-log, one row per observed change (plus a daily heartbeat row per looked-up domain). Hones
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | — |
D4 — the freshness contract a PDP can gate on. For each lens (Scry / Sigil / Tracker / GhostRoute) this reports the newest observation timestamp in the corpus, the declared ingest cadence (taken from the ingester's own code and cron schedules, never asserted), the published SLO, the current corpus age in seconds, and whether the SLO holds. GhostRoute reports its three corpus workers (CT hourly, RP
No parameter schema on file.
GhostRoute is TunnelMind's fourth lens: routing-integrity / sovereignty verification. It answers "is this infrastructure where it claims to be, owned by who it claims, routing where it says — and does that match the sovereign jurisdiction it asserts?" It resolves the originating ASN owner, RPKI validity, the certificate-issuing CA's jurisdiction, and matches the subject against a curated AI-infras
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| entity | string | yes | An IPv4/IPv6 address, domain, ASN (AS####), or cert SHA-1/256 to check. |
| receipt | boolean | no | When true, issues a signed, persisted GhostRoute receipt (GR-YYYY-NNNNNNN) instead of an ephemeral verdict. |
Retrieves a previously-issued, signed GhostRoute receipt by its GR-YYYY-NNNNNNN id, for independent audit of a past sovereignty verdict. Use this tool when: - You hold a GhostRoute receipt id and want to confirm its contents/signature. - You are reconciling an agent's action log against the attestation layer. Inputs: - receipt_id (path, required): GR-YYYY-NNNNNNN. Returns: - The full persiste
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt_id | string | yes | — |
Returns GhostRoute's ownership-graph record for an autonomous system: the registrant/parent organisation, its HQ country and sovereign zone, RIR, and cloud/AI-infrastructure flags. The long-term moat — who actually owns the network a route originates from. Use this tool when: - You have an origin ASN and need its corporate owner + jurisdiction. - You are assessing whether an ASN belongs to a clou
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| asn | string | yes | — |
Checks whether a domain or ASN belongs to a known AI company's infrastructure and what sovereignty it CLAIMS (program, zone, HQ), the baseline GhostRoute scores routing reality against. Use this tool when: - You want to know "whose AI infrastructure is this, and what does it claim?" - You are enriching an endpoint before deciding whether to send it inference. Inputs: - entity (path, required):
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| entity | string | yes | — |
Returns GhostRoute's first-party Certificate-Transparency witness state: the latest signature-verified Signed Tree Head (STH) for every trusted, non-Google CT log TunnelMind independently witnesses, plus a regression scan over our own append-only history. Proof the platform holds its own signature-checked roots rather than reselling crt.sh/certspotter. Use this tool when: - You want corpus-wide C
No parameter schema on file.
Returns GhostRoute's per-cert inclusion proofs: each is a cryptographic demonstration that the exact certificate a host serves is included in an append-only CT log whose root TunnelMind signature-verified — upgrading "a monitor said this cert exists" to "proven in a log we witness". Failed attempts are included with a reason; a cert that suddenly cannot be proven is itself a signal. Use this to
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Returns the durable, deduplicated ledger of CT equivocation events the GhostRoute witness worker detects and pushes — a tree_size_rewind (an append-only log shrank), a root_fork (one tree_size witnessed with two different Merkle roots = a split-view log), or an sth_signature_invalid (a log's latest Signed Tree Head failed signature verification). Where /v1/ghostroute/witness shows live computed
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | no | — |
Returns the routing anomalies the bgp-monitor has observed against TunnelMind's BGP watchlist — the witnessability layer's routing dimension. The monitor polls RIPEstat (RIPE NCC) on a cron, self-baselines each watched prefix's origin set on first sight, then records an event whenever a later poll deviates from that baseline. Use this to check whether a prefix or ASN you depend on (an SSP's egres
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| resource | string | no | Filter to one watched resource — a CIDR prefix (e.g. 45.32.0.0/24) or an ASN (e.g. AS13335). Omit for all. |
| since_ms | integer | no | Unix epoch milliseconds lower bound on observed_at. |
| limit | integer | no | Max events returned (default 100, hard cap 500). |
Returns a publisher's ads.txt change log — one entry per crawl in which its authorized-seller set changed. A publisher quietly adding a reseller line is a real fraud signal; this is how a buyer audits supply over time. Inputs: - domain (path, required): publisher domain. - since (query, optional): ISO date / date-time lower bound on observed_at. - limit (query, optional): max entries — de
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | string | yes | — |
| since | string | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Returns the active, versioned default weights used to combine an entity's trust-score components, plus the list of spec components that are not yet evaluated. Pass a custom weights object to sigil_score_batch to re-weight without changing the defaults.
No parameter schema on file.
Returns the pre-computed 0.0–1.0 trust score for one entity, its component breakdown, and the 14-day trend. Scores are refreshed daily by a database job — this endpoint never recomputes from raw data, so it is fast and deterministic. entity_id is {entity_type}:{key} — e.g. publisher:nytimes.com or ssp:pubmatic.com. Entity types: publisher, ssp, dsp, app_bundle (publishers and SSPs
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| entity_id | string | yes | — |
| weights | string | no | URL-encoded JSON: an object of { type: { component: weight } }. |
Scores up to 200 entities in one round-trip — built for agents evaluating many supply sources during campaign setup. Per-item parse failures are returned inline; the batch never fails as a whole. An optional weights object re-weights every entity in the call.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| entity_ids | array | yes | — |
| weights | object | no | Optional custom weights: an object of { type: { component: weight } }. |
Registers an ATAP v0.1 AIT for a media-buying agent under the sigil:media_buyer:v1 profile. Sigil validates the capability set and constraints against the published profile, signs the AIT as the witness (OAI-2026-0000201), stores it, and returns the signed token. Sigil is the ATAP witness — there is no kernel observer. See https://github.com/TunnelMind/atap-profiles.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| profile | string | yes | — |
| operator | string | yes | The agent operator's canonical OAI. |
| agent_type | string | no | — |
| capabilities | array | yes | — |
| constraints | object | yes | — |
| attestation_policy | object | yes | — |
| expires_at | string | yes | — |
Ingests one agent-reported event (bid:submitted, bid:won, bid:lost, budget:decremented) into an AIT's hash-chained attestation log. Sigil validates the payload (rejecting any PII per ATAP §7.6), classifies the evidence tier — anchored if a bid:submitted cites a valid Sigil token issued for this AIT and matching the bid's supply path, otherwise asserted — derives any `constraint:viola
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ait | string | yes | — |
| event_type | string | yes | — |
| payload | object | yes | — |
Rolls every not-yet-blocked Witness Event for an AIT into one signed ATAP Attestation Block with a profile period_summary, chained onto the prior block.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ait | string | yes | — |
Returns an AIT's status, chain head hash, event count, pending-event count, per-tier event counts, and the anchored-bid coverage ratio.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | string | yes | — |
Assembles the ATAP v0.1 §7.5 Receipt ZIP for an AIT — the signed Receipt (manifest.json), the AIT, the Attestation Block chain, the witness public key, a tier-graded summary.json, the bundled verify.sh reference verifier, and the witness events + sigil_tokens as profile artifacts. Any pending events are rolled into a final block first. The ZIP verifies offline — unpack it and run `verify.sh
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ait | string | yes | — |
| format | string | no | — |
Returns your current compliance configuration (regime, retention_days, export_formats, enabled) and the catalog of supported regimes (EU AI Act Art.12, DORA, NYDFS 500, HIPAA, PCI DSS, SOC 2, generic) and export formats (signed_json, csv, eat, stix). Authenticated. The compliance ledger is a tamper-evident, retained record of every verdict you make — configure it once, then it self-maintains.
No parameter schema on file.
Set the customizable knob: which regulatory regime your auditor maps to, how long to retain decision content, and which export formats to offer. Body: { enabled?, regime?, retention_days?, export_formats? }. retention_days is 1..3650; regime is one of the catalog ids; export_formats is a non-empty subset of [signed_json, csv, eat, stix]. No bespoke engineering — you pick, the ledger adapts.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| enabled | boolean | no | — |
| regime | string | no | — |
| retention_days | integer | no | — |
| export_formats | array | no | — |
Returns your hash-chained decision records — one per verdict-bearing call (/v1/verify, /v1/explain, /v1/preflight, /v1/profile) made while compliance is enabled. Each entry carries its node, verdict, scores, receipt_id, the full decision record, and the chain hashes (prev_hash, entry_hash). Filter with from/to (ISO8601) and page with cursor (a seq) + limit (≤1000).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| from | string | no | ISO8601 lower bound (inclusive). |
| to | string | no | ISO8601 upper bound (inclusive). |
| cursor | integer | no | Resume after this seq. |
| limit | integer | no | Page size, max 1000. |
Generates a signed export bundle of your ledger over an optional time window, mapped to your regime's field names and citation, with a manifest + chain-integrity proof + the latest signed checkpoint. Choose the format with ?format= (signed_json | csv | eat | stix; defaults to your profile's first) and override the regime with ?regime=. The response is a downloadable artifact your auditor can verif
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| format | string | no | signed_json | csv | eat | stix. |
| regime | string | no | Override the profile regime for this export. |
| from | string | no | ISO8601 lower bound. |
| to | string | no | ISO8601 upper bound. |
Recomputes your entire hash chain server-side and reports integrity ({ intact, entry_count, chain_head_hash } — plus reason + first_break_seq if a record was altered or deleted), alongside the most recent Ed25519 checkpoint signed with the TunnelMind receipt key. This is the auditor's "prove it" button — and even TunnelMind cannot rewrite history before a signed checkpoint without detection.
No parameter schema on file.
Returns the TunnelMind analyst config bundle. Configures any LLM (Claude, GPT, Gemini, local) to behave as a TunnelMind analyst that knows the data graph, follows the 5-call golden path, and surfaces attestation_tier on every claim. The bundle is signed inline (Ed25519, key_id from /.well-known/receipt-signing-key.json). Add ?receipt=true to wrap the response in a Receipt v1.0 envelope for end-
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| surface | string | no | — |
| version | string | no | Pin a specific bundle version. Omit for latest. |
| receipt | string | no | When true, wrap the bundle in a Receipt v1.0 envelope. |
Single-item revocation lookup per Receipt Format v1.0 §8.2. Verifiers that do not want to maintain a local mirror of /.well-known/receipt-revocations.json call this endpoint instead. The response includes feed_version for cache coherence. Use this tool when: - You are verifying a receipt and need to confirm its signature.key_id is still trusted. - You are verifying a receipt and need to con
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| key_id | string | no | Receipt-format signing key_id to check. |
| id | string | no | UUIDv7 of a specific receipt to check. |
Runs a curated signature corpus over a piece of untrusted text — content an agent is about to consume, a retrieved document, a tool result, an email body — and returns the matched injection patterns plus a bounded 0..1 risk score. This is a signal, never a policy decision: the caller decides what to do with a flagged input. Detected classes: instruction_override (ignore/override previous rules),
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| text | string | yes | Untrusted text to scan for injection signatures. |
Connect to a caller-supplied MCP server (Streamable-HTTP transport), read its advertised tools, and run the injection corpus over every tool name / description / input schema — plus a capability heuristic that flags broad, dangerous powers (shell execution, filesystem write, credential access, arbitrary network, destructive DB ops). Returns a per-tool safety report. A caution to review, never a ve
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | string | yes | MCP server endpoint (Streamable-HTTP). http or https. |
Close the loop: after you acted on a TunnelMind verdict, tell us how it went. Reports aggregate per node into an advisory second opinion that any caller can read back via GET /v1/feedback/{node}. Advisory only. In v0 a negative aggregate does NOT silently lower the fused trust score — it's a human-weighable signal beside the verdict, not an automatic reweight. Use this tool when: - You acted o
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| node | string | yes | — |
| outcome | string | yes | — |
| receipt_id | string | no | — |
| note | string | no | — |
Public read of the crowd-sourced outcome aggregate for a node — how callers reported their real-world results after acting on its verdict. Advisory signal, not a trust verdict. An empty aggregate returns cleanly with total: 0 and signal: none. signal is derived: none (no reports), insufficient (<3), positive / negative (score past ±0.3), or mixed.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| node | string | yes | ip, domain, asn, or entity slug. |
Validates an agent's x402 v1 client implementation against a TunnelMind surface end-to-end. Two operating modes: - mode: "demo" — HMAC over a nonce against a publicly-published secret. Does not move USDC. Smoke proves the WIRE works, not money movement. - mode: "x402" — real Coinbase facilitator dispatch (gated on operator wallet provisioning; currently returns "facilitator not configured
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| X-PAYMENT | string | no | base64(JSON) payment payload per the x402 v1 spec. Absent → 402 challenge. |
Free
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| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install TunnelMind Data API or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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—Grade not published
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Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
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Release history
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1.0.1
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