Validate Formhaus form definitions and simulate multi-step paths against the real engine.
Nothing to run from here
Secureflows is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
18
tools declared
—
trust score
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
MCP server for secureFlows: token-free URL builders and integration-linting tools for AI agents.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http secureflows-mcp https://www.secure-flows.com/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# get_sessions, post_sessions, get_sessions_identity and 15 more
Secureflows costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
MLAll 2 servers
michal-lefler2 servers
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http secureflows-mcp https://www.secure-flows.com/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
18 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Returns the decrypted session payload for the authenticated internal session token. Response shape is a flat JSON object. Empty payload returns {}. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions Requires auth.sessionToken and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | no | — |
Verifies Firebase ID token, creates a session for workspaceName, stores serialized payload (defaults to {} when omitted), and returns sessionToken (JWT; subject = internal session id). Default server-side TTL is 1 hour (implementation detail). If the Firebase token includes email, the server best-effort persists it on the workspace end-user row (for audit display
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | object | yes | — |
Returns the workspace end-user's userId and email for the authenticated session token. Does not return Firebase UID or session payload. userId is a stable, opaque identifier for this person across sessions and logins — it is not derived from Firebase. Use it as the correlation key when your own backend needs to link an external event (e.g. a billing provider webhook you receive an
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | no | — |
Verifies Firebase ID token. If an active session already exists for (workspaceName, Firebase UID, app_id), returns a new sessionToken JWT for the most recently created matching row (touches activity; does not create a duplicate session). The request payload is ignored on reuse — it is applied only when a new session row is created. Prefer a dedicated app_id per inte
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | object | yes | — |
Verifies Firebase ID token. Parses sessionToken path segment as an internal SESSION JWT without enforcing JWT expiry (signature and tokenType=SESSION are still validated). Loads the session by id from the token subject; the Firebase UID must match the session owner. Increments tokenRevision on the server so previous session JWTs (same session id, older revision) are no lo
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | yes | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | no | — |
Sets a key in the encrypted session payload and returns the updated decrypted payload. If the JSON body is { "value": <x> }, the server unwraps it and stores <x> directly. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/set/{key} Requires auth.sessionToken and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | yes | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | yes | JSON body can be either { "value": <x> } (preferred) or a raw JSON value. |
Retrieves the decrypted payload value for key. Important: 404 means the key was never written (normal first-use case). Do not treat as an error. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/get/{key} Requires auth.sessionToken and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | yes | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | no | — |
Removes key from the session payload and returns true if the key existed. Source: DELETE /api/v1/sessions/delete/{key} Requires auth.sessionToken and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | yes | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | no | — |
Permanently revokes the session referenced by the internal SESSION Bearer token. The session ends and everything stored in it is destroyed and cannot be restored. This is NOT sign-out: to sign a user out and keep their data, use POST /api/v1/auth/logout (or, in a browser, the redirect helper GET /api/v1/auth/logout). Call revoke only when the user or an admin deliberately wants the session and its
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | no | — |
Browser redirect endpoint used after hosted /app/sessions/login. No Authorization header. 1. Verifies firebaseToken (Firebase ID token). 2. Ensures client_redirect_uri is allowlisted for app_id (same rules as validate-redirect). 3. Create vs renew: If session_token is absent, reuses the newest active session for **`(workspace_name, Firebase UID, app_id
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | yes | — |
| body | no | — |
Browser-friendly logout endpoint for cross-site clients (e.g. apps running on localhost). Use this as a top-level navigation (not XHR/fetch) so Clear-Site-Data is applied in a first-party context on secure-flows.com, making cookie/session clearing reliable even when third-party cookies are blocked. Critical client rules: - Clear your in-app sessionToken state before n
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | yes | — |
| body | no | — |
Logs out the current session without revoking it. Browser warning: calling this endpoint via XHR/fetch from a different origin than secure-flows.com is not a reliable way to clear hosted-login cookies. For browser apps (especially localhost), prefer the redirect helper GET /api/v1/auth/logout?session_token=...&redirect_uri=.... Behavior: - Invalidates the current sessionToken b
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | no | — |
Returns a page of sessions for the current user within the current workspace. Self-service dashboard endpoint — requires workspace enableSelfService: true. Payload is included only for rows whose computed status is active. Sort keys match the admin workspace session list; pageSize is clamped to 1–200 (default 20). Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/my Requires auth.userToken and forwards it a
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | yes | — |
| body | no | — |
Self-service dashboard endpoint. Revokes a session owned by the caller in the current workspace. The session ends and its stored data is destroyed permanently; this is not sign-out. Requires workspace enableSelfService: true. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/revoke/{sessionId} Requires auth.userToken and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as s
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | yes | — |
| query | object | no | — |
| body | no | — |
Embeds the query with Ollama (nomic-embed-text) and returns the closest public doc chunks from the environment's search index (pgvector). Source: GET /api/v1/docs/search No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| connection | object | yes | — |
| auth | object | no | — |
| params | object | no | — |
| query | object | yes | — |
| body | no | — |
Builds a correct hosted-login redirect URL. Needs no secureFlows token — safe to call at app-scaffolding time, before any user session exists, which is the phase most secureFlows integration mistakes happen in. Always targets /app/sessions/login (session apps). Never builds the legacy /app/login console URL, which returns a firebaseToken your SecureFlowsCallback handler cannot consume and causes
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| origin | string | no | secureFlows origin — always https://www.secure-flows.com in production |
| workspaceName | string | yes | Workspace name from the human prompt ("workspace = ...") |
| appId | string | yes | App id from the human prompt ("appId = ...") |
| redirectUri | string | yes | The app's unguarded /callback URL, built from the published/allowlisted app origin — never from an iframe or editor chrome origin. |
| intent | string | no | fresh_login: normal sign-in, or app-load restore with no prior token (default — almost always correct, including after an explicit sign-out). renew_expired_token: ONLY when resuming the SAME still-int |
| expiredToken | string | no | The old sessionToken to renew. Only read when intent=renew_expired_token. Setting this after an explicit sign-out is the "send a dead JWT into hosted login" anti-pattern — it breaks renewal when the u |
Builds a correct redirect-logout URL and refuses to build one that violates the two documented logout anti-patterns: a redirect_uri pointing at /callback (SPA callback handlers treat the tokenless return as a failed login and loop), and a redirect_uri that itself embeds session_token (silently renews the old session instead of signing out). The result always instructs top-level navigation, never
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| origin | string | no | secureFlows origin — always https://www.secure-flows.com in production |
| sessionToken | string | yes | The current sessionToken to invalidate. |
| postLogoutRedirectUri | string | yes | Where the browser lands after logout completes — allowlisted, must NOT be /callback, and must NOT itself contain session_token. |
Checks source you already generated against the secureFlows integration rules. Needs no secureFlows token; safe at scaffolding time. Pass every auth/session-related file in one call — some checks are evaluated across the whole set. Two kinds of findings: • scope "file" — a forbidden construct is present (localStorage token, legacy /app/login, fetch-based logout, client-side JWT decode, e
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| files | object | yes | Map of relative file path -> full file source to scan, e.g. { "src/lib/secureflows.js": "..." } |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Secureflows or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
—Grade not published
No rule-by-rule report on file for this release
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
This listing is an address its publisher runs, and you connect to it directly — this marketplace is not in the path. The scanner reads packages and public source, and an address is neither: the repository linked on this page is where this record was collected from, not a copy of what the address serves, so it is not graded in its place. So there is no grade — not a withheld one, an unmeasured one.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.2.0.
0.2.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Secureflows can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.