Name: Mitigant
Author: mitigant

Mitigant MCP

Run real, auto-recovered cloud attacks on AWS, Azure and GCP to test your defenses.

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP API key 10 tools v0.1.0

No reviews yet by mitigant The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

93/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Run real, auto-recovered cloud attacks on AWS, Azure and GCP to test your defenses.

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http mitigant-mcp https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp --header 'apiToken: ${APITOKEN}'

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   list_attacks, get_attack_details, launch_attack and 7 more

It needs APITOKEN (Your Mitigant API key, generated in the Mitigant web app under Settings -> Application Keys. The server scopes every call to that key's organization and role): this sends it in the apiToken header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.

Mitigant costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

mitigant1 server

1 category

All 1 server

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads APITOKEN (Your Mitigant API key, generated in the Mitigant web app under Settings -> Application Keys. The server scopes every call to that key's organization and role) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the apiToken header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx APITOKEN … and open a new terminal (Windows).

claude mcp add --scope user --transport http mitigant-mcp https://mcp.mitigant.io/mcp --header 'apiToken: ${APITOKEN}'

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.

What it asks of you

It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: apiToken header — Your Mitigant API key, generated in the Mitigant web app under Settings -> Application Keys. The server scopes every call to that key's organization and role.. You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.

What it writes

One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.

What you approve

10 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

Browse Mitigant's attack actions -- atomic tests that each emulate one attacker technique -- that you can launch on their own against AWS, Azure or GCP. Currently 111 attack actions (AWS 49, Azure 36, GCP 26). Returns each action's attackName (show this to the user) and attackType (an opaque id -- pass this, not attackName, to get_attack_details or launch_attack), what it does, its impact, the MIT

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
cloud_service	string	yes	Which cloud provider's attack catalog to list
service_filter	string	no	Optional: only show attacks targeting this cloud service/resource type. Valid values are per cloud_service and not interchangeable (e.g. AWS object storage is 'S3', GCP's is 'CLOUDSTORAGE', Azure's is
category_filter	string	no	Optional: only show attacks in this category. Category names vary by cloud_service and the set is not fixed, so do NOT guess one -- a guessed category simply returns an empty list. Call this tool with
orchestration_filter	string	no	Optional: PROVISIONED attacks create their own target resources, attack them, and delete them -- they do not target your existing infrastructure (they may still read or use existing resources along th

Full description, impact, MITRE mapping, and orchestration type (PROVISIONED or INLINE -- PROVISIONED attacks create and destroy their own target rather than targeting your existing infrastructure (they may still read or use existing resources along the way), so they're the lower-risk, production-viable choice; INLINE attacks find and attack an existing resource in the account) for one attack, by

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
cloud_service	string	yes	—
action_key	string	yes	The attack's attackType value (an opaque id, e.g. IAM_CREATE_USER -- not attackName) from list_attacks

Run an attack against a cloud account connected to Mitigant and return the result once it finishes. This performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure -- it is not a simulation. Confirm with the user before calling: if their request could match more than one attack in list_attacks (similar names, or an underspecified description like "the security group attack"), show them the matching candid

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
cloud_service	string	yes	—
account_no	string	yes	Target account identifier -- AWS account number, Azure subscription ID, or GCP project ID
action_key	string	yes	The attack's attackType value to launch (an opaque id, not attackName) -- from list_attacks or get_attack_details
region	string	no	Optional: the region to run the attack in (e.g. us-east-1, eu-west-3). Omit to use the account's default region (the defaultRegion from list_cloud_accounts); passing a region here does not change the

List the cloud accounts available for attack emulation -- any account not listed here cannot be attacked, so check this before guessing an account_no for launch_attack. An empty result means no accounts are onboarded for attack emulation (for that cloud, or at all), not a failure -- the account may still exist in Mitigant for other purposes (e.g. posture scanning) without being eligible here. Each

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
cloud_service	string	no	Optional: only list accounts for this cloud provider (AWS, AZURE, or GCP). Omit the field entirely to list accounts across all three; an empty string is tolerated and treated the same as omitting.

List Mitigant's attack scenarios -- multi-step chains that combine several attack actions run in sequence, so treat a scenario as having the combined blast radius of every step. Currently 45 scenarios (AWS 26, Azure 12, GCP 7). Returns each scenario's scenarioName (show this to the user) and scenarioKey (an opaque id -- pass this, not scenarioName, to get_scenario_details or launch_scenario), plus

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
cloud_service	string	yes	Which cloud provider's scenario catalog to list

Full details for one attack scenario -- description, impact, and the step-by-step composition, by the scenario key from list_scenarios. A scenario runs several attacks in sequence; this returns every step, not just the first. Result includes scenarioName (show this to the user) alongside the scenarioKey you passed in (an opaque id, not for display).

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
cloud_service	string	yes	—
scenario_key	string	yes	The scenario's key (an opaque id) from list_scenarios

Run a multi-step attack chain against a cloud account connected to Mitigant and return the result once every step finishes. This performs real actions on real cloud infrastructure, as several attacks in sequence -- it is not a simulation, and its blast radius is the combined blast radius of every step. Confirm with the user before calling: if their request could match more than one scenario in lis

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
cloud_service	string	yes	—
account_no	string	yes	Target account identifier -- AWS account number, Azure subscription ID, or GCP project ID
scenario_key	string	yes	The scenario's key to launch (an opaque id) -- from list_scenarios or get_scenario_details
region	string	no	Optional: the region to run the scenario in (e.g. us-east-1, eu-west-3). Omit to use the account's default region (the defaultRegion from list_cloud_accounts); passing a region here does not change th

Get the current report for a previously launched attack, including its clean-up state. Returns the attack report plus a 'cleanup' summary with cleanUpComplete and a plain-language statement. Only tell the user the account is back to its pre-attack state when cleanup.cleanUpComplete is true -- while anything is pending or failed, clean-up is not done, so report it as in progress and check again rat

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
attack_id	string	yes	The attackId returned by a previous launch_attack / launch_scenario call

Clean up a previously launched attack, restoring the cloud resources it changed back to their pre-attack state. Clean-up is normally AUTOMATIC after a short, deliberate inspection window (so the team can verify the attack and collect evidence first); calling this kicks it off immediately rather than waiting out that window. It is NOT a fix for a stall, and it ends that window early -- removing the

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
cloud_service	string	yes	—
attack_id	string	yes	The attackId returned by a previous launch_attack / launch_scenario call

Get the evidence Mitigant collected for a previously launched attack -- what the account's own logging (CloudTrail, GuardDuty) recorded about it. Returns an 'evidence' summary (counts, sources, and a plain-language statement) plus the raw records, each with an evidenceUrl that opens the matching console entry. Use it to show the user what their defenses saw, especially during the clean-up inspecti

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
attack_id	string	yes	The attackId returned by a previous launch_attack / launch_scenario call

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Mitigant or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100

Release 0.1.0 · scanned 28 Oct 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score93

Findings0 threat · 0 capability

Capabilitymoderate

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digest1c844544ce9dbea4a4a6ba526e1fe23908770f792855624d9c5f570a64585551

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	moderate	capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−3
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
list_attacks	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: keyword "browse"
get_attack_details	no tags
launch_attack	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true
list_cloud_accounts	no tags
list_scenarios	no tags
get_scenario_details	no tags
launch_scenario	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true
get_attack_status	no tags
clean_up_attack	state-write	state-write: declares readOnlyHint: false
get_attack_evidence	no tags

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digest1c844544ce9dbea4

Scanned2026-10-28

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.