Model Context Protocol server for Rollbar
Checkly is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
Assertion checks for status, headers and content - no API key.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user mrfentmen-checkly-mcp '--' npx -y checkly-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# assert_status, assert_headers, assert_content and 9 more
Checkly costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Checkly as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user mrfentmen-checkly-mcp '--' npx -y checkly-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
12 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Run a synthetic check on a URL: does it answer with the status you expect, inside the time budget, without a redirect loop.
No parameter schema on file.
Check that required headers are present, forbidden ones are absent, or one header contains a given value.
No parameter schema on file.
Check that a page's HTML contains expected text and does not contain forbidden text — a smoke test for deploys.
No parameter schema on file.
Plain reachability check: HTTP status, response time, server header and any redirects.
No parameter schema on file.
Trace every redirect hop with its timing, and flag loops or an http-to-https upgrade that never happens.
No parameter schema on file.
Read the links on a page and report which ones answer with an error status, so a deploy cannot ship dead links.
No parameter schema on file.
Sample a URL a few times and assert the median and worst time stay inside a budget, reporting each sample.
No parameter schema on file.
Treat a URL as a JSON API: check it parses, then assert a dot-path exists and optionally equals or contains a value.
No parameter schema on file.
Assert that a URL redirects, optionally that it lands on a given Location and answers with a specific status.
No parameter schema on file.
Transport and browser-side security for one URL: HTTPS upgrade, HSTS, CSP, nosniff, referrer and permissions policy, COOP, Secure and HttpOnly cookie flags, and any plain-HTTP resource referenced by the page.
No parameter schema on file.
The machine-checkable part of an accessibility audit: html lang, document title, single h1 and heading levels, image alt attributes, blank alt text, viewport zoom locking, landmark elements and a skip link.
No parameter schema on file.
Search metadata actually served by one URL: title length, meta description, rel=canonical, Open Graph and Twitter card tags, robots meta, hreflang alternates and whether every JSON-LD block parses.
No parameter schema on file.
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Checkly or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| assert_status | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| assert_headers | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| assert_content | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| check_url | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| check_redirects | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| broken_links | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| assert_response_time | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| assert_json | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| assert_redirect | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| http_security_report | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| a11y_basics | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| seo_meta | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 1.0.2. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
No release note was published with this version.
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish Checkly can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.