MCP server for interacting with the Scryfall MTG API
Demozoo is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
Keyless MCP server for Demozoo, the demoscene database: search 390k+ demos, intros, graphics and...
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user demozoo-mcp '--' npx -y demozoo-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# search_productions, get_production, get_releaser and 4 more
Demozoo costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts Demozoo as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user demozoo-mcp '--' npx -y demozoo-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
7 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Search Demozoo for demoscene productions: demos, intros, graphics, music. Finds titles across 390k+ entries.
No parameter schema on file.
Get a Demozoo production by id: authors, release date, platforms, credits, and download links.
No parameter schema on file.
Get a Demozoo group or scener profile by id: nicks, group memberships, members.
No parameter schema on file.
The Demozoo taxonomies used to classify productions: every production type with its supertype, and every platform, optionally filtered by name.
No parameter schema on file.
Browse Demozoo demoparty records: parties with dates, locations, organisers and websites, party series, or bulletin board systems with their location coordinates.
No parameter schema on file.
Every production credited to a Demozoo releaser or group, with authors, release dates, platforms and types, plus a platform usage breakdown for that releaser.
No parameter schema on file.
Browse the Demozoo production archive by platform, resolving a platform name or id from the catalogue of 94 platforms and listing matching productions with authors and release dates.
No parameter schema on file.
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Demozoo or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| search_productions | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_production | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "download", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| get_releaser | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| reference_catalogue | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| parties_and_scenes | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "browse", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| releaser_productions | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| platform_productions | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: keyword "browse", declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 1.0.2. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
No release note was published with this version.
- The version this listing was on when mcprush began following its releases. The registry was not asked when it shipped, so this row carries no date.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish Demozoo can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.