Local MCP capabilities provider for Expo
pkinative MCP — X.509, CMS, OCSP, time-stamps and PKCS#12 is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
What it does
PKI MCP server: inspect, verify, issue, sign X.509, CSR, CRL, OCSP, CMS, TSP, PKCS#12. 34 tools
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user pkinative-mcp-x-509-cms-ocsp-time-stamps-and-pkcs '--' npx -y pkinative-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# open_keys_safely
pkinative MCP — X.509, CMS, OCSP, time-stamps and PKCS#12 costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts pkinative MCP — X.509, CMS, OCSP, time-stamps and PKCS#12 as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user pkinative-mcp-x-509-cms-ocsp-time-stamps-and-pkcs '--' npx -y pkinative-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Nothing is required, but it can take PKINATIVE_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR (Absolute path of the one sandbox directory: path inputs are read from it and outputMode='file' outputs are written under it (never overwritten; the real path of every file read and of every parent written must stay inside — a planted symlink or junction is SECURITY_VIOLATION). Key-bearing files (.key .p8 .p12 .pfx) are read by the key tools only, never written, never served as resources. Unset: every tool works on inline PEM / base64 only.), PKINATIVE_MCP_CACHE_DIR (Opt-in content-addressed response cache directory (SHA-256 keyed, 1h TTL, 256 MiB LRU, plaintext at rest). Never caches path inputs, file output, a call carrying a password or a signer, a clock-dependent instant, a random serial or nonce, describe_engine or draft_governance_issue.), PKINATIVE_MCP_PORT (Serve Streamable HTTP on this loopback port (POST /mcp) instead of stdio (MCP 2026-07-28, stateless, legacy fallback). Unauthenticated unless PKINATIVE_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN is set.), PKINATIVE_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN (Opt-in bearer token for the HTTP transport (>= 16 chars, no whitespace; a weaker value refuses to start). When set, /mcp requires 'Authorization: Bearer <token>' or answers 401. Compared constant-time, never logged.), PKINATIVE_MCP_PASSWORD (Operator-side password of the encrypted PKCS#8 key or PKCS#12 file the tools open (keeps the secret out of the model transcript). Exclusive with the per-call password input (both at once is VALIDATION_ERROR). Never logged; only its presence is reported at startup.), PKINATIVE_MCP_AT (Pinned instant (ISO 8601 or epoch milliseconds) every omitted at / notBefore / signingTime falls back to, for reproducible verdicts and artefacts. Unset: the wall clock (a clock-dependent result is never cached). An invalid value refuses to start.), PKINATIVE_MCP_MAX_INPUT_BYTES (Operator ceiling for limits.maxInputBytes and the decoded size of one PKI object (default 67108864 = 64 MiB, the engine default). Integer >= 1024, read once at startup; an invalid value refuses to start. A per-call value above it is refused with LIMIT_CEILING_EXCEEDED.), PKINATIVE_MCP_MAX_KDF_ITERATIONS (Operator ceiling for limits.maxKdfIterations and limits.maxPkcs12KdfIterations (default 10000000, the engine default): the CPU bound of a hostile PBES2 key or PKCS#12 file. Integer >= 1, read once at startup; an invalid value refuses to start.), PKINATIVE_MCP_MAX_PATHS_EXPLORED (Operator ceiling for limits.maxPathsExplored (default 1000, the engine default): the RFC 5280 section 6 path-building work bound. Integer >= 1, read once at startup; an invalid value refuses to start.) if you want to set them.
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
1 tool, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
No parameter schema on file.
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install pkinative MCP — X.509, CMS, OCSP, time-stamps and PKCS#12 or to call it, at any volume.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | source | publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| open_keys_safely | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 1.0.0. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
No release note was published with this version.
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Any signed-in account that does not publish pkinative MCP — X.509, CMS, OCSP, time-stamps and PKCS#12 can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.