Local MCP capabilities provider for Expo
Nothing to run from here
vetcode is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
92/100
trust score
5
tools declared
local
runs on your machine
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Security check for coding agents: malware, supply chain, secrets and web bugs. Reads, never runs.
Quickstart
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download vetcode.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is dbac2abbd119303734c6c9d21254e7c79984d256e790194674fe5e6cb742f329
The full guide: https://github.com/openyard-cloud/vetcode/releases/download/v0.8.6/vetcode.mcpb
Publishernot claimed
OCAll 1 server
openyard-cloud1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts vetcode as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download vetcode.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is dbac2abbd119303734c6c9d21254e7c79984d256e790194674fe5e6cb742f329
The full guide: https://github.com/openyard-cloud/vetcode/releases/download/v0.8.6/vetcode.mcpb
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
Scan a local folder for malware, supply-chain risks, AI-agent attacks, leaked secrets and web/server vulnerabilities. Read-only: never installs or runs anything from the folder. Returns candidates that must be confirmed by reading the code (see vetcode_guide).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | string | yes | Absolute path of the project folder to scan. |
| online | boolean | no | Also look up dependencies on OSV.dev (sends package names and versions only). |
| deps | boolean | no | Also read installed node_modules (install scripts and their code). |
| history | boolean | no | Also search git history for secrets that were committed and removed. |
| diff | string | no | Only files changed against this git base (empty string: uncommitted changes). |
| no_ignore | boolean | no | Ignore the folder's .vetcodeignore and inline suppressions. Use for code you did not write. |
Check a shell command before running it: finds the npm and PyPI packages, Rust crates and Go modules it would install (npm/pnpm/yarn/bun install, npx, pip, uv, pipx, poetry, cargo add/install, go get/install), the ones a bare npm install or pip install -r would add from the project in cwd, the…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| command | string | yes | The shell command you are about to run, e.g. "npm install left-pad". |
| cwd | string | no | Folder the command would run in (to see tools already installed there and private registry settings). |
How to do a vetcode security review: pick the scan mode, confirm each candidate with an exploit scenario, review what patterns cannot see, and write the report. Read this before reporting findings.
No parameter schema on file.
A manual-review checklist: malware (how attacks hide and how to analyse them safely), web (auth, IDOR, input handling, payments, LLM features), isolation (libraries, SDKs, brokers, databases and sandboxes that decide who may do what), server (deployment, containers, cloud and BaaS), secrets (where…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| topic | string | yes | — |
Run a vetcode security review of a folder: scan, confirm, review by hand, report.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install vetcode or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 92 / 100
Release 0.8.5 · scanned 12 Nov 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score99
Client score92
Findings23 threat · 3 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digestdbb87ce6ee91a2bdfec0888fe8a3ea31f7eae3013bbca276f9be0d0e887645bb
Score vectorthreat 99 → client 92
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| vetcode_scan | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| vetcode_guard | code-execuntrusted-input | code-exec: parameter "command"; untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| vetcode_guide | no tags | |
| vetcode_reference | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestdbb87ce6ee91a2bd
Scanned2026-11-12
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
It installs from its repository rather than from a versioned package, so the command cannot be pinned to a release. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.8.5.
0.8.5
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
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no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish vetcode can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.