Local MCP capabilities provider for Expo
Nothing to run from here
Agents is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
7
tools declared
—
trust score
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Pay-per-call safety guards for AI agents: injection, tool-call, signing, secret, x402-trust.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http paygent-obsmetrics-com-agents-mcp https://paygent.obsmetrics.com/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# secure-code-review, pr-summary, x402-trust-audit and 4 more
Agents costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
POAll 1 server
paygent.obsmetrics.com1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http paygent-obsmetrics-com-agents-mcp https://paygent.obsmetrics.com/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
7 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Security review of a code snippet or diff. Returns structured findings (severity, CWE, location, remediation). [security; up to 75c/call]
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| code | string | yes | Source code or unified diff to review |
| language | string | no | Language hint, e.g. typescript, python |
| context | string | no | Optional context about the code |
Turn a git diff into a clear PR description or release notes. [dev-tools; up to 30c/call]
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| diff | string | yes | Unified git diff to summarise |
| style | string | no | e.g. conventional, changelog, executive |
Vet an x402 counterparty before settling USDC: scores the advertised payment requirements AND (when supplied) the EIP-3009 authorization you are about to sign. Returns a machine-enforceable trust verdict (per-entry scores, coverage-honest trustScore, spend-constraint + tamper-evident fingerprint) for buyer agents and wallet/spend-policy layers. No endpoint fetch. [security; up to 200c/call]
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| paymentRequirements | yes | The x402 payment requirements from the counterparty: the 402 accepts array, or a single object. | |
| selectedOptionIndex | number | no | Index in the accepts array the buyer intends to settle (default 0). The verdict is scoped to it. |
| paymentPayload | no | The UNSIGNED EIP-3009 authorization the buyer is about to sign: { authorization|message: {from,to,value,validAfter,validBefore,nonce}, domain: {name,version,chainId,verifyingContract} }. Lets the audi | |
| expected | object | no | Optional caller expectations. |
| spendPolicy | object | no | Optional buyer spend policy to evaluate against and to pin facilitators. |
| endpointUrl | string | no | Resource URL being paid (context only; never fetched). |
| serverMetadata | no | Optional server metadata the caller already holds (context only; not fetched). | |
| context | string | no | Optional free-form context. |
Pre-sign safety oracle for agent wallets: submit the transaction or EIP-712 message you are about to sign and get a machine-enforceable verdict. Decodes the calldata/typed-data, flags the drainer toolkit (unlimited approvals, setApprovalForAll, permit/permit2 + EIP-3009 to an unexpected party, transferFrom draining an unnamed account, ownership transfer, raw ETH to a stranger), and binds the decod
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| tx | object | no | An EVM transaction you are about to sign. |
| typedData | object | no | An EIP-712 message you are about to sign (the off-chain drainer surface: permit, Permit2, EIP-3009). { domain, types, primaryType, message }. |
| expected | object | no | Your stated intent. Supplying it lets the verdict BIND the action; only a fully bound, clean action is auto-sign-safe. For an allowance, you MUST supply maxAmount; for a transferFrom, supply from. |
| spendPolicy | object | no | Optional buyer spend policy (context only). |
| context | string | no | Optional free-form context. |
Untrusted-content guardrail for agents: submit a blob of text you are about to feed to your own LLM (scraped web content, a tool result, another agent's message) and get a machine-enforceable verdict - is this a prompt-injection / jailbreak / data-exfiltration / tool-hijack attempt? Returns a risk level, the detected classes with spans, the unicode obfuscation it found (zero-width, bidi-override,
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | yes | The untrusted text to scan before you feed it to your LLM. |
| context | string | no | Optional: where the content came from (url, tool name, sender) - context only. |
Pre-execution safety oracle for agent actions: submit the tool call you are about to run (shell, http, sql, file, code, env) plus your stated intent, and get a machine-enforceable verdict before you execute it. Decodes what the call does, flags the danger toolkit (rm -rf, reverse shell, curl|sh, SSRF to cloud metadata, credential reads, DROP/DELETE-without-WHERE, path traversal, dynamic eval), and
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| call | object | yes | The tool call you are about to execute. |
| intent | string | no | What this call is for (natural language). Used by the classifier for intent-mismatch. |
| expected | object | no | Machine-checkable constraints. Supplying them lets the verdict BIND the call; only a positively-scoped, satisfied call is auto-exec-safe. |
| context | string | no | Optional: where the task/input came from (untrusted source label). |
Leaked-credential guardrail for agents: submit a blob you are about to commit, log, post, or hand to another tool (a diff, a config, an .env, an LLM output) and get a machine-enforceable verdict - does it contain a live secret? Detects cloud keys (AWS), VCS tokens (GitHub/GitLab), provider API keys (Stripe, OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Slack), private-key blocks, JWTs, and credentials embedded in UR
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| content | string | yes | The text to scan for leaked secrets (diff, config, .env, log line, LLM output). |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Agents or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
—Grade not published
No rule-by-rule report on file for this release
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
This listing is an address its publisher runs, and you connect to it directly — this marketplace is not in the path. The scanner reads packages and public source, and an address is neither. So there is no grade — not a withheld one, an unmeasured one.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.0.9.
0.0.9
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Agents can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.