Comprehensive Model Context Protocol server for managing Home Assistant through AI assistants.
Nothing to run from here
PhilForms is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
99/100
trust score
5
tools declared
local
runs on your machine
9
downloads
What it does
Find, fill and verify official Philippine government forms: BIR, SSS, PhilHealth, Pag-IBIG, CSC.
Quickstart
This one is not published to a package registry, so there is no one-line install: it is built and started the way its own source says.
Publishernot claimed
PHAll 1 server
philforms1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts PhilForms as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
This one is not published to a package registry, so there is no one-line install: it is built and started the way its own source says.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Search the catalogue of Philippine government/agency forms (BIR, SSS, PhilHealth, Pag-IBIG, GSIS, COA, CSC, GPPB …). Returns form ids to use with the other tools.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | string | no | e.g. "2307", "withholding certificate", "philhealth claim" |
| agency | string | no | — |
The fill contract of one form: every parameter with its printed label, type (tin/date/amount/choice/…), format, allowed choice values and printed cell count.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| form_id | string | yes | — |
Fill a form. data is keyed by parameter name from get_form_parameters. Values the printed form cannot hold are rejected with the reason. Returns the saved PDF path and its tamper-evident document id.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| form_id | string | yes | — |
| data | object | yes | — |
| file_name | string | no | — |
| compute | boolean | no | Fill the blank lines the form itself says how to work out (totals, 8% tax due …) — never changes a value you sent |
Dry run before fill_form (free, no PDF): returns every refused value as an issue { field, label, code, expected, message } — e.g. a letter in a TIN, a short PhilHealth PIN, an impossible date — and the core fields (filer ID, name, address) still blank. Values are never silently altered: fix the…
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| form_id | string | yes | — |
| data | object | yes | — |
| compute | boolean | no | Also work out the form's computed lines; they come back under computed |
Check whether a PDF was issued by … and is unmodified (genuine / modified / unknown).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| path | string | yes | — |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install PhilForms or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 99 / 100
Release 1.0.0 · scanned 18 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score99
Findings0 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest5cc97e117b00ba3f6a6094176fef72af8b9e4c532953da9e960efec1d385bf0f
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 99
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (5 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| search_forms | no tags | |
| get_form_parameters | no tags | |
| fill_form | no tags | |
| check_form_values | no tags | |
| verify_pdf | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest5cc97e117b00ba3f
Scanned2026-10-18
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
It installs from its repository rather than from a versioned package, so the command cannot be pinned to a release. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 1.0.0.
1.0.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish PhilForms can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
No reviews yet
Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.