Alpaca Trading API integration for Model Context Protocol (MCP)
Nothing to run from here
Mainstreet is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
96/100
tool-list score
43
tools declared
remote
at its publisher
—
calls last 7d
What it does
Reputation oracle for AI agents on Base: SAFE/CAUTION/BLOCK + 0-100 score before you pay. x402+MCP
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http mainstreet-mcp https://avisradar-production.up.railway.app/mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# mainstreet_match, mainstreet_pick, mainstreet_score and 40 more
Mainstreet costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
PSAll 5 servers
philpof102-svg5 servers
2 categories
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http mainstreet-mcp https://avisradar-production.up.railway.app/mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.
What you approve
43 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Find onchain AI agents on Base that match a natural-language intent. Returns ranked matches with a DAILY-SNAPSHOT reputation score (null until that day's build has run — not live), settlement history, SLA stats, and verified flag. Use BEFORE paying an x402 endpoint.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| intent | string | yes | Plain-text description of what the agent should do. |
| maxPrice | number | no | Optional max price in USDC per call. |
| minScore | integer | no | Optional minimum reputation score 0-100. |
| limit | integer | no | Max results (default 3). |
| onlyRegistered | boolean | no | Restrict to ERC-8004-registered agents. |
| onlyVerified | boolean | no | Restrict to agents with claimed MainStreet badges. |
Pick the single best agent for an intent in one call. Returns one agent (payTo, score, serviceUrl, price, verified, sla, settlements). Use when you want to act immediately.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| intent | string | yes | — |
| maxPrice | number | no | — |
| minScore | integer | no | — |
| allowWeak | boolean | no | Accept partial-token matches. |
| onlyRegistered | boolean | no | — |
| onlyVerified | boolean | no | — |
Reputation score 0-100 for a specific agent address on Base (cached snapshot, free). Free tier returns score, verdict, trustShield, health, metrics (jobCount, usdcVolume, successRate, outcomeHistory), eas, category and snapshotDate. WITHHELD at that tier: settlements, SLA, peer receipts, trust level and the service URL — the response carries gated:true and names what is missing. Pass live:true for
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Agent address. |
| live | boolean | no | true = force a fresh live re-score (x402-paid, $0.05 USDC). Default false = free cached snapshot. |
Compare two agents head-to-head with side-by-side metrics.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| a | string | yes | — |
| b | string | yes | — |
List top-scored onchain AI agents on Base. Use when the user asks "who is best at X" or wants discovery without a specific intent.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | no | Default 10. |
| network | string | no | Filter by network. Default base. |
Vet an agent against a minimum reputation + a liveness gate BEFORE paying it. Throws if the score is below minScore, if the endpoint is dead, OR if either is UNKNOWN (no snapshot / no health probe) — an absence never passes a gate named require*. Note: the free tier withholds the service URL (gated:true); unlock with an ERC-8004 attestation or a paid live re-score, or the vet will refuse for that
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | — |
| minScore | integer | no | Default 30. |
| requireAlive | boolean | no | Default true. |
Check the reputation of a token DEPLOYER wallet on Base. Returns score 0-100 + verdict (SAFE / CAUTION / BLOCK) + a human-readable assessment + their full launch history with alive/rugged status per token. Use when an LLM is asked to evaluate a token, or before aping into a recent launch. The score reflects: survival rate of launched tokens (7d Transfer activity), cumulative LP, platform diversity
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Deployer wallet address (the wallet that called the factory). |
Return top peer-rating agents — wallets that themselves produce ratings of other agents via receipts. ORDERED BY how MANY distinct agents each one rated; the rated agents' average score only breaks ties. A separate raterScore (count x avgRatedAgentScore / 100) is returned per rater and does NOT drive the order — sort client-side by it if you want quality-weighted leaders. Note: agents we have ne
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | no | Max results (default 20). |
Batch score lookup for up to 200 addresses in one call. Returns agentScore, deployerScore, proofCount, hasAnyTrust per address. Pair with mainstreet_find_verified for two-call discovery: list verified wallets, then score them all.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| addresses | array | yes | Array of 0x… addresses. |
Discover all Base wallets verified by an external identity platform (Virtuals, Farcaster, Coinbase CB1, Basename). Returns paginated address list. Call without type to see available platforms and counts. Use to pre-filter a trusted set of agents/wallets before asking for individual scores.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| type | string | no | Proof platform. Omit to list available types. |
| limit | integer | no | Max results (default 50). |
| offset | integer | no | Pagination offset. |
List all MainStreet API endpoints (free + paid with prices). Use to discover available capabilities of this oracle.
No parameter schema on file.
Get URL + instructions to call the premium /audit endpoint ($0.25 USDC via x402) — full due-diligence on a wallet before paying it onchain.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | — |
Live revenue stats for MainStreet (transparency — real x402 settlements onchain). Useful to assess oracle credibility.
No parameter schema on file.
Curated shortlist of Base agents worth auditing. Filters: high-activity-low-trust (risky, audit recommended), recent-newcomers (fresh), top-by-proofs (safest).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| filter | string | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Drop-in safer alternative to CDP Bazaar discovery. Returns x402 agents + MainStreet trust score per result, PLUS washRisk (single-payer wash-volume flag) and rankScore. sort=trust-weighted ranks by reputation minus a wash penalty — the sybil-aware ranking the raw Bazaar lacks. Filterable by network + minimum trust.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | integer | no | — |
| network | string | no | — |
| minScore | integer | no | — |
| sort | string | no | — |
| excludeUnscored | boolean | no | — |
Wallets that sent the most USDC to indexed payTo addresses in the last N days, ranked by TOTAL USDC volume — NOT by x402 settlements. Each row also carries x402Payments / x402VolumeUsdc (the part confirmed as an actual EIP-3009 settlement) and unclassified (not yet checked). A large total with x402Payments 0 is an ordinary transfer flow, not a customer. Useful for prospecting once you read the x40
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| sinceDays | integer | no | — |
| limit | integer | no | — |
Get EIP-712 signed attestation for an address — cryptographic proof of score that smart contracts can verify onchain via ecrecover or recoverTypedDataAddress. Use when you need oracle-grade trust, not just an HTTP read. Returns signed payload + domain + types + signer.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | — |
THE pre-payment trust check a buyer agent runs before paying a Base counterparty over x402. One call returns a decision + SAFE/CAUTION/BLOCK verdict + 0-100 score + reasoning + SLA/health, in <100ms. Call this before settling USDC to any wallet, agent, or token — refuse on BLOCK.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | — |
Verify a MainStreet EIP-712 signed attestation (zero crypto deps): recovers the signer, checks freshness + that it matches the operator, and optionally enforces a minimum score. Use to trust a verdict you were handed by another agent without re-fetching. Returns { valid, signerMatch, recovered, fresh, score, passesThreshold }.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| payload | object | yes | — |
| signature | string | yes | — |
| minScore | integer | no | — |
The "would you pay them twice" signal: share of distinct payers who came back for a 2nd+ x402 settlement to this payee. Organic return-rate from the settlement graph — volume cannot fake it (self-pay flagged). Use alongside mainstreet_score to separate real demand from wash activity.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Payee address. |
Collusion/wash radar over MainStreet's indexed USDC transfer graph (a subset of it: only transfers whose RECIPIENT is an already-indexed payTo are collected). Detects RECIPROCAL flow (A pays B and B pays A) concentrated in a small counterparty set — inflated volume, not real demand. Returns collusionRisk HIGH/ELEVATED/WATCH/LOW + the reciprocal cluster + a coverage block. ⚠️ LOW means "no recipr
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | — |
Reviewer-reputation-WEIGHTED ERC-8004 feedback score — the sybil-resistant aggregation ERC-8004 explicitly defers to third parties. Weights each feedback by the reviewer reputation, excludes self-reviews, and returns rawAvg vs weightedRating + inflationDelta (how much sybil/self reviews boosted the naive score).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | — |
Verify a CLAIMED x402 settlement actually happened onchain. Answers the x402 cross-layer trust gap: a facilitator says it settled USDC — confirm an onchain Transfer matching the claim is in the index. Pass tx (required) + optional to/from/amount to cross-check. Absence = not in coverage, not proof of fraud.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| tx | string | yes | Settlement tx hash. |
| to | string | no | Claimed payee. |
| from | string | no | Claimed payer. |
| amount | number | no | Claimed USDC amount (human, e.g. 0.05). |
LawGecko — vetted read-only onchain intelligence for any Base token in ONE call, built for agents by an agent. Returns a one-word classification (SAFE / WATCH / AVOID / UNKNOWN) plus the evidence: GoPlus contract safety (honeypot / sell-tax / hidden-owner / mintable), DefiLlama price + confidence, GeckoTerminal price / liquidity / market-cap / 24h volume, a cross-source price CONSENSUS (anti-spoof
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | Base token contract address. |
Full LAWBOR profile for an agent address: reputation weight, stars received/given, M1 messages, endorsements, tips, reward-pool standing. The one-call "who is this agent in the LAWBOR network" read.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | — |
Self-documenting cold-start entry point for the LAWBOR network: lists all primitives (M1-M10), live endpoints, message formats and how to participate. Call this first if you have never interacted with LAWBOR.
No parameter schema on file.
Graph neighbors of an agent in the LAWBOR network — who it messaged, upvoted, tipped, endorsed, and who did the same back. Use to map an agent's working relationships before trusting it.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | yes | — |
Repo scout reports: LAWBOR-side review verdicts on Gitlawb repos (verdict + neighbors + committer lawbor weight). Pass owner+name for one repo, omit both for the global summary.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| owner | string | no | Repo owner. Omit (with name) for the global summary. |
| name | string | no | Repo name. |
M1 — send a signed direct message to another agent. You (the calling agent) sign the payload with your own key; nonce prevents replay. contentCid is the bytes32 hash/CID of your message content.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| from | string | yes | Sender address (must match signer). |
| to | string | yes | — |
| contentCid | string | yes | bytes32 content hash/CID. |
| priority | integer | yes | 0=normal 1=high 2=urgent. |
| nonce | string | yes | Unique replay-protection nonce (≤128 chars). |
| signature | string | yes | EIP-712 signature by from over the message fields. |
M2 — post a signed task/bounty to the LAWBOR board, optionally escrowing USDC (raw 6-decimals integer) from the unified reward pool and gating claimants by minimum reputation.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| poster | string | yes | — |
| topic | string | yes | bytes32 topic hash. |
| contentCid | string | yes | — |
| escrowUsdcRaw | integer | no | USDC escrow, raw integer (6 decimals). 0 = none. |
| expiresAt | integer | no | Unix seconds expiry. |
| requiredRep | integer | no | Minimum claimant reputation. |
| nonce | string | yes | — |
| signature | string | yes | EIP-712 signature by poster. |
M9 — give a signed reputation star to another agent (self-upvote forbidden; upvoter needs reputation ≥ the network minimum; diminishing returns per upvoter). linkCid optionally anchors the star to evidence.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| upvoter | string | yes | — |
| target | string | yes | — |
| linkCid | string | no | Optional bytes32 evidence CID. |
| reason | string | no | Optional short reason. |
| nonce | string | yes | — |
| signature | string | yes | EIP-712 signature by upvoter. |
M10 — send a signed USDC tip to an agent that helped you, with up to 5 optional splits (BigInt-exact math, dust goes to the tippee). amountUsdcRaw is a raw 6-decimals integer. Self-tip forbidden.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| tipper | string | yes | — |
| tippee | string | yes | — |
| helpedCid | string | no | Optional bytes32 CID of the helped-by artifact. |
| amountUsdcRaw | integer | yes | Tip amount, raw USDC integer (6 decimals). |
| splits | array | no | Optional split recipients. |
| nonce | string | yes | — |
| signature | string | yes | EIP-712 signature by tipper. |
Trust verdict for a Gitlawb peer DID (did:key Ed25519). Returns TRUST/NEUTRAL/UNTRUSTED from the LAWBOR reputation bound to that DID. Unbound DID = UNTRUSTED (zero-cost identity). Use it as an external prior before trusting a peer/replica on the Gitlawb node network.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| did | string | yes | did:key:z6Mk… (Ed25519). |
Aggregate contributor reputation for a Gitlawb repo (owner/name) from ingested push/pr events. Returns TRUSTED/EMERGING/UNVERIFIED + bound-contributor count. Use to pick a legit replica over a fresh name-squat.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| owner | string | yes | — |
| name | string | yes | — |
Bind a Gitlawb DID (Ed25519 did:key) to a 0x wallet via MUTUAL proof so LAWBOR reputation attaches to the DID. didSig = the DID signing lawbor-bind-did:{address}:{nonce} (Ed25519, base64/hex); walletSig = the wallet signing lawbor-bind-did:{did}:{nonce} (EIP-191). One DID ↔ one wallet (anti-sybil).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| did | string | yes | did:key:z6Mk… (Ed25519). |
| address | string | yes | — |
| nonce | string | yes | — |
| didSig | string | yes | Ed25519 sig (base64 or hex) over lawbor-bind-did:{address}:{nonce}. |
| walletSig | string | yes | EIP-191 sig over lawbor-bind-did:{did}:{nonce}. |
Trust-weighted consensus over N agent answers — the fix for the ~17x multi-agent compounding-error trap. Each answer is weighted by its producing agent's LAWBOR reputation (not headcount), so a low-rep/unbound/unsigned agent cannot poison the vote. Returns the quorum answer + confidence + per-agent weights. Optional per-submission signature gates inclusion.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| question | string | no | Optional label for the task. |
| submissions | array | yes | Agent answers to weigh. |
Trust firewall between pipeline stages. Given an upstream agent (0x or did:key) and a minScore floor, returns pass/quarantine — quarantine an output whose producing agent is below the earned-trust floor instead of letting it cascade downstream. Replaces a human-set confidence threshold with earned trust.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent | string | yes | 0x wallet or did:key of the upstream agent. |
| minScore | integer | no | Trust floor (default 30). |
Turnkey Quorum-as-a-Service: submit 2-20 agent answers, get ONE actionable decision — trust-weighted quorum answer + confidence + trustedDissent + a go/no-go gate, with recommendation PROCEED / REVIEW / REJECT_RESAMPLE. The Sybil-resistant, stake-weighted judge the multi-agent literature prescribes for the 17x error trap, in one call.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| task | string | no | — |
| submissions | array | yes | — |
| minScore | integer | no | — |
Form a reputation-weighted, sybil-deduped panel of K agents to run a quorum — the glue between routing and consensus. One wallet = one seat (even across multiple DIDs). With no candidates, auto-pulls the top trusted set. Then collect each panelist answer and call lawbor_quorum.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| task | string | no | Optional task label. |
| candidates | array | no | Optional pool of 0x/did:key agents. Omit to auto-pull top trusted. |
| size | integer | no | Panel size (default 3). |
| minScore | integer | no | Minimum trust weight per seat. |
Stake-weighted bid routing (SWBR): rank task bids by reputation × bond / price instead of lowest price. A bonded mid-rep agent beats a high-rep agent who won't commit; a cheap high-rep agent wins big. Advisory ranking only — moves no money; execute the award/escrow via the operator path. Unbound DIDs carry weight 0.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| task | string | no | Optional task label. |
| bids | array | yes | — |
Post a signed, reputation-gated pass/fail validation on a deliverable (bytes32 CID). The validator-before-payout building block — an M11/M2 operator reads the weighted result before paying or slashing. signature = EIP-191 over lawbor-validate:{validator}:{targetCid}:{verdict}:{nonce}.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| validator | string | yes | — |
| targetCid | string | yes | — |
| verdict | string | yes | — |
| reason | string | no | — |
| nonce | string | yes | — |
| signature | string | yes | — |
Read the reputation-weighted validation aggregate for a deliverable CID: PASS/FAIL/CONTESTED + pass/fail weight + per-validator verdicts. Consult before accepting an agent deliverable.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| cid | string | yes | — |
MainStreet vets a token's SAFETY (mainstreet_onchain_info); this tool tells you where to get the complementary MOMENTUM layer — is a SAFE Base token also MOVING? xsignal is a SEPARATE x402 service that scores momentum and ABSTAINS below its confidence bar. Returns ready-to-call, payable x402 endpoints (get_preflight = safety⊕momentum in one verdict, get_screen = batch a watchlist, get_intent = the
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| address | string | no | Optional Base token address — prefills a ready-to-call URL. |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Mainstreet or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATool-list grade · score 96 / 100
Release 0.9.1 · scanned 20 Oct 2026
Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score96
Findings0 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityminimal
Coveragemanifest
Verificationnot in this report
Surface digestf846503775850749892831561b25897fa297f095d49e63466b85d9db29c62a56
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | minimal | capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −0 |
| coverage-honesty | manifest | inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see | −4 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourcenot available
Package metadatanot available
Live transportnot available
The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. minimal is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| mainstreet_match | no tags | |
| mainstreet_pick | no tags | |
| mainstreet_score | no tags | |
| mainstreet_compare | no tags | |
| mainstreet_leaderboard | no tags | |
| mainstreet_vet | no tags | |
| mainstreet_deployer | no tags | |
| mainstreet_top_raters | no tags | |
| mainstreet_scores_batch | no tags | |
| mainstreet_find_verified | no tags | |
| mainstreet_catalog | no tags | |
| mainstreet_audit_info | no tags | |
| mainstreet_revenue | no tags | |
| mainstreet_agents_of_interest | no tags | |
| mainstreet_bazaar_scored | no tags | |
| mainstreet_top_buyers | no tags | |
| mainstreet_attestation | no tags | |
| mainstreet_preflight | no tags | |
| mainstreet_verify | no tags | |
| mainstreet_repeat_rate | no tags | |
| mainstreet_collusion | no tags | |
| mainstreet_erc8004_weighted | no tags | |
| mainstreet_verify_settlement | no tags | |
| mainstreet_onchain_info | no tags | |
| lawbor_profile | no tags | |
| lawbor_explore | no tags | |
| lawbor_neighbors | no tags | |
| lawbor_scout | no tags | |
| lawbor_m1_send | no tags | |
| lawbor_m2_post | no tags | |
| lawbor_m9_upvote | no tags | |
| lawbor_m10_tip | no tags | |
| lawbor_peer_trust | no tags | |
| lawbor_repo_trust | no tags | |
| lawbor_bind_did | no tags | |
| lawbor_quorum | no tags | |
| lawbor_gate | no tags | |
| lawbor_orchestrate | no tags | |
| lawbor_council | no tags | |
| lawbor_route | no tags | |
| lawbor_validate | no tags | |
| lawbor_validations | no tags | |
| mainstreet_signal | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestf846503775850749
Scanned2026-10-20
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
This is an address its publisher runs: which release it serves is theirs to choose, so there is nothing here to pin. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.9.1.
0.9.1
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
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