Name: Pretty QR
Author: pretty-qr

Pretty QR MCP

Create branded QR codes from AI assistants: templates, styled PNG/SVG, and editor links.

Tool-list grade A Remote · Streamable HTTP API key 4 tools v1.0.0

No reviews yet by pretty-qr The publisher’s own endpoint — this marketplace is not in the path

93/100

tool-list score

tools declared

remote

at its publisher

—

calls last 7d

What it does

Create branded QR codes from AI assistants: templates, styled PNG/SVG, and editor links.

Quickstart

# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http pretty-qr-mcp https://pretty-qr.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
#   list_templates, create_qr_code, create_file_upload and 1 more

It needs AUTHORIZATION (Bearer API key from https://pretty-qr.com (Authorization: Bearer pqr_…)): this sends it in the Authorization header from your environment, so export it first — its endpoint answers 401 without it.

Pretty QR costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.

Publishernot claimed

pretty-qr1 server

1 category

All 1 server

Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.

Installation

Where are you running it?

Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. Nothing here runs on your machine and nothing runs on ours: this server answers at its publisher’s own address, and what you install is the connection straight to it.

Claude Codedeclared by this listing

This is a public server: it answers at its publisher’s own address and this marketplace is not in the path. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The transport below is http, as the publisher's own manifest declares it. Claude Code reads AUTHORIZATION (Bearer API key from https://pretty-qr.com (Authorization: Bearer pqr_…)) from your environment each time it connects and sends it in the Authorization header — its endpoint answers 401 without it — so the key stays out of its config: export it in your shell profile (macOS, Linux), or run setx AUTHORIZATION … and open a new terminal (Windows).

claude mcp add --scope user --transport http pretty-qr-mcp https://pretty-qr.com/api/mcp --header 'Authorization: Bearer ${AUTHORIZATION}'

Reconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.

Free on mcprush, and it answers at its publisher’s own address: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add — but its publisher asks for a key of their own on every call.

What it asks of you

It reaches a system of yours, so it needs your own credential rather than the publisher’s: Authorization header — Bearer API key from https://pretty-qr.com (Authorization: Bearer pqr_…). You set it in your own client’s config, on your machine — this marketplace never holds it.

What it writes

One config entry pointing straight at the publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path, and nothing from this listing executes on your machine.

What you approve

4 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.

Tool surface

What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.

Only tools that write or reach the network

The Pretty QR templates: id, name, description and a preview image URL.

No parameter schema on file.

Make the QR code file Download makes in the Pretty QR editor: a 2048 px PNG or an SVG. Counts as one QR API request.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
content	string	yes	Text or URL to encode.
template	string	no	Template id from list_templates. Its design is the starting point.
design	object	no	Design fields as in POST /api/v1/qr. Each top-level field replaces the template's. Without template or design the code is black on white.
format	string	no	—

Start hosting a photo, video, audio file or PDF for a hosted file QR code (up to 10 files per account). Returns a one-time upload_url (valid 30 minutes) and the file_url the file will have. Upload the raw file with the returned curl command, then call create_qr_code with content set to file_url. Counts as one QR API request.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
file_name	string	no	Name of the file, e.g. menu.pdf. Shown when someone downloads it.

Save the design to the account of the API key and return a link that opens it in the Pretty QR editor. Counts as one QR API request.

Parameter	Type	Required	Notes
content	string	yes	Text or URL to encode.
template	string	no	Template id from list_templates. Its design is the starting point.
design	object	no	Design fields as in POST /api/v1/qr. Each top-level field replaces the template's. Without template or design the code is black on white.

Free

$0 forever

Every tool — any call limit is its publisher’s, not ours
No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
Runs at its publisher’s own address — this marketplace is not in the path
Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing

Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Pretty QR or to call it, at any volume.

ATool-list grade · score 93 / 100

Release 1.0.0 · scanned 7 Nov 2026

Graded from the tools this server lists, not from its source code.

Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.

Threat score100

Client score93

Findings0 threat · 4 capability

Capabilitymoderate

Coveragemanifest

Verificationnot in this report

Surface digestba2e5d9ef19ca580827be627aa65bace4154787d35cca45ab9360b4ebc591e11

Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93

Term	Level	What it prices	Points
capability-exposure	moderate	capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated	−3
coverage-honesty	manifest	inspection depth (manifest) — how much of the target the scan could see	−4

score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.

What the scan could actually read

A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.

The scan read each tool’s name, description, input schema and annotations exactly as the server listed them the last time it answered us; no code was reviewed. We ask the server again about once a month, and a list that changed is graded again.

Tool surfaceread

Implementation sourcenot available

Package metadatanot available

Live transportnot available

The implementation source was not read — this reflects the declared tool metadata only.

Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated

Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.

Tool	Capability tags	Why the tag was assigned
list_templates	no tags
create_qr_code	untrusted-input	untrusted-input: keyword "download"
create_file_upload	external-sinkfile-write	external-sink: keyword "curl"; file-write: keyword "create_file" in tool name
open_in_editor	no tags

Toxic-flow graph

The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.

flow-1

Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.

Supply chain and provenance

Integrityfirst-seen

Surface digestba2e5d9ef19ca580

Scanned2026-11-07

This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.

Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.