Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for freee API integration
Nothing to run from here
Quidli Connect is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
96/100
trust score
638
downloads a day
local
or remote
1k
downloads in 30d
What it does
Resolve social handles to wallets, score onchain reputation, and make agent payments in USDC.
Quickstart
# 1 — add it to Claude Code
claude mcp add --scope user quidli-connect-mcp '--' npx -y @quidli/connect-mcp
# 2 — ask your agent for something these tools do
# connect_get_price, connect_get_chains, connect_lookup and 11 more
Quidli Connect costs nothing on mcprush: there is no plan to choose here, no cap to set and nothing mcprush can bill you for.
Publishernot claimed
QUAll 1 server
Quidli1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one can run either way — at an address its publisher runs, or as a process under your own user, with your files and your network — and this marketplace is in the path of neither.
Claude Codedeclared by this listing
This is a public server: you run it yourself and this marketplace is not in the path. You need Node.js — the current LTS (24) is the safe choice; npx comes with it. Claude Code registers it in one command; --scope user makes it available in every project. The '--' is in quotes so that PowerShell passes it on.
claude mcp add --scope user quidli-connect-mcp '--' npx -y @quidli/connect-mcpReconnect, or start a new session, and the tools appear in the model’s tool list.
Or connect to its publisher’s address
Its publisher also runs it at https://mcp.connect.quid.li: nothing to start on your machine, and this marketplace is not in the path.
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http quidli-connect-mcp https://mcp.connect.quid.liFree on mcprush, and it runs from its publisher’s own package: this marketplace is not in the path, so there is no key of ours to hold and no card to add.
What it writes
One config entry your client uses to start the process locally. A local server runs with your file system and your network, which is why it is priced without metering.
What you approve
14 tools, with what each one reads, writes and reaches shown before you agree — the same list on every route above. Read the tool surface.
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Get public x402 list prices for lookup and scores (reference only; live paywall amounts are in 402 responses).
No parameter schema on file.
List product chains with per-feature compatibility. lookup is true for EVM catalog chains and Solana; drop is true for Smart Send chains, enabled delegation chains, and Solana (chainId 1399811149 for connect_drop / connect_drop_balance).
No parameter schema on file.
Resolve social identities to EVM and Solana wallet addresses. Resolving a recipient who has no wallet provisions one for them, so this is read-only for the caller but not for the recipient. If status is processing, retry the same payload.
No parameter schema on file.
List platforms a recipient has exposed on Connect, with enriched profile, scores, and wallet addresses. Recipient may be a social account, an exposed wallet (EVM/Solana/smart wallet), or a Connect username. May require x402 payment when the profile owner charges for lookups.
No parameter schema on file.
Batch scores for linked accounts or Connect usernames. One result per request user. Optional filter sets passedFilter (quidli 0–100, neynar/lens 0–1, ethos 0–2800).
No parameter schema on file.
Scores for a linked social account or wallet.
No parameter schema on file.
Scores by Connect public username.
No parameter schema on file.
Get the Connect profile, scores, and all linked accounts for the API key owner. Use to identify which user the key belongs to.
No parameter schema on file.
Execute a Smart Send from the API key owner Connect embedded wallet. EVM: batch native or ERC-20 (need native gas plus the token). Solana (chainId 1399811149): SOL or SPL from the Solana embedded wallet; packs up to 20 native or 10 SPL recipients per transaction. Social recipient types: email,…
No parameter schema on file.
Get native and token balances for the API key owner embedded wallet. Accepts Smart Send chains and enabled delegation chains. Robinhood Chain (4663) returns ERC-20 balances from Blockscout. Monad (143) returns ERC-20 balances from Moralis; other delegation chains return native plus featured…
No parameter schema on file.
Create a unidirectional trust attestation on Base (EAS) from the API key owner embedded wallet to a wallet or social identity. Identical active attestations are returned without a new transaction. Requires CONNECT_API_KEY, Smart Send attestation signer enrolled, and ETH on Base for gas.
No parameter schema on file.
Revoke active trust attestations from the API key owner to a target. Optional context limits which attestations are revoked. Requires CONNECT_API_KEY and ETH on Base.
No parameter schema on file.
Check whether identities sit in a trust graph at depth 1. Omit context to match any context.
No parameter schema on file.
List outgoing or incoming trust edges for an identity at depth 1.
No parameter schema on file.
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under MIT
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install Quidli Connect or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
—
—
Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 96 / 100
Release 0.6.12 · scanned 18 Oct 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score96
Findings0 threat · 1 capability
Capabilitymoderate
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digest1cfae97a1ecb43c9db02f11f4eca6de87c8c9890ef87a158115b58c1a32b0380
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 96
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | moderate | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −3 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. moderate is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| connect_get_price | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| connect_get_chains | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| connect_lookup | untrusted-inputexternal-sink | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server); external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST (client.request({ method: 'POST', path: '/lookup', body: { recipients }, }) at dist/tools/register.js:55 |
| connect_lookup_exposed | untrusted-inputexternal-sink | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server); external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST (client.request({ method: 'POST', path: '/lookup/exposed', body: { recipient }, }) at dist/tools/register.js:65 |
| connect_scores_batch | untrusted-inputexternal-sink | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server); external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST (client.request({ method: 'POST', path: '/scores', body: { users, ...(filter ? { filter } :…) at dist/tools/register.js:75 |
| connect_scores_by_account | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| connect_scores_by_username | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| connect_me | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| connect_drop | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true, handler sends an HTTP POST (client.request({ method: 'POST', path: '/drop', body, requireApiKey: true, query: ignoreFa…) at dist/tools/register.js:115 |
| connect_drop_balance | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
| connect_trust_create | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true, handler sends an HTTP POST (client.request({ method: 'POST', path: '/trust', body, requireApiKey: true, }) at dist/tools/register.js:142 |
| connect_trust_revoke | external-sink | external-sink: declares readOnlyHint: false, destructiveHint: true, openWorldHint: true, handler sends an HTTP POST (client.request({ method: 'POST', path: '/trust/revoke', body, requireApiKey: true, }) at dist/tools/register.js:153 |
| connect_trust_check | untrusted-inputexternal-sink | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server); external-sink: handler sends an HTTP POST (client.request({ method: 'POST', path: '/trust/check', body, }) at dist/tools/register.js:164 |
| connect_trust_graph | untrusted-input | untrusted-input: declares openWorldHint: true (interacts with entities outside the server) |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
flow-1
Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digest1cfae97a1ecb43c9
Scanned2026-10-18
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
Always latest — the install command names no version, so it installs the newest release when it runs; the current release on file is 0.6.12. Pin a release below and the command asks for exactly that one.
0.6.12
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
no reviews yet
Who can review
One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
Sign in to write one
Any signed-in account that does not publish Quidli Connect can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
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Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.