MCP Server for Z.AI - A Model Context Protocol server that provides AI capabilities
Nothing to run from here
A2A Mailbox is installed from its publisher's own source and answers where it runs, so this marketplace is not in the path of a single call. There is no address here to send one to, and a panel that pretended otherwise would be showing you an answer we made up. Install it and call it from your own client — the Installation tab has the entry for each one.
93/100
trust score
6
tools declared
local
runs on your machine
17
downloads
What it does
Cross-CLI agent mailbox: tmux-injected messaging for Claude Code, Codex, Pi and ZCode
Quickstart
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download a2a-mailbox.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is 3635d09a48c2669f1af8c0d0e32a48b5414099ed162997b6ab35fc956c3f8d5a
The full guide: https://github.com/RegretSSS/a2a-mailbox/releases/download/v0.1.0/a2a-mailbox.mcpb
Publishernot claimed
REAll 1 server
regretsss1 server
1 category
Collected from a public index. Nobody has claimed this account, so nothing here was written by its author — claim it if it is yours.
Installation
Where are you running it?
Every route below installs the same thing and ends at the same approval screen. This one runs on your machine: your client starts A2A Mailbox as a process under your own user, with your files and your network, so the tool surface below is what it can do to your computer rather than to a server somewhere else. Its scan result is on the Security tab — read the surface before you approve it.
Install it the way its author documents:
1. Download a2a-mailbox.mcpb and open it in Claude Desktop or another client that installs MCP bundles (.mcpb)
2. Its sha256 is 3635d09a48c2669f1af8c0d0e32a48b5414099ed162997b6ab35fc956c3f8d5a
The full guide: https://github.com/RegretSSS/a2a-mailbox/releases/download/v0.1.0/a2a-mailbox.mcpb
Tool surface
What the model actually sees. Descriptions are diffed on every release — see version history.
Read from its source code. A server that builds its tool list when it starts can list more tools than this.
发消息给另一 agent。in_reply_to 用 mail_read 返回的 msg_id（可自动确认原消息）；expect_reply=True 唤醒词尾加『[需回函]』。
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| to | string | yes | — |
| body | string | yes | — |
| in_reply_to | string | no | — |
| context | string | no | — |
| expect_reply | boolean | no | — |
列出自己邮箱待处理消息的摘要（不消费，可反复查）。
Takes no parameters.
读自己邮箱一条消息全文（含 ack_id——业务确认用）。
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| msg_id | string | yes | — |
确认一条消息（幂等）。ack_id 用 mail_read 返回的；跨主机传输不可见时自证落盘 self_attested。
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ack_id | string | yes | — |
列出在册 agent（默认只列在线 active，含同目录分身行 agent_id@session短码 可定向发信；all=true 附已下线 stale）。group-only 标记与成员计数，附联邦 peers 状态。
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| all | boolean | no | — |
群组权限五合一。action=join 申请加入对方 group(agent_id=门主,note=来意)；action=pending 列自己的待审申请；action=admit 批准 agent_id 可发给自己；action=revoke 移出 agent_id；action=gate 开关仅准入名单收件闸(group_only=true 开,group 为展示名)。错误返回含完整用法。
| Parameter | Type | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| action | string | yes | — |
| agent_id | string | no | — |
| note | string | no | — |
| group | string | no | — |
| group_only | boolean | no | — |
Free
$0 forever
- Every tool, no call limit
- No card, and mcprush charges nothing for it
- Source published under Apache-2.0
- Runs on your machine — nothing of it reaches our gateway
- Nothing to cap, because mcprush bills nothing
What counts against your monthly calls
| Tool | Unit | Calls used | Out of the allowance |
|---|
Nothing here is billable: mcprush charges nothing to install A2A Mailbox or to call it, at any volume.
Call allowance · this installenforced at the gateway
Monthly allowance, in calls
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Alert at 80% · then the tool returns a normal MCP error
Used this month: —
ATrust score 93 / 100
Release 0.1.0 · scanned 6 Nov 2026
Two independent axes, because powerful and malicious are different questions. The grade is threat only. The capability level is blast radius, and it is never a penalty on the grade — it is priced as one subtract-only term in the score, where you can see it.
Threat score100
Client score93
Findings8 threat · 0 capability
Capabilityhigh
Coveragesource
Verificationrepo
Surface digestd4ed11ea0323850e7af3c599f3267591272f21cec72c1f59498844e8b5992d87
Score vectorthreat 100 → client 93
| Term | Level | What it prices | Points |
|---|---|---|---|
| capability-exposure | high | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated | −6 |
| verification-discount | repo | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable | −1 |
| coverage-honesty | source | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see | −0 |
score = clamp(round(threatScore − E_cap − E_ver − E_cov), 0, 100). No model, no opinion, no network call at scoring time: the same methodology version against the same bytes always produces this number, and every line above is a field of the report rather than a summary of it.
What the scan could actually read
A grade is only as meaningful as its coverage, so the scanner publishes its own depth before it publishes its result.
Tool surfaceread
Implementation sourceread
Package metadataread
Live transportnot available
Tools were statically extracted from the published source (6 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Capability — what it could do if the model were manipulated
Tags derived from each tool’s schema and the implementation, not from what the tool calls itself. high is the level these add up to.
| Tool | Capability tags | Why the tag was assigned |
|---|---|---|
| mail_send | no tags | |
| mail_poll | no tags | |
| mail_read | no tags | |
| mail_ack | no tags | |
| mail_who | no tags | |
| mail_group | no tags |
Toxic-flow graph
The lethal trifecta, checked as a graph rather than as a checklist: untrusted input, a sensitive source and an external sink have to meet before there is a path worth worrying about.
The public result for this release does not print the flow graph, so there is nothing to show here. That is not the same as "no paths were found": what the scan did read is above, under coverage.
Supply chain and provenance
Integrityfirst-seen
Surface digestd4ed11ea0323850e
Scanned2026-11-06
This is the first scan of this surface here, so there is nothing yet to compare it against.
Every result on this tab comes from one deterministic pass over the published package — offline, rule by rule, and auditable line by line above. Same methodology version, same bytes, same score.
Release history
It installs from its repository rather than from a versioned package, so the command cannot be pinned to a release. The history below is for reading; the current release on file is 0.1.0.
0.1.0
undated
latestNo release note was published with this version.
—
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One review per account, from a signed-in account that does not publish this listing. Nothing else is asked — you can say what you think before you install it. Publishers can reply once per review, and a review can be edited or deleted by whoever wrote it.
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Any signed-in account that does not publish A2A Mailbox can review it, once — before installing it or after. A review from an account that has installed it is marked as one.
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Nobody has reviewed this listing. The rating on the card is the mean of the reviews written here and nothing else, so there is no rating until somebody writes the first — which takes a signed-in account that does not publish it, and nothing else.